840.50 Recovery/10–2048

The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State

top secret

No. 1499

Sir: I have the honor to transmit a copy of a memorandum prepared by the Minister Counselor of Embassy with regard to the conversation between the Honorable Alcide De Gasperi and Count Sforza with the Secretary of State at my residence during the Secretary’s visit to Rome.1 Secretary Marshall did not read this memorandum prior to his deparature, but according to Martel 66 repeated Rome as 402, October 20, the Secretary has approved it without change.

Respectfully yours,

James Clement Dunn
[Enclosure]

Précis of Conversation Between Secretary of State George C. Marshall, President of the Council of Ministers De Gasperi, Foreign Minister Sforza, and Ambassador Dunn, October 18, 1948

Italian Economy

In reply to the Secretary’s inquiry regarding the present general state of the Italian economy, the President of the Council of Ministers stressed as foremost the need for an immediate solution of the problem of Italian surplus population. He pointed out that Italian industry (particularly the mechanical industry in the North) had more workers on the pay rolls than was economically sound. This resulted in a vicious circle which tended to vitiate the benefits of the European Recovery Program. For instance, Americans supplied coal to Italian industry, but due to the excessive number of workers on the pay rolls and the resulting high production cost of the products, Italian industry did not yield a sufficient return for Italy to purchase itself the coal that was needed to restart the cycle. He said that a solution of putting excess workers on relief was politically most undesirable because the workers themselves felt strongly that they wanted work and not relief. He pointed out that public works took considerable time and heavy financing, both of which Italy did not have. The only solution politically [Page 884] practicable was the export of Italian labor to the other countries of Europe and South America. He appealed to the Secretary for the good offices of the United States in persuading other European and South American countries to accept Italian immigration.

In answer to Secretary Marshall’s inquiry with regard to the magnitude of unemployment in Italy, the Prime Minister pointed out that it was over two million and that the annual population increase was over 400 thousand a year. The Secretary of State mentioned that he had had recent exploratory discussions on this problem with the Foreign Minister of Brazil, and he inquired what effect the proposed Italo-French Agreement would have in this regard. Both De Gasperi and Sforza said that France could readily absorb almost immediately a vast number of Italian workers which would have an immediately beneficial effect on both French and Italian economy. Sforza pointed out that Italy itself, through the proposed Agreement, was ready to sacrifice some of its heavy industry in return for the French sacrifice of some of its mechanical industry which employed a larger proportional number of workers. Sforza gave one explanation for delay on the part of the French in concluding the accord in that there was a latent political concern on the part of the French that Southern France might tend to be Italianized through too hasty admission of Italian immigrants. He also pointed out a fundamental French complex that France was a country of greater wealth and political importance than Italy and consequently somewhat more conservative in the adoption of such new ideas as the Customs Union. Italy, which felt more keenly the dire pressure of necessity, was more ready to take new steps. Secretary Marshall expressed the keenest interest and understanding of the need for the early conclusion of the Italo-French Customs Union. He also pointed out its importance in connection with the January–February hearings in Congress of the concrete results obtained so far through ERP. He said he would pursue this matter further in Paris and with Mr. Harriman.

Aside from over-population De Gasperi stressed that another problem facing Italian economy was the present industrial recession in Northern Italy. He gave as his primary explanation the fear of war which paralyzed the undertaking of new activity. Sforza added that business people in Northern Italy believed that in the event of war the first military line would be the Gothic Line and that Italian industry in the North would immediately fall into the hands of the Russians. In this connection he referred to the immediate memory of what a formidable obstacle the Gothic Line had proved in the campaign of the Allies against Germany. He then alluded to the importance of a feeling of military and political security in the solution of [Page 885] the economic problems of Italian industry in the North. He referred to his recent speech regarding Italy’s common interests with the Western Democracies and mentioned his own belief that the OEEC nations could develop further from an economic basis into a strong political and military front against the Soviet menace if supported by the United States.

The Secretary traced the development of American public opinion with regard to support of the Western Democracies from the initial attitude of Congress following the war in slashing military appropriations to the present strong support of a firm United States foreign policy. He stressed the tremendous importance of the Vandenberg Resolution and that American public opinion since that date had progressed much further in favor of the firmest sort of stand (against Soviet aggression. He felt confident that in the forthcoming Congress it would be possible to obtain a more liberal policy with regard to military help for the Western Democracies and that appropriations would be passed. Moreover, the surplus materiel which had been scattered about and to a great extent disposed of at the end of the war was now being reorganized to a point where the time lag between shipments and an authorization from Congress would be considerably cut down from what would have been possible last June. He pointed out that the United States had to go slowly in this whole matter because it was our great preoccupation not to make any declarations that we could not fully back up with action.

World Situation

With reference to the concern of both the Prime Minister and Sforza over the tenseness resulting from the Berlin situation, the Secretary reviewed the developments leading to that situation and his own personal experiences in dealing with Stalin and Molotov.2 He related step by step the great personal effort he had made to convince them of his utter sincerity and he outlined some of the evasions and falsehoods with which he had been confronted. At the same time he pointed out that the Russians had lived up to their commitments during the war.

He explained in detail the developments surrounding recent reports with regard to the proposed sending of Judge Vinson to make an appeal to Stalin, including the fact that the proposal had been abandoned by the President immediately on the Secretary’s recommendation, and, prior to the Secretary’s recent departure from Paris to the United States for consultation with the President. He referred to the President’s unique position of responsibility in being the only man in [Page 886] the world who would be faced with making the decision as to the use of the atom bomb, and that already twice in the war the President had had to bear the terrific responsibility of making that decision. He said the President realized this most keenly and with grave preoccupation. He mentioned the President’s great concern that no possible step should be left untaken towards convincing the Soviet Government that no one desired peace more than President Truman, but that if forced the point could be reached where the bomb would have to be used. Public opinion in America, due to intense Soviet provocation, had now reached the stage where it would fully support and demand the use of the bomb, and the Soviet Government knew this.

In describing the world situation the Secretary made an analogy of his recent trip to Greece where he found that everyone was concentrating on one mountain rather than on the general situation; he said that the countries of Europe seemed to be rather like a general who in an engagement of five divisions was devoting all his time to the action of one regiment; he was speaking of the Berlin situation. When he looked over the developments in Europe and the world as a whole he could not but be impressed by the great strides that had been made in the past two years towards a general improvement of both economic and political conditions and a resulting general setback of aggressive Communist expansion. He pointed to production figures in many countries that had already exceeded the estimates of their and our experts and to continuing favorable political developments such as the Italian and other elections. He thought that the Soviets had adopted their Berlin policy in a desperate effort to re-assert themselves against the tide of world resistance to their expansion. He gave statistics with regard to the extraordinary successes of the air-lift which now had established the ability of our occupation forces in Germany to continue indefinitely the provisioning of the non-Soviet zones in that city. For instance, in one day when 80 per cent of the transport planes had to be landed by instruments 7,000 tons of coal had been brought in as against the estimated requirement of 4,500 tons. Taking into consideration the tremendous factor of the atom bomb, the united American public opinion, the favorable political and economic developments already taking place in Western Europe, he did not believe that the Russians would force the international situation into war. The principal danger lay in the possibility that they might undertake an incident which could lead to war, since the American people, not subject to dictatorship control, could not safely be experimented with in incidents.

ERP

The Secretary outlined the historical development of legislation governing the appropriation of monies by the Congress, and he explained [Page 887] in that connection the importance of the ERP hearings next January–February before the Appropriations Committees and not before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was far less subject to isolationist control and broader in perspective. He referred again to the importance of the Italo-French Customs Union as a concrete proof of the efforts these two countries were making to work together under the over-all European Recovery Program and he stressed the tremendous importance of each of the ERP countries being in a position to put forth evidence of the progress it was making towards full recovery.3

  1. Secretary Marshall, accompanied by Mrs. Marshall and his staff of personal assistants arrived by plane from Greece at Ciampino Airport near Rome at 4:00 p. m. Monday, October 18. Accompanied by Ambassador Dunn, the Secretary that afternoon called on the President of the Republic, Luigi Einaudi, and on De Gasperi and Sforza. Tuesday morning Secretary and Mrs. Marshall drove to Castel Gandolfo where they were received by the Pope. After saying goodbye to Count Sforza, Secretary Marshall departed by plane for Paris at 3:30 p. m. (Rome Despatch No. 1508, October 21, 1948, 111.11 Marshall, George C./10–2148)
  2. For documentation on the Berlin situation, see volume ii .
  3. In telegram 4060 of October 20, not printed, Dunn expressed his view that “Secretary’s visit here has unquestionably in my opinion had an extremely beneficial effect on our present relations with Italy. Aside from the favorable publicity concerning his visit, I consider that he has considerably strengthened De Gasperi’s policy of orienting Italy with the free democracies. The Secretary’s talk with De Gasperi has also strengthened the Prime Minister in his struggle against Communism in Italy, an issue which is of course not yet resolved.” (111.11 Marshall, George C./10–2048)