Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

867N.01/8–1748

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Hare)¹

confidential

[Washington,] August 17, 1948.

Participants:	Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel
	Mr. Uriel Heyd, First Secretary of the Israeli Mission
	Mr. Hare, NEA
	Mr. Mattison, NE

Mr. Epstein called at his request to discuss in general the views of his government on the current situation in Palestine.

His particular theme was the reliance which his government placed on the November 29 resolution of the General Assembly. That resolution was the legal basis for the Jewish State and any change in the provisions of the resolution might affect the legal basis for Israeli statehood. This was particularly true with respect to the question of boundaries. Israel would not negotiate on the question of boundaries as a condition of a peace settlement. After a peace settlement, Israel as a free and sovereign state would negotiate any boundary adjustments which might prove advisable.

With regard to the question of the internationalization of Jerusalem, the Israeli Government still adhered to the provisions of the November 29 resolution. However, Bernadotte’s proposal that Jerusalem become part of an Arab State, and the lack of concern on the part of the Christian world over this proposal had greatly disturbed the Israelis, and particularly the 100,000 Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem. To them the question resolved itself very simply: if it were a question of Jerusalem being either Arab or Jewish it must be Jewish. If it were to be internationalized, that was well and good, otherwise it must be Jewish.

Turning to the question of the dissident elements, Mr. Epstein stated that they were a small minority, and that the Israeli Government was well able to control them. The only trouble arose when the dissident groups were also to capitalize on some popular issue, such as the question of Jerusalem’s future.

Mr. Epstein next touched on the question of the Truce, and emphasized the necessity of an early peace settlement. Israel, he stated, was anxious to proceed with its development and resettlement program. It was impossible to do this as long as the country was completely mobilized. Furthermore, present conditions represented a heavy drain on Israel’s economy. Mr. Epstein expressed the hope that at the latest the truce would end before the opening of the General Assembly and that peace negotiations would be well under way by that time. (I inferred from this that the PGI was anxious that the Palestine question not be reopened in the GA, fearing that modification might be made in the November 29 resolution which would be regarded as unfavorable to Israel.)

Mr. Epstein then went on to elaborate at some length on other factors which presented difficulties to the PGI. Among these he mentioned the lack of de jure recognition on the part of the United States and the difficulties which were anticipated in getting UN membership.

I told Mr. Epstein that I very much appreciated the opportunity of this discussion with him. I added that I realized that there were many perplexities and difficulties, but hoped that these would not be allowed to crystalize into patterns which would render more difficult the task of securing peace in the area.

1. Drafted by Mr. Mattison.