PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563
Memorandum by Mr. George H.
Butler of the Policy Planning Staff to the Under
Secretary of State (Lovett)
secret
[Washington,] February 11, 1948.
PPS/21
Mr. Lovett: Attached herewith is a paper
prepared at your request by the Policy Planning Staff on “The Problem of
Palestine.” In accordance with your suggestion, it consists of two
parts:
- 1.
- A statement of the present position of this government with
respect to the problem, and
- 2.
- A summary of the alternative courses of action now open to us,
including an estimate of the consequences in each case.
The Staff realizes that the Palestine case may shortly be brought up for
consideration in the U.N. Security Council and that this document may
not be in time to affect the decisions which must be made as to the
position which our representative should take on the subject.
Consequently, the contents of the paper should not in any way relieve
the operational officers in the Department of their responsibility in
this connection.
If you approve, it is suggested that the document be made available to
the Staff of the National Security Council1 for its study of the
Palestine problem. No conclusions or recommendations are included in the
paper. That phase of the matter could be worked out by the NSC Staff.
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff
top secret
[Washington,] February 11,
1948.
PPS/21
The Problem of Palestine
a. present position of the u.s. with respect to
palestine
- 1.
- The UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947, by a vote of 33
to 13 with 10 abstentions and one member absent, adopted a
resolution recommending the partition of Palestine into separate
Arab and Jewish sovereign states, substantially as proposed by
the majority report of the UN Special Committee on Palestine.
The U.S. Government
[Page 620]
after very careful consideration voted in support of the
resolution despite the realization that the Arabs of Palestine
and the Arab States were strongly opposed to the establishment
of a Jewish State in Palestine. In its support of partition the
U.S. Government was motivated by the following considerations:
- (a)
- A review of the statements and expressions of policy
by responsible American officials, resolutions of
Congress, and political party platforms of the last 30
years indicated that unless there were some
unanticipated factor in the situation the trend of U.S.
public opinion and U.S. policy based thereon practically
forced official U.S. support of partition.
- (b)
- The majority report of the UN Special Committee on
Palestine recommending partition actually did represent
a new factor in the situation but one which supported
the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine.
- (c)
- Public opinion in the United States was stirred by
mistreatment of Jews in Europe and by the intense desire
of surviving Jews to go to Palestine.
- (d)
- The troubled situation in Palestine accompanied by the
decision of Great Britain to withdraw as the mandatory
power made it evident that a solution of the Palestine
problem could no longer be postponed.
- 2.
- Owing to its long concern with the Palestine problem and in a
desire to achieve a fair solution, the U.S. Government welcomed
presentation of the problem to the United Nations and made every
effort to see that an impartial committee of the UN General
Assembly was set up with broad terms of reference to examine the
problem. We consistently adhered to the position that nothing
should be done to hinder the Special Committee while it
conducted its investigations, and at no time did we directly or
indirectly endeavor to influence the committee’s
recommendations. The decision of the U.S. Government to support
the committee’s majority plan was based primarily on the view,
expressed to the General Assembly by Secretary Marshall on
September 18, 1947, that “great weight” should be accorded the
majority opinion of a UN Committee.
- 3.
- During the UN discussions on the question of partition the
U.S. took into account the statements of Jewish leaders that
they would be able to handle the situation in Palestine if
partition took place. Thus, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman of
the American Section of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for
Palestine, declared before the UN Ad Hoc
Committee on Palestine on October 2, 1947:
“The Jewish people in Palestine, I repeat, will be
prepared to defend itself. It will welcome, of course,
whatever support can properly be given to it by the UN
or its members, pursuant to the decisions of the
UN”;
and, after noting the UK announcement that British forces
might be subject to early withdrawal from Palestine,
[Page 621]
“In that event, in order to avoid the creation of a
dangerous vacuum which might affect public security, the
Jewish people of Palestine will provide without delay
the necessary effectives to maintain public security
within their country.”
- 4.
- In deciding to support the majority report, the U.S.
Delegation to the General Assembly took the position that this
Government should not use U.S. power and influence in prevailing
upon other countries against their will to support partition.
The U.S. Delegation was instructed that it should explain our
reasons for supporting partition but should not exert pressure
on other delegations. While it has been shown that unauthorized
U.S. pressure groups, including members of Congress, sought to
impose U.S. views on foreign delegations, so far as can be
determined no undue pressure was brought to bear upon other
countries by U.S. Government officials responsible to the
Executive. In any event, this Government considered the vote of
the General Assembly as reflecting a belief that partition was
the best of the solutions of the Palestine problem which had
been advanced.
- 5.
- The U.S. Government has adopted the point of view that if the
problem of Palestine, long a source of suspicion and uneasiness,
could once and for all be eliminated by acquiescence on the part
of the Arab States in the UN General Assembly decision on
Palestine, difficult as such acquiescence might be, a disturbing
influence in international affairs would be removed and the
security of the Middle East measurably strengthened. We have
expressed the conviction that if there is to be a sense of
security as well as a developing prosperity in that area, the
countries of the Middle East and those non-Middle Eastern powers
who sincerely desire the principles of the UN” Charter to be
applied to the area in the interest both of the Middle Eastern
people and of world security must work with cordiality and
mutual trust. This viewpoint has been urged orally and
confidentially in the name of President Truman upon King Farouk
of Egypt,2 King
Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia,3 and Governor
General Jinnah of Pakistan.4
- 6.
- Likewise King Farouk, King Ibn Saud and Governor General
Jinnah have been informed of the President’s hope (a) that in their disappointment and
resentment at the recommendation of the General Assembly, the
Governments of the Arab States will not attempt by armed force,
or will not encourage the use of armed force, to prevent the
carrying out of that recommendation; and (b) that Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will use
their influence with the Arab States to persuade them not to
resort to actions which might undermine the present order in the
Middle East and eventually lead to a world conflict
[Page 622]
in which the peoples
of the Middle East might be the most tragic sufferers.
- 7.
- This matter being in the hands of the UN, we have not felt it
incumbent upon us to take any additional action in regard to the
Palestine situation except to suspend authorization for the
export of arms, ammunition and other war material intended for
use in Palestine or neighboring countries.
b. alternative courses of action
Generally speaking, there are three possible courses which the U.S.
might now pursue with respect to the problem of Palestine:
- (a)
- Fully support the partition plan with all the means at our
disposal, including the use of armed forces under the
UN.
- (b)
- Adopt a passive or “neutral” role, taking no further steps
to aid or implement partition.
- (c)
- Alter our previous policy of support for partition and,
through a special session of the General Assembly, seek
another solution to the problem.
- 1.
-
Full Support of the UN recommendation for
partition, based on a determination to see the successful
establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine
-
- Under this course of action, we would take steps to grant
substantial economic assistance to the Jewish authorities and to
afford them support through the supply of arms, ammunition and
implements of war. In order to enable the Jewish state to
survive in the face of wide scale resistance from the Arabs in
Palestine, from the neighboring Arab States, and possibly from
other Moslem countries, we would be prepared ultimately to
utilize our naval units and military forces for this
purpose.
-
- In the Security Council, we would seek to give effect to the
UN recommendation that “any attempt to alter by force the
settlement envisaged” by the resolution should be regarded as a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in
accordance with Article 39 of the Charter. Thereafter we would
assist in implementing the recommendation by sending armed
forces to Palestine either as part of an international force
under Article 43 or on a volunteer contingent basis to enforce
partition. Since it is clear that no other nation except Russia
could be expected to participate in such implementation to any
appreciable extent, we would supply a substantial portion of the
money, troops and arms for this purpose. If Russia participated,
we would at least have to match the Russian effort in this
respect.
-
- Any aid to the establishment of a Jewish state such as
described above, and withheld from the Arabs, would be construed
by the Arabs as a virtual declaration of War against the Arab
world. U.S. assistance in any form to the enforcement of
partition, particularly by the use
[Page 623]
of armed forces, would result in further
deterioration of our position in the Middle East and in
deep-seated antagonism for the U.S. in many sections of the
Moslem world over a period of many years. We would be threatened
with
- (a)
- Suspension or cancellation of air base rights,
commercial concessions, and oil pipeline construction,
and drastic curtailment of U.S. trade in the
area;
- (b)
- Loss of access to British air, military and naval
facilities in the area, affecting our strategic position
in the Middle East and Mediterranean;
- (c)
- Closing of our Near East educational, religious and
philanthropic institutions;
- (d)
- Possible deaths, injuries and damages arising from
acts of violence against individual U.S. citizens and
interests in the area; and
- (e)
- A serious impediment to the success of the European
Recovery Program, which is dependent on increased
production of Middle Eastern oil.
- 2.
-
Adoption of a passive or “neutral” role,
taking no further steps to aid or implement partition
-
- The adoption of this course of action would involve the
maintenance and enforcement of our embargo on arms to Palestine
and the neighboring countries. We would give no unilateral
assistance to either the Jewish or Arab Palestine States
financially, militarily or otherwise. In so far as possible, we
would require an attitude of neutrality to be observed by all
persons or organizations under U.S. jurisdiction. We would
oppose sending armed forces into Palestine by the UN or any
member thereof for the purpose of implementing partition, and we
would oppose the recruitment of volunteers for this
purpose.
-
- Such a course of action would rest on the assumption that
implementation of the General Assembly resolution was a
collective responsibility of the UN and that no leadership in
the matter devolved upon the United States. We would take the
position that the UN machinery created by the partition plan
should handle the question of implementation, and that the
five-man Palestine Commission should proceed with the task
entrusted to it of taking over control from the British. We
would leave it to the peoples in Palestine to give effect to the
General Assembly resolution.
-
- This course would have the advantage that it would not be
necessary for us to become embroiled in the Middle East through
active support of the partition plan. At the same time we would
not have to alter our original basic policy of support for
partition.
-
- The consequences of such a policy, while not further
embittering our relations with the Arab world, would not however
prevent the situation in Palestine from deteriorating even
further. It would not be possible
[Page 624]
to prevent the arming of Jews and Arabs by
ardent sympathizers on the one hand and profit-seeking arms
smugglers on the other, or Communist assistance to both sides.
Disorder and bloodshed on a large scale would take place when
the British withdrew from Palestine. The strongest kind of
pressure would be brought on the U.S. to act in the chaotic
situation which would ensue. Even if we should oppose any move
in the Security Council to send armed forces there would remain
the possibility that the USSR might intervene actively in behalf
of the Zionists.
-
- Politically, this passive attitude would be extremely
difficult to maintain in the United States. It would, moreover,
make impossible any possible future intervention on legal or
moral grounds in Greece or Italy for example. The confusion and
chaos which would result in the Middle East in the light of a
passive attitude by the United States would be exploited by the
Communists and might develop into a serious threat to our
national security.
- 3.
-
Altering our previous Policy of Support for
Partition and seeking another Solution to the Problem
-
- The special report of the UN Palestine Commission on security
phases of the problem will emphasize the need for an
international armed force if the partition plan is to be carried
out or even if a complete state of chaos in Palestine is to be
avoided at the termination of the British Mandate on May 15. If
we should determine that it would be inadvisable to join in the
carrying out of the UN resolution on this basis, our course of
action would call for a special session of the General Assembly
to consider the situation anew. Abandoning our support of
partition as impracticable and unworkable in view of the
demonstrated inability of the people of Palestine to assume the
responsibilities of self-government, we would under this course
of action attempt to seek a constructive solution of the
problem.
-
- As a first step in this direction we would seek to have the
Security Council explore other avenues of a peaceful settlement
when the Palestine case comes up for its consideration.
Specifically we would endeavor to bring about conciliation or
arbitration of the problem. We would propose that while working
for such conciliation or arbitration, a special session of the
General Assembly be called to consider a new solution in the
form of
- 1)
- An international trusteeship or
- 2)
- A federal state,
with provision for Jewish immigration
provisions in either case.
A trusteeship could take one of several forms: a three-power
trusteeship of the U.S., UK and France, a joint U.S.–UK trusteeship
either
[Page 625]
with or without
some of the smaller states, or a general UN trusteeship with the
Trusteeship Council as administering authority. Alternatively, a
federal state with cantonization, a plan which the British
originally favored as having the greatest chance of success, could
be discussed. We would make it clear that we did not favor the
introduction of an international armed force for the implementation
of any such solution.
This course of action would encounter strong opposition from the
Zionists. It would, however, probably have the support of the Arab
States and of world opinion in general. Our prestige in the Middle
East would immediately rise and we would regain in large measure our
strategically important position in the area. Our national interests
would thus be served and our national security strengthened,
notwithstanding the disfavor with which such a procedure would be
viewed by Zionists elements.5
