501.BB Palestine/6–3048
Memorandum by Mr. Leonard C. Meeker, Assistant to the Legal Adviser (Gross)1
The Problem.
To determine the position which the United States should take in the Security Council in the event that (a) the four-week Palestine truce is violated, or (b) hostilities are resumed in Palestine at the expiration of the four-week truce or an extension thereof.
Recommendation.
The United States should initiate or support action in the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter if developments there constitute, in the opinion of the United States, a threat to or breach of international peace. Such action would include a finding under Article 39, a cease-fire order under Article 40, with appropriate sanctions if necessary.
Discussion.
1.The question of the policy of the United States with respect to fighting in Palestine has already been determined by the President. On May 22, 1948 the Secretary of State presented to the President a memorandum* requesting approval of proposed United States policy on Palestine. The memorandum proposed that the United States continue to urge immediate action by the Security Council to bring about a cease-fire in Palestine. This action was to be an order for a cease-fire under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter. Such action was described in the memorandum as the basis of the resolution proposed by the United States in the Security Council on May 17, 1948, and it was stated that this would continue to represent United States views so long as the fighting continued in Palestine.
This statement of policy applied not only to the period preceding an effective truce in Palestine, but was applicable to the period following a truce or the violation of truce terms, in conformity with the purpose of the United States to achieve and maintain peace in the Palestine area. The memorandum of proposed United States policy was approved by the President on May 27, 1948.
The United States has consistently, since the ending of the 1948 [Page 1128] special session of the General Assembly, regarded the situation in Palestine as a very serious one, calling for action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. To this end the United States on May 17, 1948 introduced a truce resolution based on Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter. Ambassador Austin on May 22, 1948 in the Security Council elaborated the position of the United States concerning the necessity for Chapter VII action. Again later, after the Security Council’s resolution of May 22, 1948 had failed to bring about a truce in Palestine, the United States supported a resolution under Chapter VII, introduced in the Council by the Soviet representative, which closely resembled the United States resolution of May 17. Both Chapter VII resolutions failed of adoption in the Council, receiving the votes only of the United States, Soviet Union, France, Colombia, and the Ukraine.
In its resolution of May 29 under Chapter VI of the Charter, the Security Council included the following penultimate paragraph, on the motion of the United States:
“The Security Council,… Decides that if the present resolution is rejected by either party or by both, or if, having been accepted, it is subsequently repudiated or violated, the situation in Palestine will be considered with a view to action under Chapter VII,…”
Thus the Security Council itself decided that it would consider again the Palestine situation with a view to Chapter VII action if the Chapter VI resolution of May 29 proved ineffectual.
2. As pointed out above, the United States has, since May 17, 1948, formally advocated the taking of action by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter if necessary to restore international peace in Palestine. The purpose of United States policy continues to be achievement of peace in that area. In the event that the truce in Palestine under the resolution of May 29 were violated or that hostilities were resumed upon expiration of the truce, the situation in that country would be at least as grave, from the standpoint of international peace and security, as it was before the May 29 resolution was adopted. The United States has been subject to charges of oscillation and unreliability in its Palestine policy. If the United States now altered its stand on Chapter VII action, this Government would probably be subject to renewed and aggravated charges of inconsistency, resulting in embarrassment to the United States, particularly in the forum of the United Nations.
3. According to a telegram received from Ambassador Douglas on June 19,2 Foreign Secretary “Bevin is in full agreement that if present efforts break down it may become necessary to invoke Chapter VII.”
4. In considering whether or not to press for Chapter VII action [Page 1129] by the Security Council, the United States would base its approach, as it has in the past, on the determination of whether or not there was such fighting in Palestine as to constitute a threat to or breach of international peace. The approach would not depend merely upon determination that there had occurred an act of aggression, nor would the approach be merely with a view to fixing responsibility for aggression upon any particular government or authority.
- Transmitted as Tab B to Brigadier General Carter by Mr. McClintock in his memorandum of June 30, with the statement that “Mr. Lovett has requested me to forward the attached memoranda concerning our future Palestine policy to the Secretary of State for his comment or approval.” Accompanying this memorandum were Mr. McClintock’s memorandum of June 23 (see p. 1134) and the “Comments of the Policy Planning Staff”, transmitted as Tabs A and C, respectively; Tab C not found attached to the transmitting memorandum.↩
- A copy of the memorandum for the President, dated May 22, 1948, is attached as an appendix to this paper. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Telegram 2713, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1121.↩