Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

865.00/1–2148: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy ( Dunn ) to the Secretary of State

confidential

Rome , January 21, 1948—3 p. m.

314. There is no doubt that extreme leftist parties, not only because of their known strength and popularity throughout Italy but also because of the feverish activity in their present pre-electoral campaign, will play an extremely important role in the spring elections. The Communists and left-wing Socialists have, as Department is aware, formed a popular democratic front (to be distinguished from the proposed electoral peoples bloc) made up of countless labor, agricultural, veteran, feminine, youth, cultural and social organizations, all Communist controlled or inspired, for the purpose of popularizing their cause and, most important of all, of getting people, especially women, to the polls. Many new front organizations have sprung up in recent weeks; for example, the Garibaldi Avant Guard (youth); the Feminine Alliance for Peace and Democracy, and the Association of Female Farmers. The latter group is advocating the same benefits for pregnant farmers as is accorded to industrial workers, a proposal which will certainly have considerable appeal among prolific farmers wives and daughters. Many new Communist propaganda publications have appeared, as well as countless directives to sections and federations, exhorting members to increase their agitational electoral work. Money, newsprint and energy is not lacking and it may be anticipated that the efforts of the Communists and Socialists, who will undoubtedly run on single ticket, if not throughout Italy at least in the south, will be even more intensified as election day approaches. It is not unlikely that extreme left, through the media of their countless front organizations, and with their luring campaign slogans and false promises, will succeed in attracting to their cause many Italians, especially among the semi-literate classes.

Present indications are that Communist policy here is to stick to quasi legal parliamentary methods and rely on the elections in order to reenter the government and ultimately to control it. Togliatti certainly emphasized this point at Milan conference (see Embtel 159, January 13)¹ although he left the door open to extra-legal activities—general strikes, violence and probably insurrection—in order to achieve Communist objectives in Italy, i.e. the attainment of “progressive democracy” (Soviet style) and the crippling of the Marshall Plan. Present Communist policy may of course be a smoke screen to divert attention from their extra-legal plans. However, their press, as well as Nenni’s reflects growing optimism over coming elections. It would seem that they believe that they, running with the Socialists on a joint ticket, will gain a plurality in the elections which would make it impossible to keep them out of the government—in fact, might make it mandatory for the President to ask Togliatti to form the new government. This in itself would assure the attainment of their objectives. On the other hand, if they feel at a later period in the electoral campaign that they will be defeated, a shift to extra-legal tactics may well be anticipated, culminating in an intensification of violence and possibly insurrection if they are defeated at the polls. As justification therefore they will accuse the Demo-Christians of reactionary tactics in suppressing strikes and in maintaining public order and of illegal tactics in the elections. Either course, i.e., reentry into the government following an electoral plurality or a resort to revolutionary action would in their view insure their primary objectives, and those of Moscow. And finally, although at the present time there is no substantial indication of a Communist-armed coup d’état despite countless unfounded rumors, this possibility should not be completely discarded especially if there is a sharp deterioration in the general international situation.

With respect to the specific question raised in the Department’s 2724, December 31,² we offer the following comments:

(1) The Actionist group which joined the PSI is insignificant in number, a mere two or three thousand and weak in influence. We are advised that its leaders, Lussu, Cianca and Foa,³ although anti-fusionist, will probably support the Nenni–Basso⁴ line. They are primarily interested in obtaining seats in the new Parliament. In fact, the Actionist Party has lost practically all its appeal since the Parri⁵ days and now amounts to a small group of leaders with little mass support.

(2) Regarding the attitude of the PSI at the directorate and popular level on a leftist electoral bloc, we are informed by Lombardo that 85 percent of the Socialists at a popular level do not desire such a bloc. In fact, the press has reported that the Romita motion for autonomy won out in the provincial congresses in Piedmont, Tuscany, Veneto, and Liguria, and that the Basso motion for the bloc won a majority on Emilia, the Marche, Umbria, Lazio, Lombardia and Sicily. It would appear that the Socialists in the north, where there is a strong independent Socialist tradition, dislike for Communist insistence on discipline and strong Socialist organizations, favor independent action, whereas the less organized Socialists in the south are more inclined to go along with the Communists. Although Nenni may have serious misgivings regarding this latter course he is reportedly so compromised by the Communists that he will continue to advocate it. Basso is said to be playing a double game since he is at heart anti-Soviet. But in order to be on the winning side he will also go along with Nenni. If the Socialist Congress, now in session, advocates the establishment of a single bloc with the Communists which seems almost a certainty, Lombardo may well leave the party. In order to reach a compromise and avoid another split it is possible that the Socialists will decide to run independently in some provinces of north and jointly in the south. We should have an answer to this question by early next week.

(3) With respect to the attitude of the Communist Party on this question, although the Milan Congress revealed some dissensions in the higher echelons of the party, Togliatti the boss strongly advocated the creation of a common leftist electoral bloc. He pointed out that the Communist Party was a mass party, that it must appeal even to the middle class and that there must be mass unity and alliances with other political groups in elections. The political committee of the Congress supported the bloc as did the final motion of the Congress which “fathered” the plan of the Socialists for a single electoral list.

Dunn

1. Not printed.
2. In this telegram, not printed, the Department requested that it be kept currently informed on the activities and objectives of the PSI and PCI at the level of the party directorates and at the popular level (865.00/12–3047).
3. Emilio Lussu; Alberto Cianca; Vittorio Foa.
4. Lelio Basso, confirmed as Secretary of the PSI after its congress of January 1948.
5. Ferruccio Parri, President of the Council of Ministers, June–December 1945.