840.50 Recovery/10–2748
The Coordinator of Foreign Aid and Assistance (Labouisse) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Nitze)
Dear Paul: This is a preliminary and brief report as to developments on the “French Crisis” paper:
Harriman, Caffery and Bruce all take strong stands that it would be most unfortunate at this time to take the action suggested in the paper. So far as I have been able to judge to date, none of them really disputes the general philosophy underlying the paper, nor do they [Page 671] appear to dispute the fact that some measures will have to be taken by us in the not too distant future if the situation here does not improve. They are as one however, in saying that the present is not the appropriate time.
Harriman, Hoffman and I had a short talk with Secretary Marshall on this point last Friday,1 and the Secretary agreed with Harriman’s view that we should not at this time lay it on the line with the French party leaders as suggested in the paper. It was the general consensus of this meeting that Harriman should have a talk with the British (of course bringing in Lew Douglas) and should generally feel out the situation during the course of the next few weeks.
As Dick Bissell2 will doubtless tell you, he was most upset when he learned of the meeting with Secretary Marshall.…
In order to insure against a possibly garbled version of what happened at the meeting with the Secretary and of the events leading up to it, I believe you should have the following information:
On Thursday afternoon, October 21, Bissell and I saw Harriman, and Bissell outlined the French problem which the joint State–ECA Committee had discussed. Dick presented the case very well. Harriman’s comments did not seem to me to take any real issue with anything Dick had said, except for the fact that he did not think the proposed action should be taken at this time. He went on to comment, however, that he strongly felt the British should be consulted in any event and that it would be undesirable from the point of view of OEEC to cut down the French allocation appreciably. I believe that this is a fair summary of Harriman’s position as then stated. (After the meeting I said to Dick that I thought Harriman’s presentation was a reasonable one, and Dick agreed.)
At the meeting, I told both Harriman and Bissell that I had arranged a meeting for the following morning at 10:30 with Secretary Marshall, at which time I was to brief him preparatory to a possible later meeting with Harriman, Caffery and possibly others.
The next morning, Friday, I was called at 9 o’clock by one of the Secretary’s aides, saying that the Secretary wanted to see me right away. I went immediately to sec him at the Embassy residence, arriving there shortly before 9:30, and found Hoffman and Harriman closeted with him. I do not know, but I assume that Harriman arranged the meeting. When I arrived the Secretary was telling them about his trip to Greece and his recent talks with Sforza. Shortly after my arrival, Harriman raised the question of the French paper, and I then proceeded to tell the Secretary about the Joint State–ECA Committee [Page 672] and its consideration of and views on this particular matter. Harriman then expressed views along the same line he had to me and Bissell the previous afternoon and, although Hoffman may not have made a definite statement that he agreed, I was definitely under the impression that he was fully in accord with Harriman. The Secretary agreed with the Harriman approach.
The meeting then broke up because Hoffman and the Secretary had to leave for other engagements.
I regret that I did not have an opportunity to talk to the Secretary before the meeting with Hoffman and Harriman; also that at the meeting with him there was not as full a discussion as I should have liked. Although I am convinced that the Secretary would concur in the opinions of Caffery, Harriman and Bruce that we should take no action at this time, I would be happier if the whole matter could be discussed with him at greater length to make sure that there is a complete meeting of minds. Accordingly, I hope to be able to arrange another meeting with the Secretary before I leave.
I expect to bring back with me a memorandum responsive to our “French Crisis” paper. This memorandum is under preparation in the Embassy and, I understand, will express the general feelings of Caffery, Harriman and Bruce.
The main point I should like to get over, pending my return, is that no action should be taken by Washington cutting down the French allocation without prior clearance with Paris.
I have written to no one else on this matter, so please make this available to George, Jack and Ben.3
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With best wishes,
Sincerely yours,