Office of the Historian

893.00/3–3148: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

Nanking, March 31, 1948—4 p. m.
[Received April 1—5:17 a. m.]

575. On March 29 I wrote by hand in English to the Generalissimo congratulating him on the significance of the National Assembly in [Page 175] his career, and telling him that, since it now seemed fairly probable that there would be American aid for China in some form, I hoped that this would be so utilized as to accomplish all that was intended and that I stood ready to help in this in every possible way. I expressed again my desire to see him end his career as the one who had established real democracy in China and my belief that the time had come to put this into effect. This was partly in response to a message he had sent asking me not to hesitate to advise him on anything I had in mind. The letter was delivered on the following day by Philip Fugh54 to Madame Chiang who seemed to welcome the chance to talk freely.

The following is a summary of the major features: The essential point seems to be that in trying to influence the Generalissimo toward a more democratic procedure we must be aware of the obstructive forces around him.

Madame Chiang described her recent experience in American relationships in three stages.

(1)
During the period of General Marshall’s55 stay: She tried to avoid all participation in political activity apart from acting as interpreter. This was because she understood American psychology well enough to know that she would otherwise be suspected of attempting to serve the interests of the Generalissimo by feminine wiles or social pressure on the Marshalls. But she realized also that the Generalissimo himself did not want her to meddle in American issues, although it was apparent to her that he did not comprehend the American point of view. Toward the end of this period she worried over the unsatisfactory course of events and the consequences to China if the Marshall mission failed. She tried therefore to help the Generalissimo to appreciate the gravity of the issue, but all her efforts proved abortive chiefly because of the group around him, especially Chen Cheng56 and Hu Tsung-nan.57 She added that his military associates are much more influential than the civilians.
(2)
From General Marshall’s departure until the Wedemeyer mission:58 The military comrades felt quite elated in that not only was American influence waning, but that the same was true of the Soong family who were regarded as strongly pro-American. These included, in addition to the two mentioned above, Yu Chi-shih,59 Ku Chu-tung60 [Page 176] and several others educated in Germany. T. V. Soong61 was promptly driven out by their efforts. They, with the help of the CC62 and Political Science cliques, secured the premiership for Chang Chun as one who would be easily influenced. They announced that the Communists would soon be defeated, but when matters went the other way they blamed one another. Chen Cheng had boasted that the war within the Great Wall would be finished within 3 months, but when this failed the Generalissimo sent him to the northeast to prove what he could do in a new theatre. However, the situation there became still worse and the Government suffered terrific loss, including 16 divisions mostly American equipped. General Wedemeyer’s critical attitude played into the hands of this group. She debated with herself several times as to asking me to come and talk over the problem, but decided not to for fear of criticism or of being suspected of trying to influence American policy which continued indecisive. She had made up her mind to accept Mrs. Marshall’s invitation last summer, but was prevented from doing so by the Generalissimo.
(3)
After the Wedemeyer mission: The military situation continued to worsen. The people around the Generalissimo went on blaming one another and he himself was depressed by Wedemeyer’s criticisms. She advised T. V. Soong to go to Canton and do what he could there. The smuggling was rampant under Chang Fa-kuei63 and Lo Cho-ying.64 This was his chance to help the country. Let her stay on here and fight the reactionaries. She felt in her heart that sooner or later American aid would come and she wanted China to be influenced by American political ideals. Now that the reactionaries are losing ground and American influence is increasing, she ought to stay here and help as she can, which led her again to decline Mrs. Marshall’s invitation. They had been using the slogan “self-reform” as really meaning independence of America, this feeling having been accentuated by the unfavorable effect of Wedemeyer’s parting statements. She believes that now we can all work together to alter the mental outlook of the Generalissimo.
Stuart
  1. Secretary to the Ambassador in China.↩
  2. General of the Army George C. Marshall, Special Representative of President Truman in China, December 1945–January 1947.↩
  3. Chief of the Chinese General Staff.↩
  4. Pacification Commissioner for Shensi.↩
  5. Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, President Truman’s Special Representative on mission to China and Korea, July–September 1947; for correspondence on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. vii, pp. 685 ff.↩
  6. Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Chinese National Government.↩
  7. Commander in Chief of the Chinese Ground Forces.↩
  8. Then President of the Chinese Executive Yuan; subsequently Governor of Kwangtung.↩
  9. Faction of the Kuomintang led by the brothers Chen Li-fu and Chen Kuo-fu.↩
  10. Director of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s Headquarters in Canton, 1946–47.↩
  11. Governor of Kwangtung, 1945–47↩