Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

840.00/4–1648: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret
us urgent

London, April 16, 1948—4 p. m.

1584. For Lovett’s eyes only from Douglas.

1. Many thanks your 1307, April 14.¹ I discussed the matter² with Bevin late yesterday afternon before his departure for Paris. I did not, of course, disclose to him the substance of your conversations with Vandenberg.³

2. I did, however, tell him that if the five-power talks reveal a resolute determination to integrate and coordinate the defenses of the signatory parties to the Brussels pact, we would be prepared at an early date to join in discussions for the coordination of production and supply. I also told him it would be reasonable for him and for the others to attach considerable significance to the President’s statement of March 17 in which he said, in effect, it was important that American troops be held in Germany until the peace of Europe was secure.

3. Bevin said the French were disposed to hold back and go slow on the grounds that there was little the five signatory powers could do against the overwhelming strength of the Soviet, unless the US were committed to come promptly to their support. I took it upon myself to explain to Bevin that this was precisely the attitude which, among other things might deter the US from making any commitment; that whatever we did would be conditioned largely upon the clear and unmistakable determination of western Europe to defend itself. With this Bevin agreed completely and said that he would press this point home in his talk with Bidault tonight.

4. As to the language in Bevin’s message⁴ delivered to you through Inverchapel, this Bevin had shown me after it had been sent. From my conversation with him then, I was quite clear that he did not mean that the UK would not stand up and fight, but that although she would fight, she would find it impossible to hold out for a period of two years until we came in. He explained yesterday afternoon that this was what he did mean, and gave assurances that although the UK would fight with determination, she was relatively so much weaker now than in 1940, that she could not hope for a successful stand against the Soviet hordes for a protracted period while we were considering whether we would participate actively. Does this cover your point?⁵

Douglas

1. Not printed.
2. Douglas was presumably referring here to a discussion with Bevin concerning the Department’s view that the more tightly the Five Power Treaty could be implemented, the better the United States would like it. See telegram 1195, p. 78.
3. The mention here of more than one conversation, together with the impression created by the casual opening reference to the European union in Lovett’s memorandum of conversation of April 11, p. 82, suggests that these men discussed the subject earlier than in the reported meeting. However, no record has been found in the Department of State files of any other substantive discussion of the subject by Lovett and Vandenberg prior to Douglas’ reference to the “conversations”.
4. April 9 telegram, paraphrased p. 79.
5. Lovett had expressed the view, in telegram 1307, April 14, that the Department considered Bevin’s wording on the subject highly unfortunate, and had requested Douglas to so inform Bevin. In answer to this explanation and final question, Lovett cabled Douglas that the answer was “yes” (telegram 1373, April 16, not printed: 840.00/4–1648).