711.41/8–1148: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
3625. 1. In recent months I have begun to sense an undercurrent of feeling here against the US both in and out of the government. Sometimes this takes the form of irritation and testiness, but recently it has taken on a much more serious form. At times their attitude towards US borders on the pathological, and there have been moments when the feeling here almost resembles an anxiety neurosis. I have tried to get at the bottom of this feeling and offer the following as a possible explanation.
2. Britain accepts our assumption of world leadership in face of Russian aggression, and Anglo-American unity today is more firmly established than ever before in peacetime. But Britain has never before been in position where her national security and economic fate are so completely dependent on and at mercy of another country’s decisions. Almost every day brings new evidence of her weakness and dependence on US. This is a bitter pill for a country accustomed to full control of her national destiny.
3. As British see it, given enough help from US and sufficient time, they will reverse adverse economic trends of inter-war years and repair economic damage of two world wars. While they do not expect to regain former relative supremacy, with help from US they are confident that in conjunction with British Commonwealth and Empire they will again become a power to be reckoned with, which, associated with the US, can maintain the balance of power in the world.
4. For geo-political and historic reasons, they feel we need them almost as much as they need us; that US can never again retreat into isolationism; and that in all the world there is no more stable, predictable or reliable ally than British Commonwealth and Empire led by UK. Continental Western European powers could be tremendous [Page 1114] asset in balance of power, but for variety of reasons they cannot be counted on in same way as British and Commonwealth bloc.
5. One of main objects of US policy, in their opinion, should therefore be strengthening British bloc, and they regard as short-sighted and ill-considered any policy of ours which insists on treating UK on same basis as other Western European powers, or which weakens or fails to strengthen this bloc.
6. One of the reasons why our relations are subject to severe emotional strain is the quite natural reluctance of Britain to give up her traditional position of world leadership and assume the role of a secondary and dependent power. A second reason is that Britain expects that in conjunction with Commonwealth and Empire they will in time regain sufficient economic strength to deal with the US on relatively equal terms, hence they must avoid, during this period of convalescence, making economic concessions which might impede or interfere with the realization of this expectation. A further reason, which should not be overlooked, is that the British leaders, in government and civil service, are in a state of nervous and physical exhaustion. There is no buoyancy here, no sense of optimism and confidence, of daring and adventure. Every demand we make on them poses a heavy strain on the reserves of physical and mental energy of those who make decisions. But these three reasons do not give an adequate explanation of the present strain.
7. The major reason, I think, is that Britain is subject to pressures of all kinds—internal and external. On top of six years of war she has, since 1947, been living in an atmosphere of continuous economic, political, and international crisis with no slack, no margin for error, no room to manoeuver. The British see the world dangerously unbalanced, in which only a few errors of policy may lead them to national destruction. In this world they are at the mercy of forces beyond their control and must rely at every critical turn on US decisions. They are therefore extremely sensitive to any US action or inaction.
8. Centuries of world leadership have taught them that leadership not only secures rights and claims, but imposes heavy duties, obligations and responsibilities. They are amazed at our progress in these directions since the end of the war. They appreciate the difficulties of adjusting a traditionally isolationist country to its suddenly acquired world position. They are also impressed by the many instances where we work together in harmony. At the same time they are sometimes baffled by what appears to them to be inconsistencies, loose ends or hesitations in certain of our approaches to international matters; not realizing that we too are baffled by what appears to us to be their own inconsistencies, loose ends and vacillations. But this is the way most people [Page 1115] and governments behave. There is no mirror in which any government can or will perceive a true image of itself.
9. When we begin to exert pressure on them to adopt a course which they regard as extremely dangerous, or when we pursue an independent and diametrically-opposed policy, they find themselves in the dilemma of either alienating American opinion or embarking on a course which they regard as hazardous, if not suicidal. Our failure for a period to work out a concerted policy over Palestine, so important to the Middle East, is, in their minds, an example of this.
10. The British have seen us modify our position. For example, they recall our opposition when they moved into Greece in December 1944 to stop Communism, and point to our subsequent acceptance of responsibility when they no longer had the power to hold Greece.
In the economic field they recall our mistake in insisting, over their objection, on the premature restoration of sterling convertibility in the first American loan agreement.
11. British believe our differences will narrow as we acquire a fuller appreciation of the complicated political, economic and power interrelationships which are required to restore and maintain the world balance of power. Meanwhile, as our joint relations to Russia become more critical and as the economic crisis here shows few signs of alleviation, their attitude towards us has become increasingly hypersensitive.
12. I would summarize the particular causes of her anxiety in recent months as follows:
- (a)
- Uncertainty as to the course of action which should be adopted
over the naked question of Berlin, if it reaches the point where
the issue may be war. Because of her exhaustion, her
sensitiveness to the geographical position of France, etc., and
her realization that she will bear the first brunt of any
attack, Britain, while fully conscious of the magnitude of the
stakes in the game and while taking a firm and unequivocal
stand, naturally hesitates to press matter to point of war. She
is torn by the desire to delay matters in order to rebuild her
and Western Europe’s strength, and an appreciation of the
dangers and far-reaching consequences of surrender in Berlin.
This accounts for the great emphasis she places on the air lift.
British would, I think, react strongly to an act of war committed by the Soviets.
I have not discussed this directly with the British. The foregoing is my estimate of the situation, derived from personal interpretations of the many discussions I have had with Bevin. - (b)
- Our criticism that Britain is dragging her heels in re Western Union economic integration. UK feels we have too little awareness of the difficulties, and the length of time it will take to make concrete working arrangements or resolve complicated problem of UK’s relationship to Commonwealth. They believe, rightly or wrongly, that nearly all of the constructive as distinct from platitudinous proposals have come from them.
- (c)
- Our delay in giving Western Europe specific military guarantees.
- (d)
- Our refusal to assume sufficient responsibilities in the Middle East, accept a trusteeship, or make explicit military guarantees against any Soviet threat to that area.
- (e)
- Our failure to appreciate the seriousness of Britain’s economic difficulties and our not infrequent demands that on a quid pro quo basis she make concessions to us which in her opinion will retard her convalescence.
- (f)
- The hostility of some of our people to the sterling area: specifically, our apparent indifference to the significance of the sterling area or the need for a wide inclusion of countries within this system; economic separation of the US from the sterling area for the purposes of ECA.
- (g)
- Our insistence on commitments to eliminate discrimination under the ITO Charter at a specific date without regard as to whether world economic conditions at the time will permit this.
- (h)
- Our failure to reduce tariffs or control our inflation, without which it is questionable whether economic equilibrium can ever be established.
- (i)
- The extraordinary demands we are making under ECA for data or demands to carry out policies which are impossible except under totalitarian conditions. British are not reluctant to supply pertinent information or pursue any reasonable policy we may suggest but they do not see how an operation of this kind can be carried out except on the basis of confidence in their integrity, their intelligence, their efficiency and their good faith.
13. I do not by any means wish to imply that every action of the British has been right, or that they could not have done a great deal more to improve their economic position. I think they have contributed to their own exhaustion by the heavy legislative program introduced by the Labor Government, just as they have contributed to their economic difficulties by some of the policies the government has followed. I am convinced that a great deal more could be done to improve production and productivity, lower costs, and modernize their industry. I could prepare a long and valid indictment of British internal policy and its adverse effect on her balance of payments and foreign policy. To put the matter cryptically (not Cripptically) the only answer to Britain’s difficulties is to work harder and, I fear, for less. The present government is subconsciously beginning to realize this, but because it has for 30 years been promising the opposite, it finds it difficult to say this to its supporters. This too, I think, makes for sensitiveness here.
14. But all things considered, particularly the promises which the Labor Party has made over the span of a third of a century and compared with other European countries, Britain has done a reasonably respectable job. If often imprudent, it has nevertheless faced its many difficulties, both at home and abroad, with a good deal of courage, [Page 1117] determination and ingenuity. Labor and conservative thinking is remarkably alike here especially on foreign policy and foreign economic policy.
15. The purpose of this telegram is to explain what must appear to you, and what is in fact at times, the sensitive, neurotic behavior of HMG. But despite this neurotic and supersensitive feeling, we should keep in mind that the British appreciate the imperative need for the closest US–UK relationship and on the whole are anxious to accommodate their views to ours.