S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63D351, NSC 1 Series
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of Defense 1
Subject: The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy
In response to your oral request to the Director, Joint Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views on NSC 1/2.2
With reference to paragraph 9 a (3) of NSC 1/2, it should be noted that, while it would be possible to assist the Italian armed forces with military equipment and supplies, all of the equipment and supplies requested could not be in the hands of Italian Armed Forces for effective use prior to the election scheduled for April 18, except for air shipment of limited quantities of small items such as ammunition and for such items of ammunition as may be available in EuCom. Moreover, should provision of this equipment and supplies to the Italian armed forces be given priority over the Greece and Turkey programs, delivery of equipment scheduled for support of an offensive by Greek Government forces this spring would be delayed with corresponding jeopardy to the success of the offensive, and the Turkey program, [Page 771] which is already considerably behind schedule, would be further retarded.
There is a need for a decision on the highest level concerning the priority to be accorded United States military assistance to Italy, Greece and Turkey to enable the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give sound military advice on papers concerning the position of the United States with respect to these areas.
With reference to paragraph 11 e, the United States could strengthen its naval and air forces in the Mediterranean area outside of Italy without dangerously lowering its available reserve of such forces. However, deployment of ground forces in the same area would require commitment of part or all of our reserve in this category, a reserve which, in view of our extended military position, is already dangerously low. This should not be done unless a partial mobilization is undertaken to enable the United States to have available a comparatively large, trained strategic reserve with which to reinforce units outside the United States if required.
Implementation of the actions outlined in either paragraph 11 f or 11 g, regardless of whether or not the British concur and offer such assistance as they are able to give, would entail serious risks of global warfare and, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should be preceded by mobilization.
From the military point of view it is unrealistic to conclude that the United States should, if necessary, make full use of its military power to prevent Italy from falling under the domination of the USSR, unless the United States has available sufficient military forces to accomplish this objective, particularly when identical conclusions have been approved concerning the use of these same limited forces in other areas to accomplish like objectives.
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
- James Forrestal. Under cover of a memorandum of February 27, not printed, copies of this memorandum were sent to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Army (Kenneth C. Royall), the Secretary of the Navy (John L. Sullivan), the Secretary of the Air Force (W. Stuart Symington), and to the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board (Arthur M. Hill). (S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63D351, NSC 1 Series)↩
- Ante, p. 765.↩