758.00/4–2148: Telegram
The Ambassador in Sweden (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
500. Conversations with people in various walks of life have increasingly brought home to me that one of the principal factors in Sweden’s stubborn adherence to a policy of strict neutrality is the firm belief that regardless of this policy the US will ultimately come to Sweden’s military aid. This is based partly on an exaggerated view of the strategic importance of Sweden to the US and partly on the complacent assumption that since Swedish sympathies are all with the west the US must regard her as an ally to be helped. The Foreign Office and the general public both even believe that by constantly [Page 98] proclaiming Swedish neutrality Sweden is in fact rendering a service to the US by “doing nothing to upset the tranquillity of this area”.
On the other hand as I have briefly reported there are growing doubts of the practicability if not the advisability of this neutrality policy. These doubters are still a small minority but they are not without influence and when and if Soviet control of Finland follows the general lines if not the tempo of the Czech pattern this minority will grow stronger.
I desire therefore to reenforce the recommendations contained in mytel 472,1 April 14, 6 p. m., that no export license be given for Swedish radar ground warning stations and that the Swedes be told the reason. It would also help considerably if the Department could find means of giving some blunt and salutary advice to Swedish Embassy along following lines: (1) The US has not forgotten Swedish neutrality; we do not like neutrality and we do not regard Sweden as a “western ally”. (2) Americans resent Swedish failure in official statements to distinguish in any way between the character and purposes of the “two great power blocs”. (3) Sweden’s failure to show any desire for closer political association with other free nations of the west involves in our opinion great risk for Sweden. Primary reason why the Soviets staged the Czech coup and has forced the Finnish treaty is that the Kremlin calculated—and accurately—that this would not involve the Soviet Union in war with the US; a primary reason why the USSR has not forced the issue in Turkey, Italy, Germany, Austria, Greece or Iran is because Kremlin fears a move in those areas would produce conflict with the US since all in one way or another are identified closely with US policy. The Kremlin may well feel that since Sweden is neutral it could move against Sweden without producing a major conflict. Hence by clinging to neutrality Sweden is running a grave risk. If this risk is based on the premise that American military aid at the last moment will be forthcoming this may prove to be a tragic and costly mistake for Sweden.
I believe that in our thinking and in our policy we should carefully distinguish between “neutral” Sweden on the one hand and Norway and Denmark on the other. Any gestures of aid to the latter coupled with refusals to aid Sweden will help shake Swedish neutrality. As I have said before there is no danger of Sweden veering toward the east or that such a policy on our part will undermine at this stage the Swedish will to resist.
Sent Department 500; repeated Paris as 136, London as 142, by mail to Oslo, Copenhagen.
- Not printed.↩