Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/11–1748: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

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Paris, November 17, 1948—midnight.

Delga 797. Next preceding telegram¹ gives text resolution which UK, with possibly China and other delegations but not US as co-sponsors, may introduce Committee One tomorrow² in event parliamentary situation in view UK requires action to prevent situation in committee getting out of hand and in event it is not possible reconcile divergent US–UK views as indicated below. UK representatives telegraphing text London for final clearance. This text results from series intensive consultations UK representatives in which they have accepted our views substantially all parts draft with exception numbered paragraphs 2, 3 and 5. We strongly urged acceptance following alternative drafts for these particular paragraphs:

Substitute for paragraph 2:³

“Calls upon the governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the SC’s resolution of 16 November, 1948, to bring about a final settlement of all other questions outstanding between them.”

Substitute for paragraph 3:⁴

“Establishes a conciliation commission consisting of (three states members of the UN) which shall have the following functions:

• “(a) To assume the functions given to the UN Mediator in Palestine by the resolution of the GA of 16[14] May, 1948;
• “(b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by this resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the GA or by the SC;
• “(c) To assist the governments and authorities concerned in reaching a final settlement of all questions outstanding between the parties, including any questions which may be raised by the parties concerning matters dealt with in the GA resolution of November 29, 1947 and in Part One, Section VIII, paragraph 4 of the progress report of the UN mediator in Palestine;
• “(d) To undertake, upon the request of the SC, any of the functions now assigned to the UN Mediator in Palestine or to the UN Truce Commission by resolutions of the SC; upon such request by the SC with respect to all the functions of the UN Mediator in Palestine under SC resolutions, that office shall be terminated.”

Substitute for paragraph 5:⁵

“Instructs the Conciliation Commission to assist the governments and authorities concerned to delimit frontiers in Palestine, taking into account the following general considerations, without excluding any territorial settlement mutually acceptable to the parties:

• “(a) That there are important elements common to both the resolution of the GA of 29 November, 1947, and the progress report of the UN Mediator in Palestine;
• “(b) That certain adjustments in the territorial arrangements of the GA resolution of 29 November 1947, should be considered through negotiations directly or through the UN Conciliation Commission; an adjustment of the disposition of Jaffa, all or part of western Galilee and all or part of the Negev.”

Department should compare above substitute paragraph with paragraph 3 delegation position paper contained Delga 762, November 16. Difference represents effort to simplify position paper for purposes of resolution since position paper is somewhat complicated and would be difficult to explain clearly to other delegations.

In explaining their objection to our suggested language, UK representatives on advice Foreign Office made following points:

1. UK is deeply and irrevocably committed to support Bernadotte Plan.

2. They undertook commitment to this effect to Bernadotte before his death.

3. Full British Cabinet approved Bevin’s statement in Commons in support of Bernadotte Plan, in other words, they have supported this plan with “greatest formality”.

4. They have carried on very intensive campaign with Arab leaders as result of which those leaders have agreed that if Bernadotte Plan is accepted by Assembly those leaders will do their utmost to secure acquiescence Arab governments and peoples.

5. UK is therefore not able to accept any resolution which omits a specific endorsement of Bernadotte Plan or which does not aim at carrying out this plan integrally.

In response to requests for clarification our policy we read to UK representatives appropriate portions Telmar 148 indicating in response their inquiry that this must be taken as policy US Government. British reaction was this means practically (a) that Israel gets all of Negev because Negev is given to them by November 29 resolution, and (b) that Israel gets all of western Galilee because it is in their possession and no one will force them out. We indicated our interpretation US policy as meaning Israel should not have both Negev under November 29 plus Galilee under Bernadotte Plan. We feel there is no misunderstanding between us on this point.

British indicated view that November 29 plan as stated by Bernadotte, is wholly impractical and that Bernadotte Plan is practical. They indicated further that they have no particular UK interest in Negev. Their primary interest is in stability in Palestine and they feel most strongly that November 29 resolution does not provide such stability.

Moreover, British object strongly to leaving settlement of Palestine question to negotiation between parties. Their view is that Arabs cannot negotiate because negotiation involves recognition of partition (and existence of Jewish State) which they cannot do. Arabs, according to British, will never agree directly or indirectly as result of negotiations to partition. They could, however, acquiesce in a decision of GA because they could say such decision was forced on them. Endorsement by GA of Bernadotte conclusions would be taken by them as such a decision.

British also feel failure to endorse Bernadotte Plan would be widely interpreted by public opinion as a retreat by both British and American Governments from statements already made by President, Secretary of State, and British Foreign Secretary.

Following concerns tactics in current situation in Committee One. If British find necessary to put in draft along lines text sent Department preceding telegram they would expect US to speak to this draft reasonably early (within 24 hours), expressing general sympathy but reserving right to move amendments to specific paragraphs. This would give us time to get as close as possible together on amendments in hope that any amendments we might propose UK representative would be able to accept.

Without undertaking any commitments British feel our aim should be that both our governments could accept will of majority and vote for resolution as a whole, although specific paragraphs or amendments we were supporting individually might not pass. We agreed with foregoing, making clear, however, that we could not agree to any resolution which permitted any alteration in November 29 frontiers of Israel without consent of Israel.

Sent Department Delga 797; repeated London 1282.

Marshall

1. Delga 796, November 17, not printed.
2. The United Kingdom introduced its draft resolution in Committee 1 on November 18; for text, see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Annexes, 1948, p. 55.
3. British paragraph 2 read: “Notes with satisfaction part one of the progress report of the United Nations Mediator and endorses the specific conclusions contained in part one of that report as a basis for a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question;”
4. British paragraph 3 read: “Establishes a Conciliation Commission … to carry out the functions assigned to it by this resolution in accordance with the specific conclusions of part one of the progress report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine and by such instructions as the General Assembly or the Security Council may issue;”
5. British paragraph 5 read: “Instructs the Conciliation Commission in pursuance of paragraph 3 above to appoint a technical boundaries commission to assist the Governments and authorities concerned in delimiting the frontiers in Palestine based on the specific conclusions of the United Nations Mediator (paragraph 4 (b) of the conclusions to part one of the Mediator’s report), subject to such adjustments as may promote agreement between the Governments and authorities concerned without altering the general equilibrium of the Mediator’s conclusions, and taking into account the nature of the terrain and the unity of village areas;”