501.BB Palestine/5–648: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
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587. Eyes Alone For the Secretary and Lovett From Rusk. Dr. Goldmann came in this morning at his own request to discuss the truce. He said he was greatly disturbed by the present situation and considers the shortage of time makes immediate drastic action necessary. He said two questions were bothering the JA. First was how far the Jews could go short of declaring sovereignty in organizing their state. I told him that if there was to be any prospect of Arab agreement to a truce, the formula which refers to “existing Arab and Jewish authorities” was as far as we could go. I pointed out that in fact that would permit them to operate as a kind of provisional government within the Jewish community but that I believed any attempt to establish a formal provisional government claiming authority throughout the boundaries set out in the November 29 resolution would be bitterly resisted by the Arabs. His second point was one which has been recurring in recent talks with the Jews, namely, what assurances could the Jews have that a period of truce would not be followed by large-scale intervention by the Arab states. He pointed out that the Arab states could complete [Page 921] their military preparations during the truce and that this would work a severe hardship on the Jews, an argument he had found it difficult to meet inside the Agency. I told him that no government would commit its armed forces in advance to a hypothetical situation of the sort he raised, nor could anyone give the Jews a blank check without reference to the future course of Jewish action. I pointed out that the Jews could not expect greater security than everyone else in the world has at the present time. I told him I would raise the possibility of a policy statement by the US to the effect that our policy, including our arms embargo, would be directed solidly in support of a truce and against those who violated it or attempted to take advantage of its provisions to create warfare in Palestine. He seemed to think some such statement would be most useful in meeting this particular Jewish anxiety.
On immigration, he inquired how much progress we had made with the Arabs. I told him there was still a wide gap and that my only suggestion was that both Arabs and Jews must realize that the gap was not worth a major war. To overcome this obstacle, we were suggesting that immigration for the period of the truce be left to the SC Truce Commission but that it be advised on this point by an immigration advisory board comprising representatives of three governments, one to be selected by each of the parties and the third by the two governments so named. He seemed to think that would be very acceptable from the Jewish point of view and was a good formula.
I then outlined to Dr. Goldmann my own personal views on what situation would confront the Jews on May 15 if there is not truce. I said that (1) both Jews and Arabs will declare sovereign state and both will probably obtain some recognition. Arabs would be expected to obtain more recognitions in short run because of support from Arab and Moslem states; (2) without a truce, no international action can succeed in assisting the Jews in Jerusalem and a considerable part of Jewish effort must be spent in securing this Jewish enclave; (3) Jews will face long war of attrition with Arabs, with Arabs employing guerrilla tactics which Jews will find it difficult to handle with small forces at their disposal; Arabs will probably not engage in the fixed battles between major forces which would give the Jews a chance to force an early decision; (4) November 29 resolution will undoubtedly be suspended by the special session or by the SC acting under Chapter VII if it becomes apparent that the resolution is an obstacle to a truce; (5) the SC can be expected to order a truce with sanctions against one or both sides if truce is not accepted. If SC is blocked by a veto, the US and other members of the Council may have to apply sanctions anyhow; (6) the JA will face increasingly difficult problems of control over its own extremists who will take advantage of the need for Jewish solidarity to impose increasingly extreme policies upon the JA. Present moderates among the Jews would be displaced during the [Page 922] course of the fighting; (7) the probable course of events will identify Russian and Jewish interests in such a way as to create bitter hostility and anti-Semitism in the western world.
Goldmann stated that although my wording might be a little exaggerated, he agreed with the general analysis. Goldmann then said he had come to see me on a completely off-the-record basis to say that the time had now come in his opinion for the Secretary to intervene at once by calling in Shertok, and possibly Silver (but not Goldmann) and speak very bluntly to them along the lines of the points I had enumerated. Goldmann said that the moderates in New York had been, temporarily outnumbered in discussing a truce.
[Here follow various personal observations by Mr. Goldmann.]
I asked him if he had any views on whether our intervention should be by the President or the Secretary. He said he was “thinking aloud” but his impression was that blunt talk was necessary and that the President might be moved by internal political considerations to add promises or qualifications which might not help in this situation. I then asked whether Washington was better than New York for such, intervention. He said the place would make no difference. Commenting-further, he did not know whether Dr. Silver should be included because he realized that Silver’s presence might lead merely to “a big argument”. On the other hand, Silver’s group was the one which had to be convinced of our determination to pursue a truce policy in Palestine.
Goldmann asked that his visit and remarks to me be kept entirely secret.
We are trying to arrange a meeting this afternoon with Creech Jones, Parodi and Nisot to discuss a further draft of truce terms being sent Department by teletype. If these four governments conclude that the truce terms are fair and reasonable, we have the basis for SC action to order a truce under Chapter VII. Subject to the attitude of the other three, I recommend that the Secretary call Shertok and Silver to Washington on Friday and talk bluntly of our determination to bring about a truce. I believe such talks must be based, however, upon a policy decision by the President that (1) we are prepared to insist upon a truce along the lines of our latest Articles of truce with such changes as may be acceptable to Arabs and Jews, (2) that we are prepared to join with others in pressing action in the SC under Chapter VII to obtain such a truce, (3) that if SC action is frustrated by a veto, we are prepared to join with other UN members to support the truce by our own policies, (4) that we are prepared to support the sanctions envisaged in the Charter in support of a truce, (5) that we are prepared to support a suspension of the November 29 resolution in the special session of the GA, and (6) that we shall direct our policy, including our arms embargo policy, toward the support [Page 923] of a truce and against those who violate it or seek to disturb the existing military situation by indirection of subterfuge.
The Arabs would probably accept Articles of truce with the exception of the immigration point. I recommend that we be equally firm with the Arabs that the rest of the world cannot permit hostilities to go on merely because of inability to reach agreement on immigration and that we believe that the SC Truce Commission, advised by a specially selected board of three governments, should decide this question during the truce.
Above is subject to further comments after meeting with British, French and Belgians this afternoon, but believe you should be considering policy questions raised.