893.00/3–3148
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 15.]
Sir: As of possible interest in the Department, I have the honor to quote below the text of a memorandum of conversation between me and Marshal Li Tsung-jen65 on the present political situation:66
“On the evening of March 27 Marshal Li had dinner with me and discussed at length his candidacy for Vice President and related matters. He had hoped to have an intimate conversation with Chiang Kai-shek, but since arriving here several days ago he had only seen him once when invited to a meal with two other aspirants, Sun Fo67 and Cheng Chien.68 The only reference to the elections was the statement by Chiang Kai-shek that there would be no further nomination by the Party, but that the elections would be by open voting. He thought this would give him a better chance. He described his own purpose in running as realizing that Chiang Kai-shek needed some influence that would neutralize his high-handed, self-willed and in general undemocratic methods. He believed that he could accomplish this better than any of the other candidates; that this would be the most effective way in which he could render this service, and that it must somehow be done or the present political structure would collapse. He discussed his long association with Chiang Kai-shek and his more unfortunate shortcomings. He was very stubborn and uncompromising, this latter being at once his strength and weakness. Almost more serious a defect was his refusal to discuss problems with others, keeping his own counsel, issuing orders arbitrarily. He was very willing to carry responsibility, but tended to overdo this both as regards his own physical strength and the national welfare. He ought to get away from the small group around him whom he shuffled back and forth without bringing in younger or more progressive men. But he agreed with me that under proper conditions Chiang Kai-shek could be persuaded to modify his methods.
“As to the situation in general, he thought that suppression of the Communists would be a slow process. He cited the Taiping Rebellion which required 18 years to suppress and the more recent one of the bandit chief, White Wolf (Pai Lang), requiring 8 years. It could not be achieved merely by military means, but called for political reforms. If there were war between U. S. and U. S. S. R. this would of course affect the issue in China. He asked in this event whether or not China ought to remain neutral. I replied that while my Government [Page 178] felt that every preparation should be made for eventualities, yet it seemed to me improbable that such a war would break out for several years and that the stronger China could become internally in that period, the more would she contribute toward the unlikelihood of such a war.”
Respectfully yours,
Minister-Counselor of Embassy
- Candidate for Vice President and Director of President Chiang Kai-shek’s Headquarters at Peiping.↩
- For additional reports on the meeting of the National Assembly and the election of President and Vice President, see Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 846–855.↩
- President of the Chinese Legislative Yuan.↩
- Director of President Chiang Kai-shek’s Headquarters at Hankow.↩