501.BB Palestine/5–2148: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
urgent
689. Mytel 678.1 From Ross. Following handed me this afternoon by Beeley in response to questions I gave him May 19:
“You will understand that the following answers to the questions you handed me on the 19th May have no more authority than my personal opinion.
“I will comment first on your definition of the present position of the UK Government. It seems to me that there are at least two serious objections to proceeding under chapter VII of the Charter:
“(I) In our view the word ‘peace’ in Article 39 must be read as [Page 1025] meaning ‘international peace’. A decision that what is now happening in Palestine constitutes a threat to international peace might imply conclusions concerning the juridical status of Palestine which we feel would not be justified in present circumstances. We consider, as the terms of our amendment to your draft resolution indicate, that the juridical status of Palestine is still obscure.
“(II) In Charter terms, your resolution appears to contain: (a) a determination under Article 39, and (b) a proposal for provisional measures under Article 40. The last sentence of Article 40 provides that ‘the SC shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures’. It therefore seems likely that the approach to the problem through Chapter VII might very quickly lead to proposals for economic or military sanctions against one party in the present conflict.
“We do not think that a procedure which might end in sanctions against either Arabs or Jews, involving in the first instance a prolonged discussion on the question of responsibility for the present state of affairs and eventually the risk that our two governments might reach different conclusions on this question, is one which we can afford to adopt in the present state of international relations. What we would prefer is to see the situation in Palestine treated, without reference to the question of responsibility for its origins or continuance, as a situation containing a potential threat to world peace. This attitude towards it leads us to the conclusion that action should first be taken under Chapter VI of the Charter. But it does not exclude, in my view at least, subsequent or even concurrent, action to seal off the area of conflict in order to prevent its effects from spreading and from involving wider international relationships. If it proves possible to take comprehensive and effective measures to this end, I think the UK Government will be found ready to bring their relations with the Arab states into conformity with these measures.
“In other words, the ‘action by the UN’ which, as you state, is a condition of reconsidering the treaty obligations to certain Arab governments, need not necessarily take the form of a finding under Article 39 with the consequences which on present evidence we are disposed to think might follow from that finding. It follows that the two principles with which your paper begins are not mutually inconsistent. They do, however, involve the opinion that the UN should act impartially on an issue in which we believe that neither party has a claim to the backing of the UN against the other.
“Now for your questions.
“Nos. 1 to 2. It is not within the power of the UN to stop the fighting in Palestine at present. Noting the form of your questions, I would add that the UK Government would certainly not approve of measures to stop military action by the Arab states only.
“Nos. 3 to 4. It is my personal view that there can be no stabilization of the political situation in Palestine without a period of fighting. I think there is a good chance that this fighting may convince both Jews and Arabs that they cannot obtain the whole of their claims, and that [Page 1026] it will end in some kind of military stalemate which will probably indicate the lines along which a permanent political settlement can be found. The value of the UN mediator is that his presence on the scene when that stage is reached will provide machinery through which the two parties can begin to negotiate with one another as soon as they begin to appreciate the inevitability of a compromise.
“No. 5. There are certainly risks involved in letting matters take their course for a time. The most important of these is that the Soviet Union might in some way exploit the situation. I am doubtful, however, whether they will be strongly tempted to intervene directly in Palestine to any important extent. My own speculation is that their primary aims are the following:
“(I) To drive a wedge between the Arab world and the US.
“(II) To create conditions likely to weaken the present regimes in the Arab countries. They no doubt foresee that either weakness in supporting the Palestine Arabs or military reverses in Palestine would bring down the governments at least of Iraq and Syria and might even create a revolutionary situation in those two countries.
“You will forgive me for saying that the Russians must be reasonably satisfied with developments so far. I think they will not commit themselves more deeply than they have already done in support of the Jews, but will keep their hands sufficiently free to take advantage of the political changes for which they are hoping in the Arab states.
“Nos. 6 to 7. The UK Government has used all its influence to urge moderation on the Arabs. In particular, they used their influence with every Arab government and with the SYG of the Arab League in favor of acceptance by them of the articles of the truce which were under consideration until they were rendered out of date by the proclamation of a Jewish state on the 14th May. The UK Government are still urging the Arab states to act with a sense of their responsibility as members of the international community, but it must be remembered that British influence with these states depends upon:
“(I) Their conviction that in broad objective, if not always in detail, our policies and theirs are harmonious.
“(II) The absence of overwhelming pressure from their own public opinion in a direction contrary to that indicated by British advice.
“In view of the present mood of the public in all Arab countries, our influence is for the moment limited. On the other hand, there is evidence that our present policy is strengthening the confidence of the Arabs in our intentions towards them and this should enable us to use our influence with appreciable effect when the time comes for the UN mediator to bring the parties into contact in Palestine.
“No. 8 has been answered by a Foreign Office spokesman in London.
[Page 1027]“Nos. 9 to 14. I think the answers to these more hypothetical questions are implied in what I said about our present position at the beginning of this note. I do not think our policy is intended to exclude either support for sanctions applied impartially against both Jews and Arabs, or even participation in the necessary measures to make those sanctions effective. But, of course, any precise proposals made would have to be considered on their merits when they were put forward.”
- [Ross]
- Austin