S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63D351, NSC 1 Series
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs ( Hickerson ) to the Secretary of State
Subject: JCS Comments on NSC 1/2, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy.”
The following comments are submitted in connection with the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of February 19 to the Secretary of Defense containing the JCS views on NSC 1/2.1
The JCS comment on paragraph 9 a (3) of NSC 1/2 to the effect that military equipment and supplies for Italy cannot be in the hands of the Italian armed forces for use prior to April 18, except for air shipments of limited quantities of small items and items available in EuCom, is no longer valid as we have now informally been advised by the Department of the Army that implementation of delivery of the equipment listed in SANACC 390/12 has already been ordered and that excepting for heavy equipment such as tanks and vehicles, [Page 780] it is anticipated that there is a good possibility that all items can be delivered by April 1.
With regard to JCS comment concerning the need for a decision on the highest level concerning priority to be accorded U.S. military assistance to Italy, Greece, and Turkey, it is believed that it would be impracticable to set forth a hard and fast priority as amongst the three programs. In the Secretary’s letter of February 17 to Secretary Forrestal,3 the Department recommended that a secondary priority should be accorded the Italian program with respect to the Greek-Turkish program. This decision referred only to the limited program envisaged in SANACC 390/1 and was taken in the light of the Army Department’s statement that even the highest priority, which would interfere with delivery of supplies required for the Greek spring offensive, would not enable delivery of the Italian supplies prior to April 18. In the light of that situation, EUR agreed that no useful purpose would be served by the establishment of a superior priority for the Italian program. It was agreed in principle that the Italian program should rank “with but after” the Greek-Turkish program, but that every effort should be made to expedite Italian deliveries. As things have worked out, the Army’s estimate of the time required for delivery of the Italian program proved overly pessimistic and on the basis of the “secondary” priority accorded the Italian program it now appears that substantial deliveries can be made in time to be effective in connection with control of disturbances anticipated during and immediately after the election.
It is believed that the equally vital importance of the Greek-Turkish, Italian, Iranian, and probably also Korean and Chinese situations, must be recognized, and that only on the basis of consideration of each individual operation within each program in its relationship to our limited capabilities and in relationship to all other operations can realistic priorities be established.
While the JCS comment on paragraph 11 e would appear to be valid and pertinent, this is a matter for military assessment. We can, of course, give our full support to any measures which the United States Military Establishment might feel are required to meet the needs of the situation.
This observation is pertinent also to JCS comments concerning paragraphs 11 f and 11 g NSC 1/2, as well as to the final paragraph of the JCS memorandum under reference.