840.00/3–2248
Minutes of the First Meeting of the United States–United Kingdom–Canada Security Conversations, Held at Washington, March 22, 19481
Present were (US) Ambassador Douglas, Messrs. Hickerson, Butler, Achilles, Gen. Gruenther, Col. Griffin; (UK) Lord Inverchapel, Messrs. Gladwyn Jebb, Cecil, McLean [Maclean], Gen. Hollis, Brig. Price; (Canada) Ambassador Pearson, Messrs. Wright, Stone, Gen. Foulkes. Ambassador Douglas started the meeting at 1500, adjourned it at 1700.
French participation in conversations: Jebb, after a brief explanation of the Brussels pact, raised the question of inviting early French participation in the current conversations, urging that this be done. Douglas and Hickerson suggested that the French required consideration as a security risk before this decision might be made and indicated [Page 60] that exploration on the present basis would be desirable first in any event. Jebb returned to this question at the close of the meeting, but UK and Canada accept US view, at least for the time being.
US assurances to western European states: Inverchapel and Jebb (Pearson2 being noncommittal) indicated strongly the belief that the security measures of Brussels, and especially its extension to other European nations, required a firm commitment on the part of the US to aid militarily in the event of any aggression in Europe. Douglas and Hickerson explained at some length the US problem of Congressional support in such a connection. Should US assurances be by Presidential proclamation, if there were to be any, or by adherence to a treaty? In either case, Executive would have to have support of Congress. Senate leaders have not been approached on this question.
Inverchapel and Jebb considered that the position of the US was the first order of business; that what this position might be should be developed before the conversations could usefully turn to any other questions.
Douglas stated that he felt that US full support should be assumed, for the purpose of the current conversations, since such support was more than implied in the President’s 17 March message to Congress and since no commitments could be developed in any case without support of the Congress. This position was accepted, somewhat reluctantly, by the UK representatives.
Nature of a defense past: Douglas felt that it would be most useful first to explore the various types of defense pacts which might be adopted to extend resistance to the Soviet Communistic threat. There were three which should be considered; extension of the Brussels pact; an Atlantic pact (plus other regional pacts, such as one for the Mediterranean); and a world-wide pact of self-defense based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, which might be approached initially on the basis of regional arrangements.
It developed that none of the conferees had strong pre-conceived ideas as to what might be worked out. UK and Canada felt an Atlantic pact could include more nations than an extension of the Brussels pact, since small powers would be unwilling to assume commitments too far afield. If Brussels were regarded as a regional arrangement, how could Canada be included? How could the U.S. participate or be included? However, it was conceded that the Brussels pact left participation by other than regional neighbors open: Greece and Turkey could be considered eligible.
If an Atlantic pact were adopted, it might be extended to absorb the Brussels group. However, the question was raised as to the effect [Page 61] on Italy of emphasizing Atlantic security, especially were this to become public prior to the 18 April elections.
Hickerson suggested that an ultimate world-wide Article 51 agreement might be the best goal. He suggested that regional arrangements were awkward in that certain countries were always hard to fit in: for example, what could be done with Iran if a Mediterranean pact were developed?
It was conceded that Italy must be accommodated in any arrangement ultimately worked out. Italy, more even than Norway, is now most directly menaced. Italy has not been approached on the question of adhering to the Brussels agreement. Scandinavia has not been approached: Hickerson suggested that this might be desirable.
Hollis stated that the Brussels pact, in concept, requires military staff discussions between the parties. Thus far, only minor service-to-service talks have occurred.
Action: It was agreed that the first order of business would be to explore the pros and cons in connection with the various types of common-defense pacts which offered themselves for consideration—the three types outlined above. A subcommittee would study this question as a matter of urgency (three days time limit was mentioned), meeting in the Joint Staff conference room in Pentagon beginning 1000, 23 March. Hickerson was designated to head the US membership and indicated that Gruenther and Griffin should attend.
The principal problem of security for the meetings involved Gladwyn Jebb, who will probably visit New York to appear at the Security Council from time to time as a deception measure. No firm cover plan for the meetings was adopted.