Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

867N.01/4–2848

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)¹

secret

[Washington,] April 28, 1948.

Participants:	The Eight Honorable the Lord Inverchapel, British Ambassador
	Mr. Lovett, Under Secretary of State
	Mr. Llewellyn Thompson, Deputy Director for European Affairs

The Ambassador handed me a copy of the attached memorandum on Palestine.² I indicated that it was a rather late date for Mr. Bevin to be bringing to our attention the situation in Jerusalem, as we had been doing our utmost to arrange a truce both in Palestine generally and in Jerusalem particularly and to prevent armed action. I referred also to the fact that the Jews appeared to have gone further toward agreeing to the arrangements proposed for Jerusalem than the Arabs. I pointed out that at the very moment we were talking the United States was struggling with this problem in the United Nations and that last night we had received indications that a truce might be arranged. The Jews appeared ready to agree, but the Arab representative was obliged to cable home for instructions.

The Ambassador said that the British representative in Jerusalem thought that the police there were not adequate to preserve order and that dependence on them was not realistic.

I replied that I agreed that it was unrealistic unless a truce could be arranged. If a truce could not be brought about and lived up to, we might be forced to take some action such as a financial embargo against Palestine and countries of the Middle East. We would hate very much to be obliged to take such measures as we knew that none of the countries in the Middle East were in good shape. I expressed surprise that Mr. Bevin felt we had any influence whatever over the Jewish attitude and added that in any event we had no information to justify Mr. Bevin’s comment that the Jews were considering a large-scale attack on Jerusalem. I felt he should present this whole Palestine situation and our views frankly to Mr. Bevin.

I informed the Ambassador that we had instructed our Ambassador in London to impress upon Mr. Bevin the importance of not allowing the Arabs to take armed action against Palestine. I said that the fact that Great Britain had trained and officered the Transjordan Legion might create an impression both in the United States and elsewhere, in case the Transjordanese troops should invade Palestine, that such invasion had been acquiesced in by Great Britain.

The Ambassador replied that the reports about Abdullah did not appear to be correct and that they did not understand that he was contemplating any such invasion. I pointed out that some of these British-trained troops were already in Palestine and again stressed the importance of preventing armed action.

L[ovett]

1. Drafted by Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs.
2. No. G.96/ /48, dated April 28, not printed; it cited a report from the High Commissioner at Jerusalem of “increasing indications that the Jews were considering large-scale attacks on Jerusalem.” The memorandum conveyed Mr. Bevin’s request that the United States exercise its influence with the Jews to prevent such attack. The memorandum noted also that British representatives in the Arab States had been instructed to urge restraint on the Arabs. (501.BB Palestine/4–2848)