501.BB Palestine/12–848: Telegram
The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris (Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State
restricted
Paris,
December 8, 1948—7 p. m.
Delga 1113. Following is memorandum elated December 7 from Acting Mediator concerning the position of Ben-Gurion on the Egyptian force encircled at Al Faluja and Israeli occupation of Beersheba:
- 1.
- In the course of my extended conversations with Mr. Ben-Gurion at Hakirya, Israel on 6 December, I took up the position of the Egyptian force encircled at Al Faluja and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the town of Beersheba, under the plan of 13 [Page 1653] November for the implementation of the SC resolution of 4 November (Doc. [S/] 1070).1
- 2.
- As regards Al Faluja, I pointed out that the plan of 13 November, which had been accepted by the PGI in its letter of 18 November, required the withdrawal of this Egyptian force and that the Jewish forces encircling it were preventing Egyptian compliance with the 4 November resolution. Moreover, I urged that the refusal to accept the principle that food and medical convoys under UN escort were entitled, under the truce, to go through to this beleaguered force was contrary to both the letter and spirit of the truce, since the truce could not be exploited by either side as a means of laying siege. I also expressed the view that Israeli intransigence on this issue was not only preventing the implementation of the 4 November resolution but constituted a severe obstruction to the fulfillment of the 16 November resolution on the armistice.
- 3.
- Concerning Beersheba, I explained fully that no question had been raised as to the right of Israeli forces to be in the area, since there are two Jewish settlements in the vicinity of Beersheba which were garrisoned by Israeli forces prior to 14 October. The point at issue, I emphasized, is Israeli insistence on maintaining military occupation of the town of Beersheba, from which Israeli forces were required to withdraw by the resolution of 4 November and the plan of 13 November.
- 4.
- Mr. Ben-Gurion stated that the encircled Egyptian force at Al Faluja would not be released and that his government would make no commitment to permit convoys to go through to them regularly, unless and until the Egyptian Government was prepared to undertake armistice or peace negotiations. He added that the release of the Egyptian forces could be given a high priority on the list of subjects to be discussed once such negotiations would be undertaken. A similar position was taken as regards the Israeli military occupation of Beersheba. Mr. Ben-Gurion explained that the basis for the Israeli policy in this regard was the security of his country, since a state of war still existed.
- 5.
- At the conclusion of the conference with Mr. Ben-Gurion, which
was satisfactory on all other matters, I requested that his
position on Al Faluja be summarized in writing. This was done in
the following communication addressed to me by Mr. Eytan:
[Here follows the text of Mr. Eytan’s communication of December 6 to Dr. Bunche which served to confirm in writing Mr. Ben Gurion’s position on al-Faluja, as set forth in paragraph numbered 4.]
- 6.
- In my two long conferences with Nokrashy Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt at Cairo on 4 December, I was informed that no Egyptian reply had been made to my letter on the 16 November resolution since to date neither I nor the SO had been able to obtain Israeli compliance with the 4 November resolution. The Prime Minister emphasized particularly the situation at Al Faluja which he regarded with utmost seriousness. He assured me of Egyptian willingness to comply fully with the 4 November resolution and stated that he would authorize the Egyptian commander-in-chief to enter into negotiations through the UN, envisaged in paragraph 5 (2) of the resolution of 4 November. [Page 1654] As regards the 16 November resolution, the Prime Minister stated that his government could regard it favorably providing the 4 November resolution were first carried out.
- 7.
- In the circumstances, I must report that I have been unable to achieve full implementation of the 4 November resolution, and that this has obstructed progress toward implementing the 16 November resolution.
Dulles