501.BB Palestine/6–2448: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
2785. 1. I am immensely gratified by contents Department’s 2332, June 22, and Department’s 2348, June 23, substance of which (except paragraph 3 last reftel) was delivered June 23 to Wright in Bevin’s absence.
2. Wright warmly welcomed Department’s helpful response to ideas advanced by Bevin (Embassy’s 2702, June 18 and 2701, June 18).
3. Re Haifa, Wright said Foreign Office in light Departments 2332 would telegraph at once to Rhodes (repeating to Haifa) substance paragraph 4, Embassy’s 2702, June 18. He said Mediator would be told that UK has consulted USG which sees no impropriety in HMG informing Mediator of approaches to it by Jews and Arabs and that USG thinks it would be useful for HMG to inform Mediator of HMG views re an arrangement for Haifa. Wright assumes Department will advise Bernadotte similarly.
4. Wright said he took two Deptreftels to mean that USG and HMG have accepted as common aims the following:
- (a)
- Extension cease-fire and truce (paragraph 5, Department’s 2348).
- (b)
- Efforts to concert views (paragraph 1, Department’s 2348).
- (c)
- Pooling information re Mediator (penultimate paragraph, Department’s 2348).
5. Wright said that he thought above common aims now would probably open way for Foreign Office to put to Department more clearly its thinking re various alternatives with which Mediator may be confronted. In this connection he mentioned possibility, which Mediator himself seems to envisage (paragraph 6, Department’s 2348) of temporizing in the event neither side is willing to agree on final settlement near future. (Embassy’s 2510, June 7,1 paragraph 7). Wright wondered whether Department entertains views re most effective channel for communicating Foreign Office thinking. He suggested that this Embassy to Department might be main channel and that Foreign Office to British Embassy Washington might be secondary channel to be kept fully advised with view to British Embassy officers discussing points with the Department. In view of what seems to be close association with British Government on this problem and gradual shift in British position (see paragraph 6 below) as result compulsion [Page 1144] of events reinforced by our efforts, I will be the goat if Department so desires.
6. As to whether Bevin agrees with trend thought described Embassy’s 2712, June 19, Wright speaking informally said position HMG (which means, of course, position Bevin) is that no solution (including federal state) is ruled out if it is agreeable to both sides. HMG has always been convinced that any solution which will have to be imposed will not be solution at all. From these basic premises and trend events Wright said (without definitely committing higher authority) that HMG thinking inclines to conclude that early establishment compact and homogeneous sovereign Jewish State within sensible frontiers would be in best interests Arabs if they can be persuaded to accept it. He thinks it possible, however, that if acceptance is to be secured some international action on guarantee of frontiers and probably on settlement of additional number of Jewish displaced persons elsewhere than in Israel might have to be thrown into the balance. Size and shape of Jewish State might differ considerably from boundaries envisaged in Assembly resolution and as part such a settlement, Jerusalem and Haifa might both be placed under international regimes. If, however, Arabs are not at present prepared to accept settlement along these lines (and it might take some time for them to do so) HMG believes that Mediator would do well to temporize (paragraph 5 above) and in the prolonged truce work out regimes for Jerusalem and Haifa. During prolonged truce HMG would hope tensions would ease and time would conspire to make views both sides less intransigent; i.e., although Arabs might not accept existence sovereign Jewish State now they might do so later and Jews after operating within their de facto frontiers for some months might come to realize advantages of a compact state.
- Not printed.↩