Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/11–548: Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

top secret   us urgent
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Tel Aviv, November 5, 1948—1 p. m

237. Press accounts here are not entirely clear as to precise effects of SC resolution of November 4 re Negev withdrawal and study of sanctions.

However, in this development my opinion (in which mission staff concurs) is that it opens up the possibility envisaged in my warning telegrams Nos. 70, August 24² and 217, October 29.³ Our analysis present situation follows:

1. It is wholly unrealistic politically and militarily imagine Israel will return to October 14 line in Negev thus re-delivering fate of settlements (located in area included Israel by November 29 partition) to mercy invading Egyptian forces which did everything possible destroy settlements during five months warfare notwithstanding UN supervision. Furthermore, in view serious depletion Egyptian Army in Negev, Egypt would have to send new forces to occupy restored portions. Press reports of Bunche statement concerning extreme tension in Negev not corroborated by personal partial inspection by military attaché and general belief here. On contrary, Egyptians voluntarily withdrew from Isdud and Majdal. Faluja pocket relatively quiet except one unsuccessful attempt break out after Israelis evacuated Egyptian wounded at latter’s request.

2. While Sino-UK resolution, as amended by US, may be interpreted as delaying action regards sanctions, the power to set date restoration Negev positions risks heavy blow to UN prestige unless US and other powers prepared implement enforcement. As stated referenced telegrams this would, we believe, precipitate conflict between West and Israel. This would give opportunity USSR supply aid sufficient render economic sanctions ineffective.

3. Meantime passage of resolution has increased tension here. If Israel believes sanctions are inevitable she may try, before sanctions could become effective, destroy the Iraqi Army which as per Mistel unnumbered, October 29 (MAI 9)⁴ and Bundle’s statement of November 4, is giving ample provocations. Military attaché thinks Israel capable defeating Iraqi, as both north and south fronts now quiet. Such anticipatory military action is highly possible unless Israel has positive assurance veto by Soviets of proposed sanctions. This reliance would, from US viewpoint, make Israel dangerously indebted to USSR. The danger I fear most is that in its understandable desire to keep in step with Britain—despite HMG’s record of a decade of mistakes and humiliations in this area and the British Foreign Minister’s personal inclination blame President Truman for HMG’s failures in Palestine since Anglo-American Committee report—the Department may yield to Bevin’s intransigency. To do that would delay peace, weaken the US’s influence and gratuitously enlarge the influence of the USSR in this strategic area.

Please inform Army CSGID.

McDonald

1. The expression “for personal attention President and Acting Secretary” was omitted from this telegram because of an oversight of the code clerk at Tel Aviv (telegram 239, November 7, noon, from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/11–748). Telegram 237 was delivered to the White House at 4 p. m. Eastern Standard Time on November 6 (telegram 203, November 6, 3 p. m., to Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/11–548).
2. See telegram of August 24, p. 1337.
3. Ante, p. 1525.
4. The editors have “been unable to identify this paper.