Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

Lisbon Embassy Files, Lot 56F159

The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeagh)

top secret

Washington, September 22, 1948.

Dear Mr. Ambassador: Thank you for your letter of September 9,¹ and for your very interesting despatch no. 332 of September 8. I may say, incidentally, that we very much appreciate the reporting we have received since you arrived in Lisbon.

I should like to comment on your despatch of September 8 from two angles, that of the closer association of Western European countries with ITS backing and the place for Spain in the picture.

The name “Western Union” is unfortunate because it promotes confusion between such different things as the Five Power Brussels Treaty, unofficial projects looking toward unification of Europe and such official actions as are beginning to be taken looking toward that objective. Our telegram no. 406 of August 27² applies to the latter two. We regard these two fields as European, except insofar as US economic assistance is concerned, although we strongly favor the closest practicable integration which the Europeans can achieve.

The question of American military support for the nations of Western Europe, using the parties to the Brussels Treaty as a nucleus, is one with which Ave have been actively concerned in recent months, as you will recall from our conversation just before your departure. Since early July we have been actively engaged in exploring with the Ambassadors of Canada and the parties to the Brussels Treaty the possibilities of establishing, within the framework of the United Nations Charter and the Vandenberg Resolution, a North Atlantic Security Pact similar to the Rio Treaty. It would be designed to fortify and preserve the common western heritage of the parties and to contribute to the maintenance of peace by strengthening the coordinated capacity of the parties to resist aggression and thereby, in itself, to deter aggression. In addition to the countries represented in our exploratory talks here, we would like to see Portugal, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and possibly Ireland and other countries become members of such a pact. The United States would, of course, be a full member, assuming the Senate consents to ratification. A top secret paper has emerged from these discussions and recently been forwarded to the other³ Governments for their urgent consideration. It envisages consultation with the others named above prior to the conclusion of the Pact to ascertain whether they would be prepared to accept the responsibilities of membership. Pending approval by the other Governments represented in these talks, we cannot authorize you to discuss it with the Portuguese but I see no objection to your telling the Foreign Minister in general terms the trend along which these talks have developed. I am pleased to note that the trend of the Portuguese Government’s thought reported in your despatch of September 8 is running on not dissimilar lines.

The British and French military, as well as our own, are definitely anxious to see Spain fitted into the picture at least as soon as politically possible, but the parties to the Brussels Treaty do not consider it politically possible even to think out loud about including Spain at this time. This gives point to our policy toward Spain as indicated in the latest Policy Statement, of which you have a copy. Essentially, we want to see Spain reintegrated into the Western European community, politically, economically and militarily, as quickly as practicable. However, England and France are more important to us than is Spain and Spain is more important to them than to us. Spain is still a highly controversial subject in domestic politics in England, France, the Low Countries and Scandinavia. We have long been telling the Spanish in a friendly way that we did not see how the Western European Governments could readmit Spain fully into their community in the absence of some gradual and orderly political evolution in the direction of greater democracy.

It occurs to us, and your despatch points this up, that the Portuguese could be of great assistance in bringing this last idea home to the Spaniards. If the Foreign Minister and Salazar see the problem of Spanish readmission into the Western community in the same light as we do, Franco’s impending visit to Lisbon would provide an exceptional opportunity for them to discuss it with him. We would be interested in learning their views.

It might also be helpful for you to know that we have recently circularized our Missions in Latin America, the British Dominions and a number of Western European countries to ascertain the positions which the respective governments will take on Spain at the current session of the Assembly. We have indicated to them that, while we were not prepared to take the initiative ourselves, we would probably be prepared to support modification of the 1946 Resolution⁴ to the extent of repealing the prohibition on sending Ambassadors or Ministers to Madrid and of providing that technical organizations affiliated to the United Nations might admit Spain if in the opinion of those organizations Spanish membership would be desirable from the technical point of view. The replies so far received indicate rather widespread approval of the second modification and some approval of the first, although probably not enough to secure the necessary two-thirds majority.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

John D. Hickerson

1. Not printed.
2. Not printed.
3. Marginal note, presumably in Hickerson’s handwriting, “Brussels Treaty & Canadian.”
4. For text of the resolution on Spain adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 12, 1946, see Department of State Bulletin, December 22, 1946, p. 1143, and for related documentation see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. v, pp. 1083 ff.