Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/11–548

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett)¹

top secret

[Washington,] November 5, 1948.

Subject: Future Course on Palestine

The Security Council has passed its tenth resolution seeking to enforce a truce in Palestine by exhortation. It is to be doubted whether this resolution, unaided by diplomatic action, will be successful in securing a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the northern Negev, to say nothing of a withdrawal of their forces from the frontiers of Lebanon.

The First Committee of the Assembly will next week undoubtedly commence its scrutiny of the Bernadotte Plan. Since the British Minister of State, Hector McNeil, has, according to a telegram received by Mr. Epstein from Mr. Eban, told the Israeli Representative in Paris that the Security Council resolution passed last night was designed by the British for its political effect and for the purpose of carrying out the Bernadotte Plan, the Provisional Government of Israel will most certainly have an additional motive to disregard the Security Council’s order. We shall thus find ourselves, on the one hand, debating the Bernadotte Plan in the Assembly and, on the other, making increasingly futile gestures in the Security Council with regard to effective maintenance of the truce, unless pursuant to yesterday’s resolution we join with other governments in getting down to brass tacks on applying Chapter VII sanctions, which in this case would most probably run against Israel. Please see in this connection General Riley’s top secret despatch to the Chief of Naval Operations, of November 4, attached.²

The damage to United States prestige in the United Nations, given this set of circumstances, is only rivaled by the greater damage to the prestige and the effectiveness of the United Nations itself which will shortly, in my opinion, have reached a new nadir of impotence unless immediate steps are taken to redress the situation.

It would seem necessary urgently to review United States policy toward Palestine and to ascertain what are the President’s desires. At the moment we have a Presidential directive of October 21, reaffirmed as according to Telmar 130, November 2, to stand firm by our pronouncements in the Security Council. We have a Presidentially approved position with regard to the territorial settlement, as contained in Department’s telegram 72 of September 1, to Tel Aviv. This position is in general agreement with the territorial recommendations of the Bernadotte Plan, except for the northern Negev. We also have the Secretary’s statement of September 21, supporting the Bernadotte conclusions in their entirety.

Finally, we have the President’s speech at Madison Square Garden of October 28, in which he says that Israel should be “large enough, free enough, and strong enough to make its people self-supporting and secure”.³

I believe the Department could fairly recommend to the President, in light of the foregoing documents, that our Delegation follow a course in Paris designed to secure most of the considerations in the Bernadotte Plan, with the important modification that Israel should be permitted to expand its southern frontiers into that portion of the northern Negev where most of the twenty-three Jewish settlements are situated. However, in order to retain at least some “face” for the Security Council it would seem essential that Israel make at least a token withdrawal of its forces in the northern Negev pursuant to the Security Council’s resolution of yesterday. A convenient formula for achieving a political settlement along these lines, in my opinion, would be for Israel to withdraw its troops more or less to the position held on October 14, in return for assurances that the Egyptian forces will remain where they are as of today. The disputed territory in the northern Negev would become a United Nations No-Man’s Land, to borrow Dr. Bunche’s phrase, and be held open for the eventual return to Israeli sovereignty when recommended by the General Assembly.

I should like to stress once more the belief that too little reliance has been placed upon diplomacy in the recent phase of the Palestine problem. The Jews have repeatedly indicated their desire for direct negotiations and there is increasing evidence that conversations have taken place in Paris, if not elsewhere, to that end between representatives of Israel and certain of the Arab governments. I think that the United States and Great Britain could do much by diplomatic representations to suggest to the parties the need for getting together on some common-sense settlement. Ambassador Griffis’ telegram No. 1567, November 4,⁴ lends emphasis to this point. We have certain diplomatic tools which have thus far gone unused as, for example, the question of de jure recognition and effective support of Israel’s application for membership in the United Nations, and the Specialized Agencies.

Accordingly, it would seem useful also to recommend to the President for his approval that the Department undertake friendly diplomatic action with, the Representatives of Israel, both here and in Paris and Tel Aviv, to explore the grounds of a lasting settlement. Similar representations could also be made in certain of the Arab capitals.

Meanwhile, I think it would be useful if an effort were made in London to regain some of the ground which has been lost mutually between the British and American positions. The current British talk of commencing to rearm the Arabs is mischievous and will have an effect contrary from that hoped for by Messrs, McNeil and Bevin.

1. In a separate transmitting memorandum of November 5, Mr. McClintock noted that “The attached memorandum has been gone over by Mr. Satterthwaite and has received his general concurrence. If any or all of the suggestions set forth in the memorandum meet with your approval, NEA and UNA will be glad to develop a memorandum for the White House which could be submitted to the President for his reactions.” At this point, Mr. Lovett wrote a marginal notation, reading: “Better see me.”
2. Not found attached.
3. For relevant portion of this speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 913.
4. Not printed; it conveyed the Ambassador’s strongly held opinion that “this is psychological moment to bring to and hold before UN firmly resolved plan for Palestine partition jointly approved by UK and US. No matter what plan for such partition and settlement is agreed upon by top levels it should now be forced through by any means possible. … world interests, American interests and Near East interests particularly can best be served by forcing early decision if possible.” (501.BB Palestine/11–448)