Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/2–2148

The Department of State to President Truman ¹

February 23, 1948

top secret

Message to the President

We give below working draft of basic position paper for Security Council discussion Tuesday. This has not yet been approved by Secretary Marshall or discussed with Forrestal. Its general line has been discussed with Austin who will come to Washington Monday for final discussions and briefing.

This draft is sent in order give opportunity for consideration fundamentals. We expect transmit draft Austin’s remarks Sunday night or Monday morning after clearance Marshall and Austin and talks with military. Would greatly appreciate general indication president’s views on following position paper very soonest possible. Note particularly last part of paragraph eight.

Working draft follows:

1. The problem of Palestine has been before the United Nations as a matter of special concern since the United Kingdom placed it before the General Assembly on April 2, 1947. The United States as a Member of the United Nations, has supported since that date those United Nations procedures which we considered best adapted to obtaining a broad and impartial expression of world opinion on the problem which would result in a just and workable solution and which would therefore commend itself to the Mandatory Power and to the people of Palestine.

2. As a result of the recommendations of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947 on Palestine, that problem is now before several of the principal bodies of the United Nations for various types of action under the Charter. The United States, as a Member of the United Nations and of these bodies, will continue to deal with the question of Palestine as a Member of the United Nations and in conjunction with other Members. United States policy will not be unilateral. It will conform to and be in support of United Nations action on Palestine.

3. In view of the complexity and importance of the Palestine problem, every possible effort must be directed toward calmness and the avoidance of bitterness. The task will require the attention of the United Nations for some time. In dealing with the various aspects of this problem the United States Government will decide what is right for it to advocate as a Member of the United Nations and will pursue this course regardless of improper pressures or threats of any kind from any source, whether from within the United States, within Palestine, or from Arab groups outside Palestine.

4. During the consideration of this question in the United Nations, the delegations of the other Members should understand that United States Delegation alone is authorized to present the attitude of the United States Government.

5. The recommendations of the General Assembly have great moral force which applies to all Members regardless of the way in which they might have voted on any given recommendation.

6. Similarly, the Security Council, although not bound under the Charter to accept and carry out General Assembly recommendations, is nevertheless expected to give great weight to them.

7. The Security Council now has before it the recommendation of the General Assembly on Palestine of November 29, 1947 which was received by the Security Council on December 9, 1947 but which has not yet been acted upon by the Council In addition, the Council has before it two reports of the Palestine Commission, the first Monthly Report of February 2, 1948² and a Special Report on the Problem of Security in Palestine of February 16, 1948.³ In determining what action it should take with respect to these three documents, the Security Council must consider the moral responsibilities which derive from the recommendation of the General Assembly as well as the obligations and the powers of the Security Council under the Charter.

8. The Security Council is required by the Charter to take the necessary action to maintain international peace if it finds that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression exists with respect to Palestine. This might arise either in connection with incursions into Palestine from the outside or from such internal disorder as would itself constitute a threat to international peace. Although the Security Council is empowered to use, and would normally attempt to use, measures short of armed force to maintain the peace, it is authorized under the Charter to use armed forces if necessary for that purpose. A finding by the Security Council that a danger to peace exists places all Members of the United Nations, regardless of their attitudes on specific political questions, under obligation to assist the Council in maintaining peace. If the Security Council should decide that it is necessary to use armed forces to maintain international peace in connection with Palestine, the United States will be ready to consult under Article 106 of the Charter with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Such consultation would be required in view of the fact that armed forces have not as yet been made available to the Security Council under Article 43.

9. The Security Council, under the Charter, is empowered to take action to prevent aggression against Palestine from outside. The Council is also empowered to take action to prevent a threat to international peace and security from inside Palestine. This enforcement action must be directed solely to the maintenance or restoration of international peace. The Council is not authorized by the Charter, however, to employ enforcement measures to give effect to recommendations either of the General Assembly or of the Security Council itself. This applies to the General Assembly’s resolution on Palestine. The Council’s enforcement action, in other words, would be directed to keeping the peace and not to enforcing partition.

10. The Security Council can and should, however, endeavor to reach a settlement of the Palestine question along the lines of the General Assembly recommendation. It should accept the tasks which the General Assembly requested it to accept in the resolution of November 29, 1947 and should use its broad powers to find a peaceful settlement of the problem through agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine.

11. In summary, the Security Council takes action on the one hand to maintain international peace, calling upon its full authority under the Charter if necessary to use enforcement measures to that end; on the other hand, it should attempt to carry out the requests of the General Assembly with respect to the partition plan, short of the use of its enforcement powers to impose the plan upon the Mandatory Power and the people of Palestine. In any event, it should make every effort to use its authority and experience in the field of peaceful settlement to obtain a result which is acceptable to the Jews and Arabs of Palestine.

The substance of the following three numbered paragraphs will not be discussed in Ambassador Austin’s proposed speech but is submitted for the President’s consideration and approval in relation to the further development of the problem.

12. If the Security Council and the other organs of the United Nations are unable to give effect to the General Assembly resolution on Palestine for lack of sufficient acquiescence on the part of the people of Palestine to permit its implementation without enforcement measures, and if the Security Council is unable to develop an alternative solution acceptable to the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, the matter should be referred back to a special session of the General Assembly. The Department of State considers that it would then be clear that Palestine is not yet ready for self-government and that some form of United Nations trusteeship for an additional period of time will be necessary.

13. Since the proposed effort to reach a peaceful solution under Security Council auspices may take additional time, it may be necessary for the Security Council to consult with the United Kingdom and to ask it as Mandatory Power to retain the mandate pending further United Nations consideration and action on the matter.

14. In connection with above, the Department of State plans to take vigorous diplomatic action with the Mandatory Power, the Arab Governments and the representatives of the Jews and Arabs of Palestine to bring about an immediate cessation of violence and illegal acts of all kinds which are contributing to the present disorders in that country. End of working draft.

In view extraordinary efforts pressure groups and press learn our position in advance we request every precaution against possibility leaks.

1. The source text is dated February 23; yet the message was actually transmitted to President Truman two days earlier, at 9:30 p. m., Greenwich Mean Time. The latter point is definitely established by the copy of the message, identified as White 4 and marked “urgent and top secret” in the George M. Elsey Papers in the Harry S. Truman Library at Independence, Missouri. Mr. Elsey was Assistant to Clark M. Clifford; Mr. Clifford was Special Counsel to President Truman.

   Mr. Rusk transmitted a copy of the message to Brig. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, with a memorandum dated February 22, which read: “Attached is a top secret message to the President which was received on board ship at 7:00 p. m. on Saturday [February 21].

   “The Secretary will wish to read the attached message tonight. Senator Austin is coming to Washington on a midnight train for conferences in the Department early Monday morning. The principal task now remaining (assuming Presidential approval of the policy line) is the completion and clearance of Senator Austin’s speech in the Security Council for transmission to the President by not later than noon on Monday.”

   The editors speculate that an undated copy of the message of February 21 was retyped two days later, and dated February 23, for possible use at the conference on Palestine held at 9:30 a. m. that morning. A marginal notation on Mr. Rusk’s memorandum of February 22 states that Messrs. Lovett, Austin, Armour, Rusk, Henderson, Ernest A. Gross, the Legal Adviser, and George H. Butler, a member of the Policy Planning Staff, attended the meeting.

   The source text of the message to the President has filed with it various earlier drafts.

2. The report was actually dated January 29; see the extract printed on p. 572.
3. See the extracts printed on p. 630.