501.BB Palestine/4–2948: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
urgent
526. For Lovett from Rusk. Prospects for a truce now turn on dealing with the question of immigration on which there is a very wide gap between the parties. Each side faces pressure of explosive Arab and Jewish public opinion and the serious threat of extremist and terrorist groups. There is little hope that we can get formal agreement in advance on immigration but some chance that we could get acquiescence in an arrangement “imposed” from the outside which would keep their respective records clear, establish no precedent in principle and leave both sides entirely free in later negotiations on the future of Palestine. The same kind of problem probably will arise in connection with other issues such as land purchase and land tenure.1
Both sides appear to agree that it would be a pity to lose a truce over these issues, yet each seems to be unable to extricate itself from its present position. It occurs to me that there is some possibility in an agreement that, during the period of the truce and without prejudice to the future governmental structure of Palestine, the SC Truce Commission might be given emergency authority to determine a temporary [Page 874] solution which could be acquiesced in but need not be accepted by the parties. Such authority might be granted on the basis of an understanding or an exchange of letters between the members of the SC Truce Commission and the parties setting forth the general lines which the SC Truce Commission would follow with respect to an issue like immigration.
Any such arrangement would be subject to the termination of the truce on proper notice from either party. However, this would considerably enlarge US involvement in Palestine issues because of our membership in the SC Truce Commission. I believe we should be prepared to pay that price for a truce for three or four months since we should at long last get the parties into some form of collaboration and into negotiations with each other. Every week of such joint effort reduces the possibility of eventual open warfare. I am reluctant to suggest this to the parties, even on a personal basis, without some assurance from the Dept that the US would be willing for the SC Truce Commission to undertake the tasks agreed to in accordance with the revised articles of truce which follow.
If the Dept is willing for me to proceed on this line, we should have Arab and Jewish reactions within a day or so. At that point Dept must consider whether the time has not come for full governmental effort to establish a truce on basis of position representing maximum agreement between parties, using diplomatic and other means to the limit. The emphasis being placed by other GA delegations upon implementation and forces together with extreme reluctance of other governments to assume any responsibility makes effective assembly action most unlikely if there is no truce.
Text of revised articles, on which your comments are urgently needed, now follows:
[Here follows text of revised articles. Revised Article 8 read: “During the period of the truce, the AHC and the JA for Palestine accept, as a matter of emergency, the authority of the SC Truce Commission to adjust administrative problems such as the repatriation of Arabs and Jews displaced from their homes in Palestine, immigration, the applicability of existing laws, and similar questions.”]
- [Rusk]
- Austin
- Messrs.
Jessup and Rusk and other members of the United States Delegation
met at Prince Faisal’s apartment in New York on April 28 for a
three-hour discussion on the articles of truce with the Chairmen of
the Saudi Arabian, Syrian, Iraqi, Egyptian, and Lebanese
Delegations. Mr. Kopper’s memorandum of conversation states that
“The attitude of the Arabs regarding immigration was summed up by
Prince Faisal as follows: The Arabs cannot sign any document which
would permit the entry of a single Jew into Palestine. Speaking for
the Arab Delegations, however, he wished to point out that they were
most anxious to do their utmost to find a final solution. While they
could not legally accept immigration, they might restrain themselves
from any action against immigration if the following conditions
could be present:
- “1. Immigration would take place for a limited period of time not to extend [beyond] the truce. After the truce, immigration would cease altogether.
- “2. The amount of immigration should not exceed the present quota of 1500 per month.
- “3. All immigrants should be women and children but not young warriors.
“If these conditions were fulfilled, the Arabs would promise to curb the Arab people and to acquiesce although they could not sign any document. This according to Prince Faisal was frankly all that could be done at this time,” (IO Files, US/A/C.1/684)
↩