Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/4–2948

Mr. Moshe Shertok to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 29, 1948.

Dear Mr. Marshall: I hasten to clear up a serious misunderstanding which seems to have arisen. I understand that at an off-the-record press conference yesterday you are reported to have said that an agreement for truce had virtually been reached between the Jewish Agency and the Arab League on 13 out of 14 points, the outstanding point on which a reply from the Arab League is yet due, being that of immigration.¹

I regret to have to say that this is not the case. I was shown on Monday night, April 26th, a draft on which I made my comments. I indicated a number of difficulties and objections which it involved from our point of view. On the substance I remained non-committal and made it clear that I would have to consult my colleagues and that the final decision would be taken by the Executive in Palestine. Indeed, having given further thought to the matter, the difficulties grew in my estimation and yesterday morning I explained them to a member of the United States Delegation at Lake Success, when I expressed great skepticism whether the whole arrangement in its present form would be acceptable. The draft and my comments have been telegraphed to Palestine and the reply is awaited.

The main objections as I saw them were: first, that the proposed truce entails the deferment of statehood and renders its attainment in the future most uncertain, thereby gravely prejudicing our rights and position; second, that as the effective operation of the truce obviously involves the presence and the use in Palestine of a considerable force, we cannot but assume that the intention is to keep the British forces in occupation and control of Palestine.

I was also greatly concerned about the gross inequality under which we would be placed as regards arms and military training: the Arab states would be entirely free to acquire arms and stock-pile them for eventual use in Palestine against us; Palestinian and other Arabs would be free to train en masse in any of the neighboring countries; we would be precluded from either acquiring arms abroad or from any large scale training—training which we could only organize in Palestine.

We are most vitally interested in a truce, but, with every desire to be helpful, I am sure you will appreciate our anxiety to protect ourselves from the grave dangers with which it may confront us.²

Very sincerely yours,

Moshe Shertok

Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine

1. The memorandum of the press and radio news conference of the Secretary of State on Wednesday, April 28, 1948, recorded the off-the-record remarks as follows: “He [Secretary Marshall] said that, in addition to the various moves and resolutions which had been made by the Security Council, the Assembly and the Trusteeship Council, there was an unofficial effort being made to try to establish the basis for a truce until matters could be straightened out. He explained that through the offices of one of our people the representatives of the Jewish organizations and the spokesman of the Arab League had reached an agreement on 13 of 14 points establishing the basis for a truce. He said that the point on which they had not agreed concerned the question of immigration. Secretary Marshall said that the Arab League spokesman had referred back his agreements to the people in the Middle East, and that, although an answer had not yet been received from them, much progress had been made toward establishing the basis for a truce. It was not at all sufficient, said Mr. Marshall, to say we agreed to a truce since the great difficulty in any truce was the question of what the terms of the truce would be. Referring to his experience in China, the Secretary explained that one got a tremendous number of obligations involved, particularly when there was not the same sort of mediation in the middle for each particular issue.” (News Division Files)
2. Mr. Henderson, on April 29, pointed out to Mr. Epstein “the great desirability of moderation in efforts to secure a truce. He [Mr. Epstein] stated that he regretted the misunderstanding which had made it necessary for Mr. Shertok to write the letter of today’s date to the Secretary, but had felt that it was necessary that the Jewish position be clear. He agreed that there was great necessity to make every effort to achieve a truce, but said that the JA could not agree to a truce which would involve ‘surrender’.” Earlier in their conversation, Mr. Epstein had stated that “The Jewish State already exists and the Jews have no use for trusteeship” and “That no foreign troops are necessary. The Jews need arms and diplomatic action to prevent the invasions of outside countries.” (Memorandum of conversation by Mr. Henderson, 867N.01/4–2948)