Office of the Historian

865.00/6–1648

The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State

top secret
Rome, June 16, 1948.

Dear Mr. Secretary: With reference to Undersecretary Lovett’s top secret message of March 3 (telegram no. 566),1 you, Mr. Lovett, and some of your advisers on European affairs will probably be interested in a summary of what this Embassy did of a concrete nature to support the democratic, non-Communist elements and political groups in Italy during the pre-election period. In the light of the major victory against the Communists won by the Italian people, it is of interest to evaluate the part our efforts may have played in this reaffirmation of the democratic processes in Italy. During the last six weeks of the pre-election period a small committee composed of the heads of the Political [Page 880] and Economic Sections, of my Economic Adviser on the Treaty and of the Military, Naval, Air and Treasury Attaches, functioned in the Embassy as a “political action committee” to consider scores of suggestions from friendly outside sources and initiate and produce suggestions for ways and means to encourage, support and make more effective the electoral campaign being waged by the non-Communist democratic parties in Italy.

The various proposals which emanated from the Embassy or were supported by it, and which may have had an influence on the elections are briefly summarized under the headings of the peace treaty, official American statements, and political, informational and economic activities. These are outlined below:

1.
Peace Treaty.
a.
The Tripartite Proposal on Trieste (my telegram 1965, July 15, 1947,2 and my telegrams 883,3 943,4 9665 and 11546 of March 1, 4, 6 and 16, 1948).
b.
Prompt and affirmative action upon Count Sforza’s suggestion that surplus submarines be scrapped rather than sunk (my telegrams 38652 and 4028, November 29 and December 13).2
2.
Official American Statements.
a.
The Secretary’s mid-March statement at the University of California regarding the removal of Italy from ERP benefits if the Communists gained an election victory (Embassy telegrams 5437 and 7618 of February 7 and 21, and 1223 of March 19).9
b.
Statement upon an inevitable decline in American tourist trade if a Communist Government should gain power (our letter to Ray Murphy, EUR, of February 24).12
c.
Pertinent quotes from United States immigration laws upon inadmissibility of Communists given to non-Communist party leaders. (My telegram 1207, March 18.)10
d.
Foreign Ministry denial of a Communist-spread rumor in Southern Italy that any persons voting would be ineligible to emigrate to America (my telegrams 1446, 1524, and 1639 of April 1, 5 and 10).11 American consular offices in Italy also made proper statements on this.
3.
Political Actions.
a.
Letter writing program from America to relatives and friends in Italy.…
b.
Circular letters to about 5,000 United States Veterans’ Administration beneficiaries in Italy, from well organized anti-Communist civic group, warning the beneficiaries of the uncertainty of their remittances if a Communist regime were elected.
c.
Statement of support for the Italian autonomous Socialist movement (my telegram 1367,12 March 27) from Norman Thomas, which when received was extensively employed by the independent Socialists.
d.
Anti-Communist material made available to and effectively used by democratic political organizations and newspapers. (This appeared in posters, leaflets and articles comprising subjects such as the notorious anti-Italian army statements by Vishinsky at the Paris Conference and stories of comparative life in the United States and USSR.)
4.
Informational Activities.
a.
Effective aid provided to iron out copyright difficulties, thus permitting the Italian language publication of Kravchenko’s “I Chose Freedom”.
b.
Support given to secure the greatest number of prints of the film “Ninochka” which satirizes life in the USSR, and which enjoyed even greater nationwide success following the protest of the local Soviet Ambassador (my telegram 1452 April 1).12
c.
Maximum showings of newsreels and topical shorts upon democratic processes such as elections facilitated by local Italian film board (see my telegrams 96712 and 1101,12 March 6 and 13).
d.
The role of radio was limited through Government restrictions upon pre-electoral political broadcasting and since only a small number of people have radios able to receive American broadcasts. However, the suggested relayed broadcast (my telegram 1536 [1356],12 March 26) by Hollywood stars for the benefit of widows and children of Italian aviators got good advance publicity, was well received, and added its healthy effect to the general campaign.
5.
Economic Aid.
a.
The American relief program (AUSA) and the interim aid program, as well as advance information and publicity upon ERP operations. (The Italian Government with Embassy cooperation used 500 million lire for six million posters on American assistance, as well as varied newsreels on the subject; it spent 8 million lire additional on leaflets and public conveyance signs; it used a postage cancellation stamp reading “Assistance from America”; it printed with appropriate Vatican approval 10 million prayer cards to Mother Cabrini (American saint) that American aid would continue, and it arranged publicity displays.)
b.
Italian Government projects, financed by the lire fund, entailed relief projects, mainly for southern Italy. (These included a 1,500 million lire contribution to relieve the unemployed which was used for vocational training and 1,800,000 food packages; a 20 million lire land reclamation project; irrigation and repair of roads; 28 billion lire for railways; 4 billion lire to refit the passenger ships Conte [Page 882] Biancamano and Conte Grande, and a recent 7 billion lire enterprise of agrarian aid and development for southern Italy.) (See quarterly report on American relief programs dated March 30.)
c.
Speeches by American Ambassador in various parts of Italy on every appropriate occasion, to explain the role and true purpose of American aid. (These were reported to the Department by despatch and telegram as they were made.)
d.
Pre-election settlement of Italian war prisoner claims against the United States (Embassy telegram 662, February 1),14 the resultant ceremony at the Treasury Ministry being favorably covered by the press and newsreels (Embassy telegram 1477, April 2),15
e.
Export of fruits and vegetables to Germany (see my telegram 541,15 February 7) for dollar exchange with resultant favorable publicity (my dispatch 60215 and telegram 1661 of April 12).15
f.
Department’s statement suggested in Embassy telegram 1319,15 March 30, upon imports of steel scrap from Germany to offset the unfavorable reaction occasioned by exports of steel scrap from Italy to the United States (radio bulletin, April 8).
g.
Suggestion that the British make a timely export to Italy of gas coal (my telegram 1604, April 8),15 which was done prior to the elections.
h.
Despatch of two experts (my telegram 939,15 March 4) from the United States to study agricultural and hydro-electric development possibilities in southern Italy (see radio bulletin 91 of April 16).

I cannot, of course, bring a letter of this nature to a close without expressing my profound admiration for the services of the Department in responding to our various suggestions. The imagination and industry which under your direction characterized the responses of our colleagues in the Department during this critical period made possible whatever success we may have achieved in supporting and helping the forces of democracy in Italy.

Sincerely yours,

James Clement Dunn
  1. Not printed.↩
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  3. See footnote 1, p. 509.↩
  4. Ante, p. 509.↩
  5. See footnote 3, p. 510.↩
  6. Ante, p. 514.↩
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  9. Ante, p. 827.↩
  10. Ante, p. 832.↩
  11. See footnote 4, p. 854.↩
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  13. See footnote 3, p. 866.↩
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  20. Not found in Department of State files.↩
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