Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/6–3048

Memorandum by the Department of State to President Truman ¹

top secret

Washington, May 22, 1948.

The Department of State finds it necessary to instruct Ambassador Austin promptly with regard to the policy of the United States on the shipment of arms and military equipment to the Near East.

From the point of view of the foreign policy of the United States, the basic factors in the situation are:

(a) The increasing violence in Palestine and our determination to do everything we can as a Member of the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire in that country;

(b) Our policy in accord with the Security Council resolution of April 17, 1948, to take all possible steps to assist in securing a ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities in Palestine. Article 3 of that resolution calls upon all governments to take such steps “and particularly those referring to the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals and weapons and war materials”.

(c) The increasingly serious strain being placed on the relations between the United States and the United Kingdom by the position of the United Kingdom with respect both to their assistance to the Arabs and to United States efforts to obtain prompt action by the Security Council.

It is recommended that the President authorize the Department of State to instruct Ambassador Austin on the basis of the following statement of United States policy:

(a) The United States continues to urge that the Security Council act immediately to bring about a cease-fire in Palestine. The most immediate action which it can take is to direct an order under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter to all governments and authorities controlling armed forces in Palestine, requiring them to issue an immediate ceasefire order to such armed forces. That is the basis of the resolution proposed by the United States in the Security Council on May 17, 1948, and will continue to represent our views so long as fighting continues.²

(b) If the Security Council issues such an order under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter (or calls upon the parties under Chapter VI of the Charter to effect a cease-fire for all of Palestine), the United Nations must expect prompt compliance from all governments and authorities involved in the fighting in Palestine. If there is failure to comply, the United States will be prepared to adjust its arms embargo policy, to support the action of the Security Council.

(c) The United States should support action by the Security Council under Article 41 to order all governments to refrain from the shipment of weapons and war materials, and the rendering of other military assistance, to governments and authorities now participating in hostilities in Palestine. This order by the Security Council would remain in force so long as the cease-fire order is complied with by the governments and authorities participating in hostilities in Palestine.

(d) If the Security Council succeeds in bringing about a cease-fire and in placing an effective general arms embargo against all those participating in any way in the fighting in Palestine, the United States will retain its present arms embargo on the entire Near East until such time as there is no longer any danger of hostilties.

(e) If the Security Council is unable to take effective action to bring about a cease-fire or to impose a general arms embargo the United States will inform the Security Council that we shall resume our freedom of action with respect to the licensing of arms shipments.

The Department of State wishes particularly to invite the attention of the President to the fact that the policy proposed above engages the most solemn powers and responsibilities of the Security Council and involves a major political commitment on the part of the United States. If such a policy is to have the desired effect, it must be pursued with vigor and singleness of purpose; otherwise, the Security Council will he demoralized and our attitude toward lifting the arms embargo itself might become the cause of even greater bloodshed in Palestine.

1. The Department, on May 26, notified New York that this memorandum had received tentative White House approval (telegram 327, 501.BB Palestine/5–2648). Filed with this telegram is an undated copy of the memorandum to President Truman, which contains a marginal notation by Mr. Lovett that the memorandum was “Approved by President & original initialed. Cleared again May 27th”.
2. In a telephone conversation at 1 p. m., May 27, with Mr. Beeley, Mr. Jessup stated “That we simply can’t go back on the stand we took on May 17. We have got to stand by our insistence on our feeling that this does require definite action under Chapter VII. Now, we are not planning to put in any resolution today, but we can’t take in the Council the initiative on anything which would suggest any change in our attitude because there has been none. Our general feeling is this, that our proposal on the 17th having been turned down and your initiative having been taken on the milder form of the resolution and no definite conclusion having come out of that, that we look to you to suggest the next step.” (Undated memorandum fry Mr. Jessup, USUN files)