501.BB Palestine/5–2448: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret   us urgent
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2235. For Lovett from Douglas. Bevin informed me this morning that Azzam has called a political meeting of the Arab League and has requested a short delay in the discussions of the cease-fire proposals now before the Security Council.

Bevin thinks that since the Arab leaders have to be assembled from their respective countries this is reasonable and I am inclined to agree with him provided that the delay is short. He suggests 48 hours. He has sent a telegram to New York to this effect and has asked our support.

Bevin tells me that meanwhile he is bringing strongest possible pressure to bear on Arab leaders to accept.1

Since dictating the above, I have just heard from the FonOff that they have this moment received a cablegram from Baghdad to the effect that the cease-fire proposal was not received until the night of the 23rd, that the Regent is leaving today for Amman, that if the ceasefire order were agreed to by the Arab League at Amman, a certain amount of time would be required to get the necessary orders to the field. This is an example of the physical impediments to speedy acceptence [Page 1041] by the Arab leaders with which the Israelite state is not confronted. It reinforces the view that more time is necessary than the 36 hours to permit the Arab leaders; first, to assemble in Amman from relatively remote parts; secondly, to arrive at a decision, and third, if the decision is favorable to get orders to the troops in the field. Accordingly, it seems fair to extend the 36-hour period by 48 hours in order that the purely physical difficulties which the Arabs have to resolve will not prevent a mutual acceptance and execution of the cease-fire proposals.2

In this connection Goldmann has just called upon me. On hearing that the British were exerting every influence to persuade the Arabs to accept the cease-fire proposition and on the suggestion that more time be permitted the Arabs, he agreed that this was a fair suggestion.

Douglas
  1. According to information furnished to Mr. Ross by Mr. Beeley, such pressure was exerted through “very strong representations” in all Arab capitals and by personal messages from Mr. Bevin to Abdullah, Farouk, and the Iraqi Regent (telegram 697, May 24, 9:25 p. m., from New York, 501.BB Palestine/5–2448).
  2. The Lebanese, Syrian, and Iraqi Governments, on May 24, made known before the Security Council that the time limit provided for in the resolution of May 22 was insufficient for consultations among the Arab States (SC, 3rd yr., No. 73, p. 37). British, United States, and French representatives supported an extension, of the time limit, whereupon the Council granted a 48-hour extension, until noon, May 20 (ibid., pp. 38–41).