852.00/8–2548
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the
Division of Western European Affairs (Achilles)
confidential
[Washington,] August 25, 1948.
| Participants: |
Mr. Felix Lequérica, Spanish Inspector |
|
Mr. Hickerson, Director, EUR
|
|
T. C. Achilles, WE
|
Lequérica called at his request. Mr. Hickerson opened the conversation by
observing that he must be making a rather thorough inspection of the
Spanish Embassy and Consulates. He laughed and stated in reply to the
question that he had been here for four months. Mr. Hickerson commented
that our own inspections of large posts abroad sometimes took as much as
four or even as much as five months.
Mr. Hickerson observed that conditions in Spain were conspicuously
unchanged in both the political and economic fields. Mr. Lequérica
deprecated the need for any political changes but thought economic
changes both desirable and possible.
Mr. Hickerson reviewed UN action on Spain. The 1945 [1946] Resolution excluding Spain from membership in the UN was
obviously entirely within the competence of the organization. Its
subsequent actions on Spain had been open to question on two counts:
they came very close to attempted intervention in domestic affairs and
they were
[Page 1048]
based on the
unsound premise that conditions in Spain threatened the maintenance of
peace. We had in 1946 and 1947 questioned both the advisability and the
efficacy of the action taken. While we did not believe that, in the
absence of substantial change in Spain, there was any likelihood that
two-thirds of the members would support either repeal or modification of
the 1946 Resolution, we would be prepared to support modification both
concerning membership in affiliated agencies and concerning the sending
of Ambassadors but not ourselves to initiate such action.1
Mr. Lequérica handed over the attached informal paper and expressed the
belief that the difficulty of obtaining a two-thirds majority for repeal
could be avoided by presenting a new Resolution substantially identical
to the 1946 one, which would presumably fail to obtain two-thirds. Mr.
Hickerson commented that whether such action would effectively repeal
the 1946 Resolution or not would depend largely on the Secretary
General’s verdict. Mr. Achilles added that a number of governments would
probably be antagonized by the transparency of such a maneuver.
Mr. Lequérica stated that much could be accomplished, including
“miracles” in the economic field if the United States had contact with
Spain through an Ambassador in Madrid. Mr. Achilles reminded him that
any time the Spanish Government wanted contact with the U.S. Government
it had only to approach our Chargé in Madrid or use its own Chargé in
Washington. Lequérica stressed Spanish pride and prestige and said that
when Norman Armour had been Ambassador2 he had been able to “obtain” several desirable
changes. Mr. Achilles interjected that we were not interested in
“obtaining” anything from Spain, that it was the Spanish Government
which was interested in obtaining readmission into the international
community and were merely giving friendly advice as to how it might go
about doing so.
The conversation ended with Lequérica saying that progress was up to the
United States and being advised that in our opinion it was definitely up
to Spain.
[Annex]
During 1946 it was proposed to recall the Chiefs-of-Mission from
Madrid. This motion was passed by the General Assembly of the United
Nations with the required two-thirds majority. Consequently many
nations recalled their Chiefs-of-Mission, excepting the Argentine
[Page 1049]
which sent an
Ambassador to Madrid claiming that the motion had only been a
recommendation.
In 1947 the same motion again was put to a ballot. The United States
voted against it and the resolution was not passed as it failed to
obtain the two-thirds majority required by the rules. Thereupon the
U.N. member-nations were free to send Chiefs-of-Mission to Madrid;
this Bolivia, El Salvador, Santo Domingo, and Peru have done.
According to the U.N. rules of procedure no new resolution is needed
to normalize diplomatic relations with Madrid, but the Department of
State alleges moral reasons for not appointing an Ambassador. It
states that if the 1947 resolution did not receive the two-thirds
vote necessary for its approval according to procedure, morally it
is not binding as a majority of votes were not cast on the
resolution.
Perhaps a new and favorable resolution might be taken regarding Spain
reversing the 1946 resolution and clearly permitting the return of
Chiefs-of-Mission to Madrid and the renewal of full diplomatic
relations. For such a resolution to be passed two-thirds of the
votes cast would have to be “ayes”.
But if this did not happen? We could have the paradox of a majority
voting in favor of full diplomatic relations and yet not have a new
and favorable 1948 resolution. And have at the same time a
resolution favoring renewal of relations in 1947 owing to the fact
that that resolution was defeated even though by a minority. What
would the United States and, perhaps, other nations do in this case?
Follow the desire of the majority who voted in favor of full
diplomatic relations with Spain (1948) even though the agreement was
not valid because it did not obtain the votes of a two-thirds
majority? Or feel scrupulous and maintain that, although there had
been a majority, it had not been of two-thirds and that, therefore,
normal diplomatic relations could not be taken up with Madrid? But
if this was alleged, why not apply the principle to the 1947 vote
which, according to procedure, permitted full diplomatic relations
even if the motion were passed by a minority?
To solve this situation naturally and within legal bounds is to
follow the 1947 resolution without any new vote. The majority will
be determined individually by the nations as they send
representatives to Madrid and can be obtained through a special
agreement between the nations favorably inclined.
If because of some unexplained resistance this solution were not
reached, it would be expedient to vote on a new negative resolution
such as those of 1946 and 1947—contrary to Spain—which, most
probably, would not receive the two-thirds majority necessary for
approval, as in 1947, but which, considering the present attitude of
many countries, might even be turned down by a majority.
[Page 1050]
Or again, an explicatory resolution could be passed to determine
whether the 1946 or the 1947 recommendation should be followed, but
this only if such an agreement did not require, as we believe, a
two-thirds majority of all votes but only a simple majority as per
procedure.
