840.00/5–748
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Achilles)
Mr. Maclean1 called at his request to show me copies of telegrams between London and Rome on the question of including Italy in the Brussels Treaty.
On April 26 De Gasperi had given an interview to the United Press in which he had implied that relaxation of the military clauses of the Italian Treaty and some favorable action on the former Italian colonies would both be desirable before Italy did anything about adhering to the Five Power Treaty. De Gasperi had subsequently referred rather vaguely to these two points on discussing the question with the British Ambassador, but had stressed principally the political criticism to which his new government might be subjected should it move quickly toward adhering to the Treaty. The Communists were still playing the tune that Italy was being drawn by the West into a trap which could only lead to war. The far Right would attack the government if it adhered to the Treaty without prior action on colonies [Page 116] and military clauses. He accordingly felt it necessary to proceed with caution and feel his way.
Bevin had advised the Italian Ambassador in London that in view of De Gasperi’s wish to proceed cautiously the British would do the same. He had also instructed the British Ambassador in Rome to take a strong line with De Gasperi to the effect that Italian adherence to the Treaty would be an advantage to Italy but a liability to the other signatories, and that the Italians would be ill-advised to try “blackmail” in this connection.
In response to Maclean’s inquiry as to our views, I told him that we considered inclusion of any other government in the Treaty a matter for the present Parties to decide, but that our own view was that Italy fell undoubtedly into both a Western European defensive system and a Western economic and political group. We had so advised the Italian Ambassador. I said we fully agreed that Italy’s adherence would present a liability to the present Parties and that we did not see under the circumstances how the Italians could expect to demand concessions for their adherence. He hoped we would be willing to advise the Italians of this view. I said we had already pointed out to the Italian Ambassador that Italian adherence would be a liability for the other Parties.
In reply to his question as to our attitude on the military clauses, I said that we had from the very beginning of the CFM considered the clauses too restrictive and felt that means must eventually be found to increase Italian armed strength. We did not at present see any legal way of altering the Treaty provisions but felt that the Italian armed forces could be greatly strengthened within Treaty limits by greater utilization of civilians in administrative, supply and other non-combat fields and by modernization of equipment. In so far as equipment had to come either from one of the Brussels signatories or from us we felt this an additional argument in favor of Italian inclusion in the Brussels Treaty system in order that its requests could be dealt with in coordination with the needs of the others.
- Donald D. Maclean, First Secretary, British Embassy.↩