IO Files
Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting of the Committee of the Security Council on the Palestinian Question Held at Paris on December 8, 1948
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Mr. Ross (United States) stated that he found more encouragement than discouragement in the statements of the Acting Mediator.1 He called attention to the cease-fire which had been obtained in Jerusalem in the past few days, and mentioned the indications of a favourable attitude on the part of Egypt and Transjordan towards the 16 November resolution.
He did not wish, however, to overlook Dr. Bundle’s report concerning the difficulties of compliance with the 13 November plan.2 The Committee was well aware of the importance attached by Egypt to the release of its forces from Al Faluja, It seemed feasible that a practicable solution could be worked out by the same methods which had been employed in the Jerusalem area, i.e., discussions among the military commanders of ‘both sides and Dr. Bunche’s staff. There was no reason to believe that such an approach would not have similar good results in the case of Faluja.
In the opinion of Mr. Ross, it was possible to proceed simultaneously to implement both resolutions and to take steps leading to a prompt conclusion of the armistice called for in the 16 November resolution. Apparently both the Arab and Jewish Governments were prepared to accede and negotiate on the 16 November resolution.
Moreover, Mr. Eytan’s letter3 could not be interpreted as a categorical refusal to release Egyptian forces.
Mr. Ross believed that the opposing views, one based on the 4 November resolution, and the other on the 16 November resolution, had been drawing closer together, though the process had been slow and [Page 1655] painful. It ought to be possible with Dr. Bunche’s assistance to bridge the remaining gap, and thus advance the problem towards an armistice and a peaceful settlement.
A certain amount of time, perhaps only a few days, might be necessary to enable the Acting Mediator to bring about the implementation of the 4 November resolution. If this were succcesful, there would be no need for this Committee or the Security Council to consider the matter further. If this proved to be too optimistic a view, Mr. Ross said, he would support the United Kingdom representative with regard to referring the situation back to the Security Council to deal with the request contained in the Egyptian letter.4
The Acting Mediator had made a specific suggestion as to the manner in which the impasse might be broken. The representative of Israel had taken note of that suggestion and also of the information in the Egyptian reply concerning the 16 November resolution. Mr. Eban had promised to communicate with this Government and with the Acting Mediator in regard to the matter. The Committe might therefore let the matter rest and leave the next meeting to the call of the Chair in consultation with the Acting Mediator.
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- Mr. Bunche addressed the Committee earlier the same day, advising of his consultations at Cairo, Amman, Tel Aviv, and Haifa and giving his “definite impression that there is a marked change in the attitude of the parties, and that there is a moderate, but nevertheless definite, readiness to take constructive steps toward a solution of the problem.”↩
- See editorial note, p. 1580.↩
- See Delga 1113, supra.↩
- Presumably the letter dated December 1, sent to the President of the Security Council by the Egyptian Representative at the United Nations. The letter requested that the Council include on its agenda for the following day the question of the implementation of its resolution of November 4; it concluded as follows: “The continued Zionist refusal to abide by this decision seriously affects the situation in Palestine as envisaged by the Security Council’s decisions in relation to the truce which has been repeatedly violated by the Zionists, and gravely hampers the possibilities of any progress towards a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.” (SC, 3rd yr., No. 128, p. 1)↩