865.00/4–2748
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)
| Participants: | Ambassador Tarchiani |
| Mr. J. D. Hickerson, EUR | |
| Mr. W. B. Sale, SE |
Ambassador Tarchiani informed me that in about ten days he expects to return to Rome for consultation. He pointed out that now that the elections have been decisively won the Italian Government must consider the next phase of its program and that the policy now must [Page 794] change from the negative attitude of being principally anti-Communist to the institution of a sound positive policy of reconstruction. This program will be based primarily on social and economic reform promised by the government parties during the election campaign and will be within the framework and dependent upon the Marshall Plan. Aside from the economic and social problems which face the Italian Government is the problem of Italian participation in the military phase of Western European cooperation. Italy is placed by the treaty in a position of military inferiority which might cause Italy’s participation in the Western Union alliance to weaken the system rather than strengthen it. He expressed the opinion that Italy does not require a large army but rather an extremely efficient small force capable of defending Italy’s frontiers and making an appropriate contribution to the defense of Western Europe. In building such a force Italy would need the help of the United States. The Ambassador explained that he must be in a position to explain United States views in this problem to De Gasperi when he returns to Rome. Before this time he considered discussion of this subject might be premature, but now that the present government has been confirmed and strengthened by the results of the elections, the Italian Government desires to have an expression of our position in order to determine its own best course of action in the fullest cooperation with us.
I expressed the view that, while this is a matter for the determination of the Italian Government, the first problem of the Italian Government must be to determine what measures should be taken to counteract the disaffection of the large portion of the Italian electorate which voted for the Popular Front despite the Front’s opposition to the Marshall Plan and all that it means to Italy’s future. I stressed the fact that despite all of the help which we have provided the Italian people and despite open opposition of the Church to Popular Front parties, still more than 30% of the Italian people voted against the Government. I repeated that this is, of course, a matter to be decided solely by the Italian Government.
The Ambassador replied that it is not difficult to explain the size of the Communist vote in Italy for that vote is largely a reflection of deep-rooted non-partisan discontent on the part of a large segment of the Italian people with existing economic and social conditions in the country. The fundamental problem is that of providing nourishment for 47 million people in a country which can support only 35 million. Signor Tarchiani considers a solution must be found to the problem of immigration in order to relieve the pressure of present over-population and an annual increase of more than 500,000. Mr. Tarchiani said that in addition to the problem of over-population there is deep discontent amongst the more than 2 million unemployed and 5 million underpaid [Page 795] Italian workers. The Italian Government has pledged to do everything within its power to alleviate this situation and with our help hopes to be able to make much progress in the solution of these problems during the four years of the Marshall Plan.
With regard to Italy’s position in the Western Union I explained to the Ambassador that we are studying the matter in order to determine our own position with regard to the problem of defense of Westtern Europe and that we hope for some development within the next few weeks. I pointed out that as everyone knows aggression against any of the Western powers would immediately involve United States participation in the conflict. I explained that it is difficult for this Government to make a positive commitment in this regard and that whatever we say must have bipartisan support which is particularly important in an election year. I added that for my own part I hope that Italy would join the Western Union powers but that it would be necessary to proceed cautiously in order to ensure full acceptance of Italy’s participation on the part of all powers concerned. I agreed that under the limitations of the Treaty Italy’s participation might add to the weakness rather than to the strength of the Western Union. I pointed out that the Peace Treaty provides only two means for the revision of the military clauses, namely, by agreement between Italy and the Allied and Associated powers or, after Italy’s admission to the United Nations, between Italy and the Security Council; both of which procedures would of course be subject to Russian veto. I expressed the opinion that the members of the Pact must examine all possible ways of resolving this apparent impasse and that at the proper time we would do all we could to contribute to a solution of the problem.
In reply to the Ambassador’s question, I stated that there were no plans for a meeting on this subject by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom and France but that it was to be expected that there would be a constant exchange of views among the three Governments. I informed the Ambassador that we had made it plain to the five present members of the Western Union Pact that the better and faster the progress of their joint planning the easier it would be for us to arrive at an early decision concerning our own position.
Ambassador Tarchiani said that there was considerable concern on the part of De Gasperi and others in Rome regarding the possibility that a decision had been made by us that in the event of a sudden attack on Western Europe Italy would be abandoned as strategically indefensible. I replied that I had no knowledge that any such decision had been made by our military strategists. I added that I felt very [Page 796] certain that the only sure way of preventing the overrunning of any area of Western Europe was to stop World War III before it starts by making it so clear in advance that in case of aggression the United States would be involved immediately and that such a military adventure would be so unattractive as not to be worthwhile. I expressed the opinion that we should strive to establish unmistakably the clear understanding that an attack on any of the western powers would be considered an attack on each one of us within the meaning of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. I stressed that such mutual assistance would of necessity be entirely dependent upon and proportionate to the determination and vigor with which the country attacked resisted the aggression and defended itself. I explained again that we are actively working on the problem.
The Ambassador stated that as regards the military clauses perhaps the only way the problem could be solved would be through Italy’s initiating as a matter of right, regardless of treaty restrictions, the rearmament necessary for her defense and her participation in the mutual defense of Europe. I replied that we hope to see Italy participate in Western Union, that we recognize the handicap of present military limitations and that we are prepared to consider the whole question at the proper time with all other members of the Western Union Pact. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation and added that all look to the United States support as the only hope for success of Western Union at this moment. He expressed the opinion that none of the other powers could object to Italy’s participation if that participation is looked on with favor by the United States.
I asked the Ambassador to stop in to see me again the day before departing for Rome and assured him that I would then review our position as of that date and give him whatever further assurances might be possible in the light of the progress made by then. Before leaving the Ambassador expressed the desire to see the Secretary for a few minutes before his departure for Rome. I agreed that such a visit would be desirable if it could be arranged and asked him to let me know as soon as possible the exact date of his departure and that I would endeavor to arrange a meeting for him with the Secretary before that time.