840.20/4–948
Paraphrase of a Telegram From the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) of April 9th Regarding Recent Talks on North Atlantic Security Arrangements1
Long and careful consideration was given to all the risks involved, but the greatest risk, especially having regard to the lesson of past history, is to do nothing and not to be positive in our development, and we feel therefore that the approach that has been made to the problem of regional defence is the right one.
I have had an opportunity of consulting in the greatest secrecy the Prime Minister and a few of my closest colleagues. They agreed that the summoning of a conference by the United States Government to discuss defence arrangements for the North Atlantic area is the right course and would be the best guarantee of peace that could be imagined at the present time.
As I have stated above, we considered the risks and whether such action on the part of the United States Government might provoke the Soviets and cause them to take further rash measures which might result in war; but we took the view that this would not occur, and the risk would be a very small one. We believe that a real effort at organisation of collective security by the western powers now is more likely to cause an eventual reorientation of policy on the part of the Soviet Union, whereas if we proceed with half measures which are purely economic and financial and do not carry them to their logical conclusion, the Soviet Government might think that that is all we are likely to do. This would consequently weaken our position and so might precipitate the conflict which we desire to avoid.
Another essential thing in Western Europe, and indeed among all free European countries, is to give confidence. That confidence would have very great repercussions and make the economic steps that have been taken more effective. Therefore the construction of a North Atlantic defence system would put heart into the whole of Western Europe and would encourage them in their resistance to the infiltration tactics which they have had to face hitherto.
If a defence arrangement were set up which resulted in a really solid backing for the Brussels Treaty and which produced a sound [Page 80] Atlantic Security system, this would have a profound influence in dealing with the long standing German problem. France, of course, had hoped for the four-party treaty proposed by Mr. Byrnes and supported by Mr. Marshall. This would have given France a feeling of security in the event of a resurgence of the German menace. The French are still nervous and there is concern here too. In addition if the new defence system is so framed that it relates to any aggressor it would give all the European States such confidence that it might well be that the age-long trouble between Germany and France might tend to disappear.
We feel that American support only in the form of a declaration by the President would be inadequate. It would leave the situation in doubt and this would apply whether we extended it to the Scandinavian States and Italy, or whether we left it to the more limited area of the five power treaty. Again, any such declaration not having the backing of the Senate would make people here very doubtful as to whether they had incurred any reciprocal obligation. We should certainly be under a moral obligation not to leave the United States in the lurch. We should be constantly challenged as to whether we were in any way bound by a presidential declaration, and we should have to say that there was no commitment. That would leave us in a very unsatisfactory position and might arouse resentment in America.
One of my great anxieties in this business is whether, if trouble did come, we should be left waiting as in 1940 in a state of uncertainty. In view of our experience then it would be very difficult to be able to stand up to it again unless there was a definite worked out arrangement for the Western area, together with other assistance, on the basis of collective security to resist the aggressor.
To sum up, we do not believe that there is any substitute for a Treaty if something effective is to be done. A real defence system worked out by the United States of America, Canada, the United Kingdom and the Western European States would affect the whole approach of the world to the peace problem and be the first great step towards what could ultimately become a real world collective Security System, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.
- Point of origin, date and addressee not indicated on file copy. Apparently delivered to Lovett through Inverchapel (840.00/4–1648).↩