Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

880.00/5–3148

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Paris, May 31, 1948.

No. 831

Sir: I have the honor to forward herewith the agreed findings and recommendations of the North African Conference held at this Embassy on May 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28, 1948, pursuant to the Department’s instructions. This Conference was attended by representatives of our missions in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Great Britain, Italy and France, as well as by observers from the Department. It was my privilege to preside at the opening session, after which Mr. Edwin A. Plitt, Diplomatic Agent at Tangier, acted as Chairman. Mr. Ridgway B. Knight, of this Embassy, served as head of the Drafting Committee. The agenda as well as a list of the officers who participated in the Conference’s work are also enclosed.

All sections of the enclosed report were unanimously approved.

I feel that this Conference, like its predecessor in 1947, was most useful in that it permitted an exchange of valuable information, personal views, and made it possible to consider not only the over-all Franco-North African problem but also the Libyan question in relation thereto.

Respectfully yours,

Jefferson Caffery

Enclosure 1

Agenda

I. Present status of French North Africa. Measures adopted by French authorities during the past year. Results thereof.

(a) Morocco.

(b) Tunisia.

(c) Algeria.

II. Suggestions and possibilities of inciting French and North Africans to cooperate with a view of reaching a general entente leading to political stability of the area, as well as to the ultimate good of France and North Africa.

III. What will be the effect on French North Africa of the final disposition of Libya based on the possible following solutions?

(a) Independence of a united Libya.

(b) Italian trusteeship for Tripolitania and British trusteeship for Cyrenaica.

(c) British trusteeship for all of Libya (either single mandate or two individual trusteeships for Tripolitania and Cyrenaica).

(d) Alternative solutions such as United States, Egyptian or Arab League trusteeship.

(e) The Fezzan—possible French control over area under any or all of above cases (possibly under trusteeship agreement).

IV.

(a) What steps should France take to minimize to greatest extent possible the political effects on French North Africa of the preceding possible formulae for the final fate of Libya?

(b) What steps will she probably take?

V. More and more indications have been received that North African Nationalists will make serious attempt this year, supported by Arab League, to present North African case, in toto or in part, to the United Nations General Assembly.

(a) Probability of above?

(b) How will case be prepared and presented?

(c) What will be France’s position?

(d) What should be the position of the U.S.?

VI. Communist activities and objectives in French North Africa. Their relationship with policies and aims in France proper and else-where in the French Union. (Item suggested by Mr. Packer).

VII. Plans and opportunities for OIE work in French North Africa. (Item suggested by Mr. Packer).

Enclosure 2

Attendance

Morocco	Chairman	—	Edwin A. Plitt,
			Diplomatic Agent, Consul General with rank of Minister at Tangier.
			Colonel Marion Carson, U.S.A.,
			Military Attaché at Tangier.
			Commander Howard White,
			Naval Attaché at Tangier.
			C. Paul Fletcher,
			Consul General at Casablanca.
			Maurice Pasquet,
			Consul at Rabat.
Algeria			Harold D. Finley.
			Consul General at Algiers.
Tunisia			Earl L. Packer,
			Consul General at Tunis.
Libya			Orray Taft. Jr.,
			Consul Designate at Tripoli.
Egypt			Philip W. Ireland,
			First Secretary of Embassy at Cairo.
Great Britain			George Lewis Jones, Jr.,
			Second Secretary of Embassy at London (was recalled to London in the evening of May 24).
Italy			Homer M. Byington, Jr.,
			Counselor of Embassy at Rome.
Department of State			Harry A. Schwartz,
			Acting Assistant Chief,
			Division of African Affairs.
			John Utter,
			American Commissioner,
			Four-Power Committee for Italian
			Colonies.
France			James C. H. Bonbright.
			Counselor of Embassy at Paris.
Head of Drafting Committee	}		Ridgway B. Knight,
			Second Secretary of Embassy at Paris.
			Lt. Col. Paul Birdsall. U.S.A.,
			Assistant Military Attaché at Paris.

Enclosure 3

North African Conference, Paris, May 24–28, 1948

Agreed Findings and Recommendations

items i and ii of agenda

I. Present status of French North Africa. Measures adopted by French authorities during the past year. Results thereof.

(a) Morocco

(b) Tunisia

(c) Algeria

II. Suggestions and possibilities of inciting French and North Africans to cooperate with a view of reaching a general entente leading to political stability of the area, as well as to the ultimate good of France and North Africa.

Morocco

The Conference, considering the present status of Morocco, accepted the agreed findings of the June 1947 North African Conference as being essentially valid today. (See Appendix I to this report.)¹

The Conference then proceeded with an examination of the reforms instituted during the past year by the French authorities in Morocco. While accepting on the one hand that the state of mind in top political circles in Paris appears to be on the whole liberal and in harmony with the evolution program towards self-government which was recommended by the 1947 Conference, it was felt, on the other hand, that the reforms actually instituted to date are either inadequate, or controversial in nature.

The reform of the Cherifian Government (Council of Directors and Vizirs) of June 21, 1947, was held to be of no practical value until such time as the Moroccan officials appointed to work with the French Directors will be entrusted with real authority and prepared for the assumption of greater responsibilities at a later date and until such time as the School of Administration in Rabat has opened its doors and started to train Moroccan cadres. With reference to the planned judicial and municipal reforms, it was felt that it was still impossible to assay their true worth as they were still in their preliminary stages.

The reform of the Government Council with a partial and very limited indirect election of some of the members of the Moroccan college was noted and was felt to be only a timid first step toward representative Government.

In the field of public liberties it was felt that little had been achieved.

With reference to public instruction it was observed that the French had made an effort in this direction, and mention was made of the increase of nearly Frs. 500,000,000 for public education in the 1948 budget which now includes a total appropriation of Frs. 1,613,969,000 under this heading (so far it is not known how this amount will be subdivided between Moslem and European schools). Regret was expressed, however, that the French authorities have interfered for political purposes with the opening of a few public schools which had been financed and organized by Moroccan Moslems.

With reference to the continued economic development of Morocco, French accomplishments were recognized. Regret was expressed that French elements in the country had been unduly favored in many ways and, in particular, had received an unduly large share of equipment, such as essentially needed tractors and other mechanized farm equipment.

Essentially it was the sense of the meeting that French accomplishments in the field of reforms during the past year had been disappointing.

The meeting then considered the evolution in Moroccan Nationalist opinion and attitude during the same period. It was agreed that the Nationalists’ intransigeance had increased and that they now insisted on “full independence” before discussing the modalities under which such so-called “full independence” would be exercised. Concern was also expressed that the more extreme Nationalist elements systematically refused to cooperate with any Moslem party or group which does not set forth immediate full independence as the first of its demands.

The meeting then considered the means for constructive American action intended to increase the political stability of the area as well as to insure the ultimate good of France and of North Africa. On the one hand, it was unanimously agreed that no policy could be advocated which would in fact lead to a return to past obsolete colonial policies or to the increase or protection of direct French administration in Morocco. On the other hand, it was also unanimously agreed that Morocco was not yet ready for independence and that support at this time of Nationalist aspirations in this direction would not be in the general good.

Finally, it was accepted that today the French Union exists only in theory and that its definition as well as the definition of the rights and privileges of the parts thereof were now only in the process of elaboration. Therefore, it was felt that no useful purpose would be gained by endeavoring to ascertain whether or not Morocco should ultimately be included within an undefined entity. However, it was also agreed that the interests of the United States would best be served should Morocco and the other parts of French North Africa eventually and willingly agree to join this Union rather than become a mosaic of weak and nominally independent States. At the same time the Conference expressed deep interest in a sufficiently liberal and truly federal elaboration of the French Union concept to permit and even incite the willing membership of Morocco and Tunisia. It was felt that the United States could play a most useful role during this crucial formative period by influencing the French towards true liberalism and federalism with real local autonomy.

In view of the above and more particularly in view of the limitations to its recommendations which the Conference accepted, it was felt that the only feasible course of action for the United States Government follows the lines set forth last year and which appear on pages 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the 1947 North African Conference final paper (Appendix I to this report), with special emphasis on the “Time Table” provisions thereof. The Conference felt that with a view to decreasing existing tension, it might be useful should the French authorities permit the legal organization of political parties by Moslems in Morocco and Tunisia; in this connection it was pointed out that the French currently tolerate the de facto existence and the activities of the Nationalist parties in both Protectorates.

It was felt, however, that this program should now be supplemented and that further stress be placed upon it. In particular, it was thought that the French Government being now well aware of the true character of United States policy, the efforts which should continue to be exerted in Paris should now be supported and reinforced by similar initiatives of our officers in Morocco who should seize upon every opportunity to insist with local French officials on the importance the United States Government places on the elaboration and immediate execution of an acceptable plan of evolution.

It was felt that the Department of State might usefully follow a similar policy with the French Embassy in Washington.

In view of the vital strategic importance of French North Africa it was accepted that no comminatory language could be used in our conversations with the French which might alienate them, as for the time being and for an indeterminate future French organization and administration are believed to be essential to the maintenance of those conditions of public order needed for the protection of North Africa’s strategic value to the United States. However, as time may be limited, an all-out effort as stated above should be made simultaneously in order to break down the traditional French inertia in colonial thinking and actions by the Department in Washington, the North African posts, and by the Embassy.

In particular, every effort should be exerted to persuade France that if she can put herself in the position of leading peoples dependent upon her toward the contemporary inevitable goal of autonomy or so-called “full independence”, she will thus become a valued friend instead of the “bête noire.”

In such conversations it was suggested that mention may be made of the direct American strategic interest in the area involved as well as of the direct American interest in view of the costly and vital part which the United States is playing in the rehabilitation of metropolitan France.

The Conference, as did the Conference of 1947, again unanimously concluded that French administration in Morocco was direct in fact if not in theory and that the Act of Algeciras as well as the Treaty of Fez were thus effectively violated. However, the Conference did not feel that it would be advisable to use this legal argument as a threat to influence French policy at the present time. Indeed it was believed that should this rather far-reaching position be adopted today, the United States would probably have to retreat, as for strategic and other reasons of paramount national interest it was thought that nothing would be done which could endanger public order and political stability of Morocco. Consequently it was felt that it would be ill-advised to blunt this argument by premature and ineffective use. Instead it was unanimously recommended that this recognized violation of the Treaty of Fez be kept in reserve for use as an argument with the French Government at such a time as the United States might feel compelled to intervene directly and energetically in Moroccan affairs. At that time the continued violation of the Treaty of Fez and the resulting encroachment upon American rights should be forcefully brought to the attention of the French because it is believed that continued acquiescence to these violations by the United States will make it progressively more difficult for the United States to defend or recover its established Treaty rights.

It was recommended that once the French have adopted a plan of evolution acceptable to us, we then approach Moroccan and Tunisian Nationalist leaders along the lines set forth in Section IV of the Recommendations contained in the final paper of the 1947 Conference.

It is still believed that such action can only be undertaken usefully after preliminary agreement with the French, as should the Nationalists be approached simultaneously, and should they derive the impression that the United States is forcing a course of action upon France, the latter country’s prestige would be so affected and her authority so weakened as to prevent the orderly solution desired, the Moroccans and Tunisians “writing France off” and being unwilling to negotiate or to cooperate with a European nation so weak as to be incapable of adopting its own policies for areas which for decades have been within its orbit.

The Conference then considered the influence of Palestine developments in Morocco and elsewhere in French North Africa. While on the one hand it was agreed that the vast majority of Moghreb Moslems felt no close ties with the Arabs of Palestine, it was nevertheless felt that widespread dismay and discouragement followed American recognition of Israel and that the situation in the Holy Land could at any time be effectively exploited by North African Arab leaders, particularly should Arab resentment reach the proportions of a “Jihad”. For the time being it was agreed that Moghreb reactions, particularly as local leaders do not appear intent on capitalizing on the propaganda value of the issue, will be limited to financial drives and perhaps to a limited number of volunteers. It was also noted that Moslem leaders in French North Africa seemed anxious at the present stage to prevent pogroms and anti-Jewish agitation. However, in view of the high potential disturbing aspects of the Palestine situation, the Conference agreed that developments in the Holy Land should be closely watched in connection with the Moghreb as an important possible over-all factor.

Tunisia

While the reforms introduced by the French authorities in Tunisia seem to be more extensive than in Morocco, the Conference agreed that the general findings and recommendations in the case of Morocco apply even though to a somewhat lesser extent, in the case of Tunisia.

The principal reform measures which the French have applied in Tunisia in recent months have been:

(1) The abolishment of press censorship which occurred in April 1947;

(2) The reorganization of the Council of Ministers, which occurred in August 1947; and

(3) The abolishment of the Higher Council, thereby placing a greater responsibility on the Grand Council, which occurred in April 1948.

Certain comments on the foregoing items, in order of sequence, may be of interest:

(1) The abolishment of the press censorship occurred before the June 1947 Conference at Paris and accordingly was unconnected with any post-Conference pressure by the United States Government on the French Government for the application of reforms in North Africa. While censorship has been abolished, the Government does at times admittedly exert some pressure on the press. While occasionally this action may be repressive, it can also be constructive. An example of the latter very recently has been, according to the Resident General himself, a request made of the press that it refrain during the present Palestine crisis from publishing inflammatory items.
It is of interest to note that the Tunisian Communist Party organ, L’avenir de la Tunisie, is permitted to be published as the official organ of the Party, whereas the Destourian Parties are not allowed the same privilege. (This naturally follows from the fact that the Communist Party is legal, whereas the two Destourian Parties are illegal.)

(2) The reorganization of the Council of Ministers in August 1947 and the creation of the “Cabinet Council” has resulted in the six Tunisian Ministers receiving a measure of authority, but the attachment to each Minister of a so-called French Advisor (“Conseiller”) who, if he disagrees with the Minister can cause a particular question to go to higher level, even the Resident-General himself, severely limits such authority.

(3) The abolishment of the Higher Council in April 1948 has returned to the Grand Council its previous authority in regard to the Tunisian budget and thereby removes from the hands of the Government a weapon which was previously held as a threat over the Grand Council’s action, the Higher Council having had the authority to make into law any proposal upon which the Tunisian and French sections of the Grand Council did not agree. The Grand Council remains, however, a consultative body.

While the foregoing reforms represent some progress in the way of giving greater authority to the Tunisians, a number of reform measures envisaged in the French Foreign Office Policy Folder have not been put into effect. Among these are:

(1) Only one municipality, Tunis itself, out of 46 proposed municipalities, has so far been formed.

(2) The creation of an “administrative tribunal” has not yet been effected, although its creation is expected to take place in the very near future.

(3) The “National School for Administration” has not yet been established.

With regard to the matter of a “time-table” for putting further reforms into effect, the Resident-General has indicated that, because of a very fluid situation, it is not practicable to announce “what one is going to do today, tomorrow, or the next day.”

Among concrete measures which the French might logically take to encourage the Tunisians to look forward to eventual self-government, would be the recognition as legal organizations of the two Destourian Parties, thereby putting them legally on a basis equivalent to that of the Communist Party.

Algeria

For the same economic, social and demographic as well as political reasons which were set forth last year, it was felt impossible to consider Algeria in the same fashion and at the same time as the two neighboring Protectorates.

In general, it was believed that adequate political measures had been adopted by the French, at least in theory, to permit the Algerians to play an adequate part in the shaping of their own destinies and to acquire a democratic political education. At the same time it was thought that the theory has not yet been adequately translated into fact, partially due to French initiative and partly due to the Algerians’ own fault in not exercising the rights which they have.

Under the Algerian Statute the Moslem second college elects 60 representatives to the Algerian Assembly. Furthermore they have at least as many registered voters in the first or so-called European college as the Europeans themselves. While the French undoubtedly used coercive methods to influence second college votes, specially in outlying districts, it was also noted that abstentions of registered Moslem voters in the first college were unusually large. This in fact represents a voluntary renunciation of an opportunity to influence the elections, as it is generally accepted that election frauds or coercion are far fewer and more difficult to resort to in the populated and more orderly centers where the bulk of the first college voters is concentrated.

Consequently it was the opinion of the meeting that United States action in Algeria should not include the stressing of political reforms but should instead stress the implementation of the political reforms already instituted.

In addition thereto, it was recommended that the United States follow the policy set forth following the 1947 North African Conference and advocate the adoption of a publicly announced, far-reaching educational, social and economic program which, while not satisfactory to the extreme Arab Nationalist leaders, may so improve the lot of the average Arab as eventually to permit the peaceful cohabitation of Algeria by two essentially different peoples. In this connection it was felt that the approach to the French authorities should follow the lines set forth on page 20 of the 1947 Conference’s final paper.

item iii of agenda

What will be the effect on French North Africa of the final disposition of Libya based on the possible following solutions?

(a) Independence of a united Libya.

(b) Italian trusteeship for Tripolitania and British trusteeship for Cyrenaica.

(c) British trusteeship for all of Libya (either single mandate or two individual trusteeships for Tripolitania and Cyrenaica).

(d) Alternative solutions such as United States, Egyptian or Arab League trusteeship.

(e) The Fezzan—possible French control over area under any or all of above cases (possibly under trusteeship agreement).

In considering Item III of the Agenda: “What will be the [comparative] effect on French North Africa of the final disposition of Libya, based on the possible following solutions?”, it was decided to agree first on the probable reactions of the French on the one hand and of the Nationalist Moslem leaders on the other, vis-à-vis the various possibilities prescribed in the Agenda.

It was unanimously agreed that the French would oppose the various solutions in the following decreasing order: (1) independence of a united Libya; (2) Egyptian or Arab League trusteeship; (3) United States trusteeship; (4) British trusteeship for all of Libya; (5) or, in other words, the solution which it was believed the French would prefer, Italian trusteeship for Tripolitania and British trusteeship for Cyrenaica.

The meeting then proceeded with appraising the effect on Moslem Nationalist opinion, and it was unanimously agreed that they would oppose the various solutions in the following decreasing order: (1) Italian trusteeship for Tripolitania and British trusteeship for Cyrenaica; (2) British trusteeship for all of Libya; (3) United States trusteeship; (4) Egyptian or Arab League trusteeship; (5) or the solution which would be preferred, independence of a united Libya.

It will be observed that French and Nationalist Moslem reactions were estimated to be exactly contradictory.

The Conference then proceeded with its own estimation of the complications likely to result in North Africa from the various solutions and establish its own order of precedence.

While there were differences in opinion as to which solution would result in the gravest complications, it was agreed that either solution (a) “Independence of a united Libya”, or the first part of (b) “Italian trusteeship for Tripolitania”, would have the most disturbing effect on French North Africa.

With reference to (a) “Independence of a united Libya”, it was felt that the granting of this advanced status to a relatively backward North Africa area would cause immediate and widespread Moslem general resentment throughout all of French North Africa. While it was not anticipated that this discontent would reach the proportions of large scale outbreaks of violence and even less of a successful revolt, in view of the size and preparedness of French armed forces in the area, it was believed that this bitter dissatisfaction would serve to maintain agitation for North African full independence at fever pitch and would thus effectively prevent any Franco-Moslem spirit of cooperation essential for the success of the evolutionary program recommended by the Conference.

As to the solution including Italian trusteeship for Tripolitania, the Conference, from all the information submitted to it, fully concurs with the information at the Department’s disposal, to the effect that “a majority of Tripolitanians will oppose the return of Italian administration with all means at their disposal.” Notwithstanding the fact that the present Italian Government would presumably be willing to make every effort to live up to its obligations as trustee towards Tripolitania and that the terms of trusteeship could in any event stipulate as a condition of acceptance the establishment of a new and progressive Italian colonial administration, Arab feeling is so strong against Italian administration that it would probably not permit the peaceful reestablishment of Italian authority, be it even in the form of a trusteeship over any part of Libya. Thus it was believed most likely that uprisings would break out in Libya in such a contingency. The Conference did not think the effect of such a revolt would have immediate widespread repercussions in French North Africa even though it felt that local disturbances in Tunisia, although unlikely, cannot be entirely discounted. It did feel, though, that Italian presence in a part of Libya would antagonize Arabs throughout the entire North Africa area, the Moslems not only manifesting varying degrees of sympathy to their Libyan brothers (to whom it should be noted they are not particularly closely attached by traditional or economic bonds) but essentially would view this decision as proof positive of reactionary intentions, and would discourage them from possibly accepting to cooperate with the French and would make these Moslems turn increasingly towards Egypt or the Arab League as their sole sources of support.

The Conference then ranked solution (d): “Egyptian or Arab League trusteeship.” In this connection it was felt that to some extent the factors of discontent mentioned in connection with “independence of a united Libya” would come into play, in that the Moslems of French North Africa would envy the closer ties with the Arab world granted to their relatively backward Eastern neighbors. In addition it was the sense of the meeting that economic difficulties as well as administrative complications would be certain to arise, as neither Egypt nor the Arab League countries were felt to be capable or sufficiently strong economically to undertake the guardianship over this economically weak area. In this connection it was pointed out that Egyptian agitation for trusteeship over Libya did not represent a serious desire to assume these responsibilities but was primarily intended to oppose the return of any European power—Italy in particular—to any part of Libya.

With regard to United States trusteeship, the Conference agreed that this would probably be preferred by the Arabs to any European trusteeship but that we should hesitate to undertake it because of the invidious comparisons the French can be expected to make of any trusteeship, with their own long-established régimes in North Africa and because of the likelihood of our régime becoming the scapegoat of malevolent criticism, no matter how well intentioned and applied, if unsuccessful in conciliating the conflicting Arab and other interests. Regarding the French reactions thereto, it was believed that on the one hand the French would very probably be opposed, as they would realize that we would faithfully comply with our trusteeship undertakings, do our best in fact to prepare the populations for self-government, and withdraw our administration upon a specified date. It is always possible, of course, that the international situation or strategic considerations might render (postponement unavoidable. On the other hand it was believed that the French might perhaps view with some satisfaction the United States being compelled to grapple concretely with native and Moslem problems which they believe we view in a somewhat dilettante and abstract fashion.

Viewed purely in terms of effect on French North Africa the best solution with regard to the Arabs and possibly also the French, was felt to be (c): “British trusteeship for all of Libya, with two individual trusteeships for Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.” It was felt that the liberal policies followed by Great Britain in India, Burma, Ceylon and even in Nigeria, the Gold Coast and elsewhere in Black Africa, would serve to temper Nationalist disappointment throughout French North Africa that a European trusteeship had been decided. It was believed that this solution would not arouse resentment in French North Africa to the extent of civil disturbance. It would provide indirect but very worth while advantages. For example, it was felt that the British would, like ourselves, adopt an evolutionary plan towards self-government but that at the same time they would be better fitted than the United States to provide a corps of administrators for the interim period and thus to discharge themselves of their practical administrative responsibilities. Such British action in neighboring Tripolitania could have only a healthy effect on French policy in North Africa and serve to spur them on with their avowed intentions to lead Morocco and Tunisia towards “full autonomy.”

The Conference recognized that British trusteeship for all of Libya, including the Fezzan as discussed in the following section, would provide practical advantages for United States strategic interests in Libya as regards such questions as military bases and common defense. These strategic interests of course would have to be reviewed within a larger framework than the terms of the Agenda. During such review a major consideration would of course be the maintenance of European stability in the face of Soviet aggressive policy.

The Fezzan

It was unanimously agreed that the French appear to be fully resolved to maintain their present de facto occupation indefinitely. Numerous indices of this intention were supplied by various officers present: the building of the uneconomic and longer road from Ghadames to Sebha, opening of new schools teaching French, generous paternalistic policies in order to conciliate the population, digging of wells, building of dispensaries, etc.

Apart from such known French arguments as the historical claim that the Fezzan was oriented towards Central Africa rather than towards the Coast, or that the population of the Ghat district was of Tuareg stock and therefore more closely related to the Tuaregs of the Algerian southern territories, the meeting believed that the dominant factor was French determination to maintain its control over that part of Libya which was “liberated” by the French forces of General Leclerc. While the element of prestige involved was felt to be of real importance, particularly at a time when French administration is under fire throughout North Africa, it was also believed that the possibility of oil and other mineral wealth being found in this region was not entirely foreign to France’s position as well as possibilities of strategic airfields on the Madagascar route. The Conference unanimously felt that as long as trusteeship under any foreign power would be the solution advocated or adopted in Libya, the French would maintain with determination their claim for control of the Fezzan, and that the legal form of this control would be secondary in French eyes.

The Conference noted the economic ties binding the Fezzan proper to Tripolitania and recommended that should the French claims to the area be accepted in any form, the traditional economy of the area be respected. It was also felt that the only solution which might lead to the departure of the French from the Fezzan would be independence for a united Libya, a solution which of course they could be expected to contest energetically.

It was accepted that should the French continue in possession of the Fezzan in one form or another, Moslem dissatisfaction varying in degrees of intensity, would result throughout French North Africa. It was believed that this dissatisfaction would stem from Moslem disappointment over the increase in France’s North African interests at the very time when vocal Nationalist elements are striving to reduce them. It was also feared that these Moslems might view United States approval of any form of French control over the Fezzan as evidence that we are not sincere in any liberal statements concerning North Africa which we may be called upon to make in our approach to the Arabs under the policy recommended in sections I and II.

Viewed only in terms of the effect on French North Africa, it was felt that, should it be necessary for the United States to take a position, the best solution with regard to the Arabs and possibly also the French, would be to support limited boundary rectifications on the basis of tribal areas, and that at the same time the United States should oppose any trusteeship or other form of French control over the entire Fezzan, the balance of which should be returned to Tripolitania. It was felt that these partial boundary rectifications should receive careful consideration from a body more competent to deal with this problem than is this Conference.

item iv of agenda

(a) What steps should France take to minimize to greatest extent possible the political effects on French North Africa of the preceding possible formulae for the final fate of Libya?

(b) What steps will she probably take?

The Conference believed that under any of the possible solutions for the disposal of Libya, with the possible exception of (b) which embodies Italian trusteeship for Tripolitania, aspirations and agitation for full internal autonomy and/or so-called independence, will be increased to varying degrees (to the greatest extent, of course, in the case of independence of a united Libya, but also under any of the other trusteeship arrangements which will certainly embody evolutionary programs and terminal dates for the trusteeships). Consequently, it was unanimously agreed that in order to minimize these political effects, the French should actively prepare and rapidly institute a program of evolution acceptable to the United States along the lines recommended above. In particular, France should be careful to adapt her programs for the three North African entities so that these will not compare unfavorably with the trusteeship conditions which will be established for Libya in whole or in part.

Turning to: “What steps France will probably take”, the Conference does not dismiss the possibility that the combined efforts of the Department, the North African posts and of the Embassy at Paris, may succeed in influencing France so that she will follow the policy thought to be advisable and described in the preceding paragraph. However, the French record to date of doing too little and too late in her overseas territories (excepting in French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa where, on the contrary, she may be adopting political reforms over and beyond the natives’ receptive ability) makes the Conference fear that instead of keeping abreast of developments in Libya, she will again lag behind and thus not succeed in neutralizing the disturbing political effects of any one of the trusteeship formulae for Libya (excepting the Italian for Tripolitania).

item v of agenda

More and more indications have been received that North African Nationalists will make serious attempt this year, supported by Arab League, to present North African case, in toto or in part, to the United Nations General Assembly.

(a) Probability of above?

(b) How will case be prepared and presented?

(c) What will be France’s position?

(d) What should be the position of the U.S.?

It was felt that the Arab League, absorbed by the problem of Palestine, having suffered reverses and having lost some cohesion thereby, will probably not be able to prepare and present a North African case at the September 1948 General Assembly Session. The Conference agreed, however, that this probable delay is accidental in nature and should not be interpreted as an indication of any lessening of the long-term Arab League interest in the North African situation, nor of any lessening in the determination of the North African political leaders to bring their case to the United Nations through a member state of the Arab League. On the contrary, it was felt that perhaps in need of regaining prestige after disposal of the Palestine affair and of finding a popular platform likely to unite Arab opinion and thus strengthen its position throughout the Arab world, the League will then turn to the North African problem with greater interest than shown heretofore.

Because of Azzam Pasha’s (Secretary-General of the Arab League) personal interest in Libya, the Conference was inclined to believe that the Arab League might introduce the issue of Libya separately and prior to any proposal dealing with French North Africa in part or in toto. The Libyan issue, it was felt, could be placed on the Agenda through the provisions of the Peace Treaty with Italy.

The Conference was of the opinion that as matters now stand, Irak or Syria might well be the Arab country to introduce any resolution pertaining to any part of North Africa.

While thus of the opinion that probably the French North African situation or any part thereof would not officially be considered by the General Assembly, it was unanimously agreed that one or, more probably, several unofficial attempts will be made by various North African Nationalist leaders to bring their local situations to the attention of the United Nations delegates at Paris. This unofficial activity was expected to be extensive in view of the proximity of the seat of this General Assembly session, and the relative ease with which North African Nationalist leaders may be expected to travel thereto.

With reference to the manner in which the North African case will be eventually prepared for submission to the General Assembly, the Conference expressed the belief that while the case may be prepared to some extent in a statesmanlike fashion, due to the influence of Azzam Pasha and of the more experienced Arab League leaders, the case as submitted will probably include lengthy demagogic indictments of France’s record in North Africa with numerous exaggerations. The latter assumption is based on the contents and tone of the various memoranda which have already been prepared in Tunisia and Morocco and on their past oral presentations of their case.

In view of the little likelihood of debate occurring in the General Assembly in September, the Conference did not feel it necessary to study at length the position which France will take when faced with the North African problem before the United Nations. In brief, the Conference assumed that France will develop at great length the concrete benefits—hygiene, railroads, roads, harbors, land development, etc.—which she has brought to the area; that she will stress such things as the universal right to vote in Algeria; that she will point up the hunger, poverty and even famine which might follow her withdrawal unless remedied by extensive relief shipments from abroad. Finally, she would certainly emphasize the reforms which she describes herself as anxious to introduce in Morocco and Tunisia, and place great emphasis on the alleged obstructionist tactics of “undemocratic” Nationalist leaders.

The Conference then unanimously agreed, in view of the preceding, that it was still premature to attempt to determine the position of the United States in such a contingency and that the United States position when adopted would have to be largely based on the implementation of an acceptable program of evolution by the French during the intervening period. It was also agreed that international and strategic conditions obtaining at the time of the introduction of the North African situation before the General Assembly might greatly influence the American position, depending on the relative importance at that particular time of the maintenance of public order in North Africa, when compared to our traditional sympathy with the aspirations of dependent peoples for self-rule.

item vi of agenda

Communist activities and objectives in French North Africa. Their relationship with policies and aims in France proper and elsewhere in the French Union. (Item suggested by Mr. Packer.)

In considering Communist activities in French North Africa, the unswerving Communist determination to attain a long-established ultimate goal, regardless of wide and frequent tactical variations, was noted by the Conference.

It was felt that the definition of Communist policy presented last year in connection with Morocco holds true today as it did then for all of North Africa:

“The Conference has grounds to believe, however, that the Communists are striving to achieve the ‘independence of Morocco’ and will support the various Nationalist elements, regardless of social policy and notwithstanding any and all rebuffs which they may receive from these quarters.

“In so doing, the Conference is convinced that the Communists are thus following to the letter the first part of their oft-announced revolutionary program for colonial areas—bringing about the nationalist-bourgeois revolution—and can be expected to complete this program as soon as possible with the second step—the Socialist revolution—upon the completion of the essential first stage.”

It was the sense of the meeting that the past year was one of many rebuffs received from Nationalist leaders throughout the area but that Communist resolution to continue supporting the various Nationalist elements remains unaffected, even though for the immediate present it was felt that the Communists were somewhat at a loss to decide on the most advantageous tack to sail.

The Conference believed that “independence within the French Union”, used in Algeria, less in Morocco, and to an even lesser extent in Tunisia, is the greatest deterrent to Nationalist acceptance of the repeated Communist offers of alliance. It was accepted, however, that this clause is principally intended for Communist propaganda purposes in Metropolitan France where the national psychology makes it specially necessary for the Communist party to masquerade under patriotic colors. (In Morocco it was felt the clause is also intended to placate the French authorities.) Consequently it was believed that this clause—stressed particularly in the case of Algeria because of the century-old presence of France in that part of North Africa—is in fact meaningless and could conceivably in the long run be recognized as such by Moslem Nationalist leaders.

Another deterrent to the rapid growth of the Communist party as such in North Africa is the directing part played by Europeans and Jews in the local Communist parties of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, a fact which cannot be concealed from the Moslem Nationalist leaders, and which arouses their anti-European antagonism.

Notwithstanding the superficially reassuring Communist developments in North Africa during the past year, the Conference unanimously agreed that vigilance should not be relaxed, and recognized the constant threat represented by closely knit, active and relentless Communist parties, even though small, in a part of the world politically immature, prone to schisms and not sufficiently aware of the many deceptive shapes and forms of Moscow-directed international Communist activities.

item vii of agenda

Plans and opportunities for OIE work in French North Africa. (Item suggested by Mr. Packer.)

The Conference first accepted as a basic premise that an OIE program constitutes essentialy an auxiliary tool for implementing an American policy for North Africa, and that in the absence of such a policy an OIE program substantially loses its “raison d’être.” With this basic premise established, the Conference unanimously agreed that as part of the already existing OIE programs beamed on the Arab world, the usefulness of additional broadcasts directed towards North Africa should not be overlooked. In this connection it was pointed out that only a few carefully selected broadcasts should be made in classical Arabic and that most programs should be in Arabic dialects, without omitting the Chleuh tongue spoken exclusively by at least two million Moroccan mountain Berbers.

While it was recognized that the American policy adopted for North Africa would largely govern the composition of the program, it was believed that it would be useful under any circumstances to supply information concerning the United States to North African listeners as well as details concerning the American way of life.

The Conference agreed that the despatch of two public affairs officers with adequate assistants to French North Africa, one to Algiers and one to Tunis, would be eminently desirable to facilitate the implementation of an effective OIE program. Such a program should supplement radio broadcasts with printed material. It was emphasized that this material should be carefully prepared to fit the receptive capacity of the native audience and should be highly pictorial. It was felt that none of our existing magazines fill these specifications and that OIE might consider the publication of a periodical somewhat similar to the Reader’s Digest but illustrated and with a selection of articles specifically written or chosen for Moslem audiences. Selected motion pictures should also be shown to the greatest extent possible. This poses of course the question of adequate equipment.

It was recognized that the French Government would probably seek to oppose in some measure on political grounds such a program and base its argumentation, as it did during the war, on the futility of over-stressing the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms to an audience not yet ready for self-government, and of overstressing the American standard of living, the highest in the world, in an area which even under ideal conditions cannot aspire to supply these standards for generations to come. While it was the sense of the meeting that such French objections should not be permitted to stand in the way of an OIE program for North Africa, it was also felt that great care should be exercised in the selection of competent and properly qualified personnel and in the preparation of the programs so as not to increase needlessly the above-mentioned forms of discontent, more specially if France adopts a program of evolution acceptable to the United States.

1. Appendix I is not printed here, but for the text of the recommendations in the report of June 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. v, p. 691.