501.BB Palestine/11–1748: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, at Paris
887. I have had lengthy conversations since returning from Paris with Sir Orme Sargent, Christopher Mayhew (Foreign Office Parliamentary Secretary), Michael Wright and Bernard Burrows. Lewis Jones has also had extensive talks and I feel we are now in a position to give fairly clear picture of reaction of Foreign Office officials to “principles applicable to US position on Palestine question before UNGA” set forth in Paris telegram 1269, November 15 to London.1 Please note that views reported below without my comments are those held personally by Foreign Office experts named: They do not constitute official UK policy although latter will obviously be influenced by expert thinking.
2. Consensus opinion among officials is that Arabs would acquiesce to UN decision along lines Bernadotte plan provided UN would assume responsibility for drawing up a definite settlement including fairly definite indication regarding frontiers. This, officials feel, would give Arab leaders some reasonable explanation vis-à-vis their own people and, according British information on such a basis (i.e. original Bernadotte plan acquiescence principle) Arab acquiescence is just around the corner. British believe their efforts to persuade Arabs regarding merits Bernadotte plan are beginning to bear fruit.
3. British officials whom I have seen believe that prospects for Israeli-Arab negotiations have grown much worse following recent Israeli military successes because at outset such negotiations (either directly or under aegis conciliation commission) Jews will have behind them such military capability that it will amount to Arabs being called upon by UNGA to negotiate under duress. Expressing his personal view, Sir Orme Sargent said that in present circumstances to enjoin negotiations, however convenient this might be, would be tantamount to piously holding the ring and telling two contestants, between whom military equilibrium has been destroyed by preponderance Israeli arms, to thrash out their problems in their own way. He expressed belief that such an action would amount to cowardly avoidance of responsibility. Sir Orme fears that on the horizon lies another Munich which would be repeated if, after Arabs and Jews fail to negotiate an agreement, the powers were to come to the UK and ask UK to tell Abdullah that if he should refuse to settle with Israel, the UK–Transjordan treaty would no longer be operative. To sell Abdullah down the river for the sake of spurious peace, easy consciences, and [Page 1603] “the greater good” would, in Sir Orme’s view, be a reenaetion of the Czech tragedy.
4. Sir Orme and other officials concede that once the broad lines of settlement are established by UNGA (preferably having been marked out in advance by US and UK) and after these lines have been acquiesced in by both sides it would be possible for details to be negotiated between parties.
5. Other thoughts Foreign Office officials are dwarfed by those in preceding paragraphs. However, Foreign Office officials believe, as do I, that a factor which deserves an important place in Paragraph One, Paris reference telegram, is mutual importance, not only regarding Palestine settlement but also regarding future of UN, of US–UK policy working in concert on this problem particularly since without such cooperation no settlement seems likely.
6. The internationalization of Jerusalem (Paragraph Five Paris reference telegram) continues to be matter of greatest concern to Foreign Office officials who have been perturbed by Shertok’s statement that PGI, which no longer feels bound by November 29, will now accept only internationalization old city.
7. When US views regarding settlement by peaceful means (Paris reference telegram) were outlined to Foreign Office officials they found entire substance this paragraph admirable not only regarding UNGA settlement but also in connection with armistice. They noted, however, with great interest that implied in this paragraph is a willingness to take steps to stop recalcitrant party, i.e. sanctions.
Sent Paris for Gadel 887, repeated Department.2