501.BB Palestine/5–648: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
urgent
596. From Ross. Jessup, Rusk, Kopper and I met with Parodi, Creech Jones and Nisot (Belgium) at 6 this afternoon for two hours on status of truce discussions and future procedure. We presented following paper as basis for discussion, making clear it was not even an informal proposal of US Government:
“Representatives of the US, as one of the three members of the SC Truce Commission for Palestine, have had a number of informal conversations in New York with representatives of the JA, the AHC and the Arab States in an effort to determine if a basis could be found for agreement between the parties on specific truce terms.
Draft ‘articles of truce’ have served as a basis for the conversations referred to. Copies of this draft have been given to the parties to these conversations. Copies have also been given to representatives of the Belgian and French Governments, as the other members of the Truce Commission, and of the UK Government, as the mandatory power. The representatives of these three governments have been kept informed of the progress of the conversations.
It must now be reported that a basis for agreement on truce terms has not been found.
It is very unlikely that the Arabs will acquiesce in a figure for Jewish immigration higher than the present quota of 1,500 a month under the mandate. Otherwise it is believed that the truce terms might be acceptable to the Arabs.
The Jews would expect a minimum immigration figure of 4,000 a month. There is evidence, however, indicating that immigration is a secondary factor in the JA’s consideration of truce terms.
The principal Jewish objection to the truce terms is that it would be necessary for them to forego proclamation of a sovereign Jewish state on May 15.
[Page 924]The Jews also feel strongly that they would be put in an unfair position relative to the Arabs regarding the acquisition and importation of war materials.
The Jews might agree to forego proclamation of a sovereign state on May 15 provided (1) they were permitted under the truce terms to establish a provisional government for the Jewish part of Palestine, and (2) establishment of the Jewish state were considered as the objective of the truce or, alternatively (3) adequate guarantees were forthcoming that Arab ‘invasion’ of Palestine would be prevented in the event that with the ending of the truce the Jewish state were proclaimed.
In the light of the situation reported above the following steps should be considered:
- 1.
- Immediate consultation by representatives of the three governments represented on the Truce Commission and of the mandatory power to determine plan of action.
- 2.
- Review by said representatives and such revision as may be needed of articles of truce.
- 3.
- Formal presentation of proposed articles of truce as agreed upon by said representatives to representatives of JA and AHC. Presentation of terms to each party separately by M. Parodi in his dual role of representative of France as member of Truce Commission and President of SC. Representatives of Belgium and US to participate.
- 4.
- Simultaneous distribution by M. Parodi of proposed articles of truce to other members of SC to permit them time to consult their governments and determine their positions in preparation for later consideration in council. Query: Would it be desirable for M. Parodi to release truce terms to press, say 24 hours after giving to parties?
- 5.
- Three, or at most four day deadline for replies from parties.
- 6.
- SC meeting to consider replies and nature of any action required before May 15.”
[Here follows an account of the discussions on the question of immigration.]
SC phase:
Parodi raised question sanctions in event either or both parties refused compliance with truce terms. He said would be relatively easy apply sanctions against Jews, whether economic or military. He did not see how sanctions could be effectively applied against Arabs.
Creech Jones said “we must be realistic about what the SC is up against.” He said that a decree by the SC now directed against assistance by Arab States to Arabs in Palestine would make it exceedingly difficult for governments Arab States to maintain themselves in office. Most of these governments in position where they must help the Arabs in Palestine in response to inflamed public opinion, even against UN. Arab governments attempting to restrain people in compliance UN order would be swept to one side. Apart from resulting political chaos in these Arab States, gangs and more or less disorganized groups of [Page 925] fighters would cross from states into Palestine. Very large forces would be required to keep them out.
If threat were made to apply sanctions against Jews involving stopping of funds, “use of your naval forces” to patrol coasts and stop immigration would being [bring?] upon us during election year all of odium British have carried in past years.
Meanwhile, Creech Jones went on, the Russians would become involved by recognizing a Jewish state, provide forces, funds and supplies.
In view of presence French and Belgian, we refrained with some difficulty from pointing out to Creech Jones that we had taken some pains to point out all these factors and others besides in the situation to his government through Mr. Douglas, more than three weeks ago, in connection question providing forces to implement trusteeship.
[Here follow discussion of the subject of “procedure next 48 hours” and comments by Messrs. Nisot and Parodi.]
British policy:
General line of comments by Creech Jones this afternoon strengthens impression growing in my mind that objective present British policy is along lines Creech Jones set forth in our conversation with him last Sunday in Senator’s apartment, namely, invasion by Abdullah and effective partition with Jewish state north of Jaffa.
Further comments by Rusk will follow next telegram.1 [Ross.]
- Mr. Rusk commented later the same day on the unsatisfactory meeting with the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium and expressed his belief that “further talks on Friday with same delegations plus Jews and Arabs are essential before high level US intervention. As matters now stand, proposals I made earlier today would probably put us out in front again on unilateral basis without UK and French support.” (Telegram 597 from New York, 501.BB Palestine/5–648)↩