501.BB Palestine/11–1248: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State
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4849. Personal for Lovett (eyes only) from Douglas (no distribution). Be Telmar 148,1 repeated to me as Paris 1239.
1. Solely for the purpose of elaborating Paragraph One of Telmar 148: At meeting with President Saturday afternoon, November 6, with Lovett and Douglas, after comments on the election, Palestine was discussed.
President referred to the phrase “in its entirety” which appeared in the statement of September 21 in regard to the Bernadotte plan. Douglas took the responsibility for this language which the President said had caused him a great deal of trouble in the campaign. Douglas then recited the reasons why it was his considered opinion that unless US–UK stood together, it would be almost impossible, if not in fact impossible, to obtain a ⅔ vote in the GA for any settlement of the Palestinian question, and why, therefore, although the US wanted certain modifications of the Bernadotte proposals on the one hand, and the UK sought modifications on the other hand, it was important that neither the US nor the UK give any public indication of offering amendments to the Bernadotte plan. Briefly, the reason for the latter was that if either US or UK gave any public indication of: (a) Either a difference between themselves; or (b) an intention to offer amendments “the flood gates would be open to amendments from all sources, and there would be little if anything left of the cheese when the rats got through.” (This is a mixed metaphor.) Accordingly, the US–UK resolution, although it endorsed the Bernadotte proposal, provided international machinery under which the modifications which the US [Page 1571] sought on the one hand, and the UK desired on the other, could be had without publicly harming the chances of obtaining ⅔ vote for Bernadotte proposals in the GA.
Douglas said the British understood clearly that the US desired that “tip of the Negev north of the Beersheba–Gaza road in which Jews had settled and made investments be included in the Israel state,” and that Bevin would agree to this if there were some compensation in the north, i.e. in Galilee. On the other hand, the British desired that the Arab part of the divided Palestine be associated with Transjordan. Douglas stated further that the British were insistent that Transjordan, for strategic and other reasons, have a seaport with undisputed access to it on the Mediterranean.
Douglas and Lovett reminded the President of the extraordinary extent to which the British had modified their policy; whereas twelve months ago they were unwilling to accept partition, they are now prepared to approve it, etc. This far-reaching shift of British policy had been accomplished in order to maintain US–UK solidarity without which it was his considered opinion there would be no lasting settlement of the issue in the Middle East.
Douglas then proceeded to explain the seriousness of the existing situation. Notwithstanding the provisions of British treaty with Transjordan and other Arab states, HMG had meticulously observed the arms embargo and, insofar as Douglas knew, had shipped no arms, ammunition or materials of war of any sort to any Arab state, not even to British military installations at Amman and in Iraq. The British had on several occasions raised the question as to whether, in view of the developing seriousness of the war in the Middle East, they should in their own defense move ammunition and reinforcements to these installations, but had refrained from doing so in each case, because on our advice it was thought that such a step might be distorted to mean that they were reinforcing the Arabs.
Douglas explained that, as the President knew, the Israeli forces had received large quantities of arms and ammunition indirectly from the Soviet through Czechoslovakia; that her air force was now of substantial size. As a result of British observance of embargo on one hand and shipments from Czechoslovakia to Israel on the other, Arab Legion had been reduced to a position of relative impotence with no more than 2,000 rounds 25-pounder ammunition, while the Israeli forces had greatly increased in military power. Should the Israeli forces attack the Arab Legion, HMG would doubtless feel it necessary to observe her treaty obligation with Transjordan and to supply the Arab Legion with ammunition and equipment. Moreover, should the Israeli forces drive the Arab Legion across the Transjordan frontier, an event most likely to happen in view of the comparative impotence of the Arab Legion, HMG would feel bound, under the terms of her [Page 1572] treaty obligations, to use her own military forces in the defense of Transjordan. As a result the UK would be at war in the Middle East against the Israeli state. The consequences stretching beyond this would probably be a real division between the US and UK with far-reaching results.
The President replied in effect that this must not be allowed to happen.
Douglas then said that in his opinion the most effective way of preventing the serious consequences referred to above would be for the SC to give both sides clear notice that if the truce were not observed, serious results to the violator of the truce would ensue.
2. See my immediately following telegram2 for first blush comments, which you should perhaps have because of my intimate knowledge of British views. In this connection, I have neither revealed nor discussed substance of Telmar 148 with British or anyone else.
Sent Department as 4849, repeated Paris personal for the Secretary eyes only as 868.