Office of the Historian

840.00/12–148

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret
[Washington,] December 1, 1948.

Subject: Position of the Department of the Army in Matters to be Discussed with General Marras, Italian Chief of Staff

The attached paper which has been prepared by the Department of the Army in connection with this subject has been approved by the Office of European Affairs and the Department of the Army has been informed of the tentative concurrence of the Department.

It is suggested that you review the Army’s paper in order that we may pass along to them any comments which you may have.

J[ohn] D. H[ickerson]
[Attachment]

[Here follow statement of The Problem, enumeration of Facts Bearing on the Problem, and Discussion.]

Conclusions

1.
As long as Italy remains firm in her decision to resist the advances of communism and to utilize to the maximum her own resources:
(a)
The U.S. should continue its efforts to obtain Italian membership in the Brussels Pact.
(b)
The U.S. should continue to press for Italian participation in a North Atlantic Defense Pact.
(c)
Independent U.S. military aid for Italy may be considered as a last resort.
2.
The U.S. should obtain Italian emergency plans for the defense of northern Italy.
3.
The integration of U.S. emergency plans in Austria and Trieste with the Italian Armed Forces will require prior agreement with the British and no commitments regarding such integration should be made now.
4.
Italy can be provided with military equipment only as a result of congressional legislation.
5.
From the short range viewpoint, Italy’s major immediate contribution to the security of Europe is the assurance of its own internal security.
[Page 813]

Recommendation

It is recommended that General Marras be apprised frankly and in general terms of the U.S. positions indicated in this study.1

  1. In a memorandum dated December 1, 1048, not printed, the Director of the Executive Secretariat, Humelsine, informed Hickerson that he had discussed the paper with Lovett who advised regarding its conclusions:

    • “(1) That it was his and the Secretary’s feeling that we should not push the Brussels Pact group into accepting Italy into membership, but that their feeling was that this was a decision to be made by the Brussels Pact group when in their judgment Italy would be an asset rather than a liability.
    • “(2) That it was their feeling that Italy would necessarily have to come into the North Atlantic Defense Pact through the Brussels Pact group.” (840.00/12–148)

    ↩