Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/2–2148

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Tinder Secretary of State (Lovett)¹

secret

[Washington,] February 21, 1948.

Participants:	Moshe Shertok, Jewish Agency for Palestine
	Eliahu Epstein, Jewish Agency for Palestine
	Mr. Lovett—U
	Mr. Wilkins—NE

Mr. Shertok and Mr. Epstein called this morning for the purpose of expressing the views of the Jewish Agency with regard to British activities in Palestine since the adoption of the GA Resolution of November 29 and for the purpose of ascertaining what action the UN might take during the forthcoming SC discussions.

Mr. Shertok said that in the opinion of the Jewish Agency the Palestine Government had adopted a negative attitude toward the implementation of the GA Resolution on Palestine since November 29, 1947. Mr. Shertok cited the refusal of the British Government to make a seaport and hinterland adequate for Jewish immigration available by February 1,² and British reluctance to permit the UN Palestine Commission to arrive in Palestine more than two weeks prior to the termination of the British Mandate on May 15.

Mr. Shertok said that the Palestine Government had not impartially maintained law and order in Palestine, and that the Jewish Agency had, on February 20, submitted to the members of the SC a long memorandum outlining instances of the manner in which the British authorities in Palestine had acquiesced in, if not encouraged, Arab opposition.

For example, when armed bands had invaded Palestine from Syria recently, the British forces had only arrived after the Jewish settlers had repulsed the attack. The Palestine Government had subsequently communicated with the Syrian Government but instead of protesting in strong terms, its approach had been one of inquiry only. In another instance, the Jewish Agency gave the Palestine Government 48 hours advance notice that a band of 700 or 800 Arabs would attempt to leave Irbid in Transjordan to attack Palestine via one of two bridges over the Jordan River. The Palestine Government had not, however, taken any precautions and the attack had taken place as the Jewish Agency had predicted.

Mr. Shertok cited additional evidence of British partiality in the following: 1) The Mayor of the Arab town of Jaffa had recently undertaken truce negotiations through British channels with the Mayor of the nearby Jewish town of Tel Aviv. These negotiations were making progress until the arrival of an Iraqi Army Officer to take command of the situation in Jaffa. This Iraqi Army Officer immediately suspended the negotiations; 2) In certain areas of Palestine, the local British commanding officers were on friendly terms with the Arab leaders of the local Arab irregular military groups; 3) The British had recently turned over a number of rifles to the Arabs in Hebron; 4) The British authorities had not armed any of the Jewish metropolitan and civilian groups in self-defense as they had the Arabs.

Mr. Shertok said that he did not think British policy in Palestine flowed from a policy decision of the British Cabinet. Mr. Shertok added that he wished to be most cautious in this respect as he did not wish to impugn the British Government. Mr. Shertok believed, however, that if the activities of British representatives in the Near East were successful no questions would be raised; if they were not successful, the activities could be disavowed. The British Government was now miscalculating the situation in the Near East as it had miscalculated it before. The British Government, for example, had not expected that the American and British members of the Anglo-American Committee would reach a unanimous conclusion with regard to Palestine in 1946, nor had it expected UNSCOP to recommend partition. The British had never realized that the Jews were determined on establishing a state and would defend themselves to the last.

Mr. Shertok stated that last fall he had informed the working group of Sub-Committee 1 at the UN that if a Jewish State were established, the Jews would defend themselves but that if the Arab States attacked, the Jews would have to have funds and arms, and that if the situation deteriorated, the Jews might need an international force to back them up.

Mr. Shertok said that, in his opinion, the establishment of a Jewish State was the best means of maintaining political and social peace in the Middle East.

Mr. Shertok wanted to know whether the UN would permit the Jews to arm themselves with funds and military equipment from abroad, and whether the UN would send an international force to Palestine to back up the GA recommendation of November 29.

I asked Mr. Shertok if he could enlighten me on the following points:

1. Whom did the Jewish Agency represent and under what authority?

2. Whom did the Arab Higher Committee represent and under what authority?

Mr. Shertok replied that the Jewish Agency was the quasi-official body, established under the League of Nations Mandate, representing the peoples of Jewish faith in Palestine and throughout the World, organized under a system of democratic election; the Arab Higher Committee was the representative of the Arabs of Palestine, under the presidency of the Mufti in Jerusalem.

I ask Mr. Shertok whether the Jewish Agency had approached the Arab Higher Committee since the adoption of the GA Resolution on November 29, 1947 in an endeavor to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question on the basis of the resolution itself. Mr. Shertok said that no move of this character had been made, and that, it was impossible under existing circumstances.

I asked Mr. Shertok whether the authority of the Jewish Agency was sufficiently wide for it to prevent the illegal shipment of arms and ammunition and the departure of ships from the U.S. Mr. Shertok replied that the authority of the Jewish Agency was very great but that it was not equivalent to that of a sovereign state at the present time.

I also asked whether the Jewish Agency had discussed the various questions arising under the GA Resolution with the British Government in London. Mr. Shertok said that the British Government was aware of the various problems; that the Jewish Agency had not specifically raised these questions with it but that the Jewish Agency had been discussing the GA Resolution with the Palestine Government in Jerusalem, and with the UK Delegation in New York.

Mr. Shertok pressed me for a reply with regard to funds and arms for the Jews in Palestine, and the question of a UN international force. I told Mr. Shertok that I could not answer these questions at the present time; that the US considered the Palestine problem as a matter which was being handled by the UN, and that the SC of the UN, which planned to discuss the matter on February 24, was the proper arena for a statement by the U.S. Government. I stressed the fact that the U.S. was one of the members of the UN and would not take unilateral action with regard to Palestine.

L[ovett]

1. Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.
2. London had advised the Department of this development on January 23, giving the British Foreign Office view that “until mandate is entirely surrendered HMG considers it is not legally entitled to withdraw its authority from part Palestine only. Such action would constitute change Palestine Government immigration policy with disastrous effect on security.” (Telegram 274, 867N.01/1–2348)