865.20/10–2248: Telegram
The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State
4081. Military Attaché has cabled Dept of Army regarding approach by Italian Army Chief of Staff Marras suggesting exploratory US-Italian staff conversations on Italy’s defense position and needs. I [Page 810] concur generally with analysis and recommendations in his MAR 453, September 24,1 and have following comments:
Government here is making progress in weaning public opinion away from illusion of neutrality to necessity of western alignment, and beginning has even been made with idea of bringing up to full efficiency their armed forces in order be better able protect Italy’s internal security and primary defense. However, there exists fear that neither Western Union nor ourselves really attach importance to defense of Italy and that at first sign of trouble Italy will be abandoned. This fear will grow as increasing publicity is given to reports of our intention to contribute to rearming of countries already in Brussels pact, to the exclusion of Italy.
Government leaders have impression that they are not wanted in Western Union, that France and UK consider them more liability than a help, and that they had better, therefore, rely on bilateral arrangements with US from whom all real help for Europe must in any case come. Added to this may be a certain reluctance on Italian side give up bargaining power for purposes of treaty revision and military aid which they may feel they have in any move to get them into Western Union. Italians may also feel that they can more easily get what they need directly from US than through intermediary of Western Union.
We thus have a delicate threefold problem:
- 1.
- To give continued encouragement to those leaders who want Italy promptly and unreservedly in western alignment. In doing this we must show appreciation for what has been done recently in educating public opinion here and must dispel any idea on their part that our interest in Italy is secondary or sentimental.
- 2.
- At same time, we must keep alive in Italian mind our primary thesis of real and effective European unity as condition precedent for US economic and military aid, and we must keep their thinking planning in that direction.
- 3.
- We must take advantage of interim period before Italy is included in effective European arrangements in order to get Italy’s defenses built up to maximum possible efficiency both in her interest and in our own.
When General Marras visits US (Embtel 3955, October 112 and Deptel 2594, October 19)3 he will probably again put out feelers for staff talks. While we may not be ready for all that that term implies I think that there would be great value in informal discussions with him or with officers designated by him, on purely military level, with objective of allowing Italians to elaborate state of their own planning and of giving US opportunity to advise what Italy can do now in way [Page 811] of reorganization, training, planning, et cetera, with continued emphasis on eventual Italian participation in European defense system. US participants could no doubt take advantage of experience gained in staff talks which Brussels pact countries have already had. It would probably be better for me not to raise matter in advance with govt, but allow it to proceed on responsibility of Marras. We should naturally keep Western Union countries informed of anything we do, both to encourage them in moving faster with Italy and to forestall any false idea that we are resorting to bilateral arrangements in preference to extension of European system.