802.7902/3–2948
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Horsey)
| Participants: | Major General Samuel E. Anderson, USAF |
| Colonel Joseph A. Miller, ITS Air Attaché, Madrid | |
| John D. Hickerson, Director, EUR | |
| Outerbridge Horsey, WE |
General Anderson said that Colonel Miller had been called back on consultation as a result of a discussion at the Joint Chiefs meeting at Key West, as to the necessity of having three airfields in Spain constructed and equipped to handle the heaviest US bombers. Mr. Hickerson asked whether the Air Force had in mind that, at the same time that facilities were made available to do this work, specific arrangements should be made for the use of the fields in the event of an emergency. General Anderson said that they would like such base rights, but that he thought they would be able to get them whether or not there was a written agreement. Mr. Hickerson concurred, but thought the price exacted by the Spaniards would be a good deal higher if we waited until the emergency actually had arisen instead of making the agreement now. However, Mr. Hickerson thought we would have to pay that price since he thought it would be politically unwise to make such an arrangement at this time, even in secret.
Mr. Hickerson said that we faced, in the case of Spain, a similar situation to that of Palestine, in which there has been a prolonged build-up of emotional thinking on the question both here and abroad and in which that emotional thinking was in conflict with our strategic defense requirements. Mr. Hickerson thought that joining with Spain in a military way, either on base rights or in furnishing the Spaniards with military training aircraft, would be greeted with dismay by important sections of public opinion in this country. This would be unfortunate at the time when liberal opinion was being brought around to [Page 1035] the necessity of national unity on the Communist question. The interjection of Spain would confuse the broader issue and might lose the Administration the support of influential opinion.
On the other hand, Mr. Hickerson said that there was no objection at all to the expansion and equipment of these airfields and the furnishing of civil aircraft, if the financing was all through private channels. Mr. Horsey said that the negotiations on looted gold would probably be finished within a few weeks and that this would aid the Spaniards in obtaining bank credits in this country. Mr. Hickerson thought that in this way we would get the military benefits under the cover of cooperation in civil aviation. Mr. Hickerson readily agreed that in the event of serious difficulties, the situation on Spain would change overnight.
General Anderson said that he was preparing a paper for the Joint Chiefs on the question raised at Key West and would include Mr. Hickerson’s opinion that (a) the securing of base rights at this time was politically inadvisable; (b) the furnishing of any military aircraft at this time was likewise inadvisable and (c) there was no objection to a privately financed civil aviation program involving airport equipment and the largest civil aircraft, such as the DC–6.