865.00/2–2148: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy ( Dunn ) to the Secretary of State
761. 1. In the June 1946 elections the Communist Party of Italy, which numbered at that time approximately 2 million members, received about 4,343,000 votes (18.7 percent), a ratio of 2.17 votes per party member. The Socialist Party, which claimed approximately 860,000 members, polled 4,745,000 votes (20.7 percent) or approximately five votes per member. The Communists and Nenni-Socialists claim membership today of roughly 2,330,000 and 790,000, respectively.
Applying the 1946 ratio to the April elections, the CPI would receive 5,130,000 votes and the SPI 3,950,000 votes, a total of over 9 million. However, it is not believed that Socialist influence would catch the same number of non-party votes in the coming elections inasmuch as they, compromised by the Communists in the eyes of certain sectors of the electorate and discredited by such outstanding leaders as Saragat, Farravelli1 and Lombardo, have lost considerable ground since 1946. On other hand, it is likely that the CPI ratio has [Page 833] increased especially in the south where they made great strides during 1947. We are inclined to believe that the ratio for the Communist-Socialist popular bloc may well turn out to be three votes per party member. This would give the bloc approximately 9,400,000 votes or almost 40 percent of the estimated electorate of 24 million. The consensus of qualified observers in Rome concedes 8 to 10 million votes to the extreme left. At this early stage in the electoral campaign we are inclined to favor the higher figure and would place our preliminary estimates at perhaps 9,500,000 (40 percent). If this is correct, the left bloc would receive a plurality with the Demo–Christians obtaining perhaps 35 percent of the votes and the other minor parties running individually (Republicans) or united (UQ and liberals; PSLI and Lombardo Socialists; etc.) receiving 25 percent. There is, of course, the possibility the leftist bloc will win a majority. This, however, is not anticipated by most observers here unless through a violent awe-inspiring political campaign the Communists should succeed at the last moment in intimidating large numbers of voters into staying away from the polls. In this connection the Prime Minister informed me in confidence that he had reliable information that the Communist electoral expenditures planned for the three northern industrial provinces alone amounted to over 3 billion lire—a fantastic amount in Italy which means that the Communists have in fact unlimited funds.
2. A study of the results of the communal elections held during 1947 (reEmb despatch 237 February 10)2 and 1948 at Pescara (reEmbtels 719, February 18)3 shows that the center parties selected 1577 municipal candidates, the right 156, the extreme left 1241, with 1881 “unknown”. An attempted breakdown of the unknowns, based on geographic and other considerations, gives 955 to the center-right, 682 to the extreme left, and 244 still unknown. On a percentage basis we figure that the right-center received 55 percent of the votes in the communal elections, the left 40 percent, with 5 percent unknown.
3. The minister of the Interior has stated that there are approximately 30 million persons eligible to vote (reEmbtel 506, February 4).3 We figure that abstentions will be high because of fear of a sizable proportion of the electorate, caused by Communist intimidation, to take a stand against the extreme left. We estimate that somewhere in the neighborhood of 24 million people will vote (80 percent of the electorate) electing approximately 600 deputies.
4. On the basis of the calculations contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, and figuring that Communists will put forward three candidates [Page 834] to every one Socialist, the lineup of the future Chamber of Deputies might be well somewhat as follows: Christian Democrats 210; Communists 180; Socialists 60; others 150.
5. Although the non-Communist parties are participating in the elections individually or in separate blocs, it is probable that they will form some sort of a non-Communist parliamentarian bloc in the next government. Thus, at the time of formation of that government there may well be a non-Communist bloc made up of forces ranging from Saragat–Lombardo group on the left to the UQ–Monarchists on the right representing 60 percent of the people and a leftist, Communist-controlled bloc representing 40 percent of the people. In some respects a two-party system would be setup.
6. De Gasperi or some other non-Communist leader might form a government without the Communists or Socialists. It is generally believed however that if he endeavored to do so, in view of the great strength of the Social-Communist minority and of the fact that his United group may well obtain a plurality in the elections, such a government would lead a precarious life since the Communist-Socialist forces would resort to “direct action” in order to blackmail themselves into the government.
7. Another possibility would, of course, be the formation of a government in which the Socialists and Communists were invited to participate. It is probable that in such case the Communists would not demand key ministries (Interior, armed forces, or Foreign Office) but would insist that some of them would be given to the Socialists whom they, of course, control. Once in the government we are inclined to believe that it would only be a matter of time before they had complete control of it.
8. It is also possible that, should the popular bloc win a plurality, the president might ask the Socialists and Communists to form a government. However, it is not believed that the two would be able to do so in view of the antagonism of the non-Communist forces, the majority.
9. It would therefore seem at this writing that we are faced with the responsibility of: (1) the creation of a new government, similar to the present one, which would exclude the Communists and Socialists, or (2) one which would include them. The first might well lead to civil strife and the second to the eventual formation of a Communist government in Italy, it is our assumption that the Communist-controlled bloc will not win a majority, and thus legally take over immediate control of the government.
10. As we have pointed out in press and other telegrams the Communists have adopted an electoral line that US aid would continue [Page 835] notwithstanding a popular bloc victory. Terracini himself has made a public speech to this effect which has so far been unrefuted (see Embtel 579, February 10).4 It is of the greatest importance that the US position in regard to this damaging line of Communist electoral propaganda should be clarified. At the appropriate period in the electoral campaign (probably a later stage) it seems to us desirable that a high official in the US should publicly point out (possibly in reply to a request or comment on Terracini’s allegation) that the Soviet Union and the satellite countries have refused to participate in ERP, that Communist propaganda in Italy has constantly attacked the US and American aid to Italy; that therefore there is no reason to believe that a Communist-controlled Italy subserviently assimilated into the the Soviet orbit of totalitarianism would in any way be willing to participate in ERP or be eligible for US aid which is predicated upon the maintenance of true democracy and cooperation with other democracies towards general European recovery.5
- Giuseppe Farravelli, member of the Central Committee of the PSLI and editor of L’Umanità of Milan.↩
- This despatch, not printed, transmitted tables of the electoral returns of 1947 compiled by the Italian Central Statistical Institute (865.00/2–1048).↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- This telegram, not printed, summarized the accounts of the campaigning as given in Messaggero of February 8. In regard to Umberto Terracini, President of the Constituent Assembly, it reported that “He stated that Front will assume a policy of independence both towards US and towards Russia, and asserted his conviction that democratic America will send its aid to democratic Italy even if Front shoud take over direction of government.” (865.9111 RR/2–1048)↩
- Telegram 814 of February 25, not printed, reported that a secret survey undertaken by the Christian Democrats indicated that if elections were held that day, they would receive 37 percent of the vote, something which, Ambassador Dunn, commented, was certainly not encouraging (865.00/2–2548).↩