711.51/9–2048
Policy Statement of the Department of State
France
a. objectives
US objectives with regard to France are that France should participate in and contribute to efforts toward collective security and general economic recovery, and in particular (1) contribute to the security of the US in the struggle to contain the threat of the USSR and world [Page 652] communism and provide maximum aid for the US political counter offensive; and (2) increase its contribution to the welfare of the Atlantic community of nations. These objectives require that France itself should: (1) be politically, economically, and militarily strong; (2) remain committed to democratic processes of government in the sense understood in the west; (3) orient its foreign policy toward the US and countries in friendly association with the US; (4) contribute its full share to the formation of a more closely integrated western Europe; and (5) bear its full share of responsibility in the United Nations.
The fundamental economic objectives with respect to France and her possession are: (1) to help France achieve rapid economic recovery and to obtain her adherence to the principles and objectives of the Economic Cooperation Act, the Havana Charter (ITO) and other organizations of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations; and (2) to conclude a long-term comprehensive Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with France, applicable to dependent areas under her administration other than French Morocco and Indochina, which areas should be dealt with separately.
b. policy issues
The US regards France as a key country in furthering its over-all objectives for the increased prosperity and economic and political integration of non-Soviet Europe. We hope that developments toward these goals will lead both to domestic stability in the countries of western Europe and to a sense of strength and solidarity which will enable them better to withstand the disruptive efforts of international communism.
With these policies in mind, we wish to give every legitimate encouragement to Europe’s efforts to stand on its own feet and to combine the efforts of several countries toward this end, notably through the OEEC and the Western Union begun with the signature of the Brussels Pact. American support of the OEEC’s work for European recovery and economic cooperation takes the concrete form of aid through ECA and also the form of diplomatic encouragement to the participating countries to expand their common actions in extent and intensity. The President and the Congress have publicly endorsed the idea of regional security pacts and the Brussels Pact in particular. Privately, the US has let the participating governments know that it hopes membership in the Brussels Treaty will be extended to include other natural members of a western European association as rapidly as practicable and that the cautious initial steps toward military, political and economic cooperation will be followed by more radical [Page 653] departures from traditional concepts of national sovereignty. Recognizing that political stability in France depends primarily upon the ability of the government to increase the purchasing power of the the people, the US will continue to urge that all parties in the government subordinate their partisan political interests to the extent that realistic solutions to this most fundamental problem may be found.
1. Political
We will continue our efforts to ensure the stability of the present non-Communist government in France or a successor of the same general complexion. We believe that a majority of the French people prefer a centrist or middle-of-the-road coalition which will least divide the French people and that therefore such a government, if it pursues its task with courage and resolution, gives the greatest promise for France’s economic recovery and political stability.
On the other hand, if such a centrist government fails to find effective means of solving the vital wage-price dilemma, the French people in discouragement and disillusionment with “too much politics” will be tempted to turn to an extremist solution. This gyration would undoubtedly, under existing conditions, be toward the right and, although the progress toward economic recovery made by the middle-of-the-road government in the past year has led many Frenchmen to hope that De Gaulle is not the only alternative to Communism, his return to power is a definite possibility. If the proposed Council of the Republic and cantonal elections this fall go strongly in his favor a band-wagon psychology might easily ensue and De Gaulle might return to power following a dissolution of the Assembly forced by his followers.
Should this occur, the General would demand, and get, a revision of the present constitution giving him greatly enhanced powers. He would, at least for a time, enjoy a large measure of popular support and a docile majority in the Assembly. He would no doubt attempt to include some of the major political figures of the country in his government but would undoubtedly keep in key positions many of his faithful but ill-qualified followers who tend to isolate him from political leaders and political thoughts not concurrent with his views. His stubbornness, disregard for economic, financial and social considerations, mysticism, and strong but hazy ideas of how to govern, coupled with the facts that the final battle with communism would then be joined and that his advent would drive some members of the presently non-communist left into the Communist camp give rise to apprehension in the minds of many Frenchmen as to the ultimate fate of France under his leadership
[Page 654]While it is difficult to forecast accurately the policies which the General would pursue, his past record leads one to believe that he would, as his primary objective, strive to restore French prestige and to promote French leadership on the continent at the same time; continue to fight communism; pursue a more conservative policy than that of the present government in respect to labor and colonial problems; go further than the present government in pressing for guaranties of security against German aggression; continue the present policy of friendship toward the US and participation in the Marshall Plan; and be difficult to deal with.
In view of the foregoing, it is considered important that a middle-of-the-road government continue and that it should be able to rely on the support of the non-communist left and trade union groups. The US can legitimately pursue this aim not only through its foreign aid program but also through personal contacts with leaders of government and opposition groups, through its information program (particularly in efforts to expose the deluding nature of Soviet and Communist propaganda), and through efforts to accommodate the implementation of American policies which affect France so that opposition pressures on the French Government do not make the latter’s position untenable vis-à-vis French public opinion. In this connection, and in all matters affecting France, the US is making a constant effort, which it believes must be continued, to understand the basis of, and make adjustments for, the extreme sensitivity of Frenchmen in postwar international relations.
The US, which desires both a strong and sound France and the advancement toward self-government of dependent peoples, believes that France must implement genuine political reforms in the internal administration of many of its overseas possessions and in their relation with the mother country. It believes that past pledges have so often appeared hollow promises to the native populations that France must promptly institute significant reforms if it is not to lose irrevocably the loyalty and goodwill of native leaders, or even sovereignty over its empire. The story of too little and too late will be disastrous if continued, disastrous both for France and for the native populations, who, unready for complete self-government in most cases, may well be driven to violence that, if unsuccessful, will put back the whole movement toward reform and, if successful, will play into the hands of the well-organized Communist minorities which have been backing the native nationalists.
In implementing this policy with regard to North Africa, the US has already approached top French officials, suggesting that prompt reforms coupled with a time-table for future reforms is a first necessity.1 [Page 655] We now have under consideration a proposal to follow up these representations, in Washington and the North African capitals, as well as in Paris. We do not feel that we should approach Arab leaders until the French have offered them a reform program which can have our endorsement. French Indochina presents an especially acute problem, but one which must be solved along the lines of the general principles laid down above.
We also recognize that there can be no satisfactory future for Europe unless Germany is restored to its normal place in the comity of nations and unless the productive forces of Germany can again play a constructive part in the European economy. At the same time, we recognize that this goal cannot be achieved if the western powers are fundamentally divided in their policies toward Germany, and, in particular, if France is animated more by fearfulness of its own weakness vis-à-vis a revived Germany than by confidence in the strength of a western Europe into which at least western Germany has been integrated.
Since we feel that the security of France is bound up with our struggle against world communism, we expect of the French concrete assistance in furthering our information program so that it may reach the maximum number of Frenchmen and also that it may benefit from facilities which France has the power to put at our disposal for reaching non-French audiences. For example, we are receiving French aid in setting up a relay station at Tangier and expect French cooperation in expanding our information program in French North Africa and Indochina.
2. Economic
There is at present no modern and comprehensive treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation between the US and France and her possessions. In the joint United States-French Declaration on commercial policy of May 28, 1946 France agreed to begin negotiations as soon as possible looking toward the conclusion of such a treaty. Preliminary discussions were held with the French in Paris, extending from the end of March to early May 1948, based on a US draft. Tentative agreement was reached on a number of points, but many issues remain to be settled, including: (1) applicability of the treaty to overseas France; (2) whether commercial provisions paralleling the charter should be retained; and (3) provisions bearing on investment and business corporations. The provisional application by France on January 1, 1948 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was in respect of its metropolitan territory only. The US will press the French to bring [Page 656] about application of the General Agreement in overseas areas as soon as possible.
Recent French court decisions have raised a question as to the validity of the French patents which were not worked in France for three years during the period of The Hague revision of the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. It is the view of the United States that such revocations of patents for non-working are in violation of Article 5 of the International Convention as revised at The Hague in 1925 and at London in 1934 and that France should take the necessary steps to carry out its obligations under the Convention.
It is also our policy to endeavor to maintain the American petroleum companies’ refining and marketing interests and position in the French market on a non-discriminatory and competitive basis. Recent and continuing problems of American oil companies involve extension to them by the French Government of national and non-discriminatory treatment with respect to compensation for war damages, access to local supplies of materials and equipment, availability of a fair share of foreign exchange in the hands of the French Government to purchase materials and equipment abroad which is not obtainable locally, and access to French petroleum resources. Since the world shortage of refining capacity has caused France to receive more than its share of crude oil, we also feel that the French Government should allow some of its refinery production to be exported.
It is our policy to encourage the creation of a Franco-Italian customs union, which has been recommended by a special Franco-Italian commission and approved early in 1948 by the two governments, provided it is achieved in conformity with the provisions of the Havana Charter. This customs union would be an important step towards a possible larger western European customs union, and could lead to a western European economic union. We should keep constantly informed, however, with respect to private controls, such as the agreements between private industries in the two countries for the regulation of importation and distribution of raw materials, specialization of production, and division of export markets proposed in connection with the contemplated customs union, and with respect to agreements between French and British industry, in order to determine the degree to which these may be detrimental to European recovery.
In the field of telecommunications, it is our policy to work in close cooperation with the French Ministry of Posts and Telegraph in the development and implementation of procedures and policies not only for France but for all of Europe. As France is one of the key countries in European communications, joint efforts are essential to achieve a [Page 657] well-balanced and coordinated European communications system. In our view any international aviation policy implemented independently by France, the US and UK, and to a lesser extent the other major civil aviation powers, has little or no chance for success unless that policy is based upon a general area of agreement between those powers. We have viewed with growing concern recent developments which may indicate that France is veering away from the general agreement among the three major powers designed to promote the Bermuda concept as the basis for the conduct of air transport relations between states.
c. relations with other states
In general the UK may be expected to second our policies with regard to France. Its alliance with France signed in 1947, and the two countries’ membership in the OEEC and the Western Union, indicate that Britain also desires the friendship, stability, and prosperity of a westward-oriented France. In general, British policy toward Germany is closer to our own than to France’s, so that we can count on British support in bringing France around to our policy. Very close ties exist between the leaders of the British Labor Party and the French Socialist Party, but this relationship cannot be counted on to be decisive with the latter in all matters.
Soviet policy toward France is a major element opposing our objectives. Soviet efforts to divide and weaken western Europe, first of all through disrupting ERP, find one of their principal targets in France. The USSR has the unswerving aid of the powerful French Communist Party, with the largest bloc of seats in the National Assembly, control of the largest trade union federation, a powerful press, and trained para-military units. The edge of this weapon is currently somewhat blunted. The Communists are out of the government, isolated in parliament on most issues, no longer in control of many key municipalities, and unable to provide funds for prolonged major strikes. Nevertheless, the government’s parliamentary majority is so slim and so dependent upon both the Socialists, who are torn by dissensions on many current issues, and the votes of the various minor parties, that the Communists still hold a real threat over the government. The wage-price problem is currently the key issue in France, and the real difficulties of the working class give the Communists a powerful leverage over the non-Communist left.
The Franco-Soviet alliance has never been of benefit to France, and the French are now so thoroughly aroused against the disruptive forces let loose by the USSR that the alliance has no detrimental effects on French cooperation with US policy. The Soviet policy of centralization [Page 658] in Germany frightens the non-Communist French, who fear a Communist Germany allied to Russia even more than a merely strong nationalist Germany. Nevertheless, this fear has not yet convinced most Frenchmen that the implementation of US policy of opposing Soviet ambitions with regard to Germany is particularly effective.
Pressure from the left in the French Government caused France to close the Franco-Spanish border from March 1946 to March 1948. It also caused the government to permit the Spanish “Government in exile” to reside in France and to oppose admission of Spain to the first Marshall Plan conference in July 1947. Despite continuing Socialist pressure, however, the French Government has recently concluded a commercial agreement with Spain and the present trend is toward continuing improvement of relations between the two countries. In this respect French policy resembles our own, i.e., the rate of resumption of normal relations will depend on the degree of democratic reform which the Franco Government will put into effect. Strategic considerations naturally also affect the desire to return to closer ties.
Relations between France and Italy have tended to become increasingly cordial since the cessation of hostilities, thanks in great part to the efforts of the two foreign ministers. While such gestures of amity as the French consenting to a rectification of the frontier established in the Tenda–Briga area in favor of Italy, allowing the Italians to retain twenty-three of the warships which were to be turned over to France under the terms of the peace treaty, the Trieste declaration, etc., were inspired in part by a determination to help the anti-communist forces in Italy, results have been edifying. The two countries are now studying, although with considerable hesitation on the French side, the possibilities of a customs union.
d. policy evaluation
No American policy toward France can be successful that does not increase France’s self-confidence and give the French confidence in the US. In the present state of international tension, France’s best efforts are not forthcoming because of the ever-present cloud of fear that the USSR may launch a military offensive that will overrun France before outside aid can arrive. The US must convince the French that our policies are those best calculated to protect the western democracies against Soviet aggression.
Present US policy has made progress toward restoring French confidence through the ECA, the “Vandenberg Resolution,” the President’s statement approving the Brussels Pact, and the security clauses in the London agreements on Germany. Nevertheless, our policy has not yet succeeded in wholly calming the nerves of the French who fear [Page 659] that American “boldness” may result in a war in which Russia would not be defeated until after French civilization had been destroyed under Soviet occupation and communist oppression. In consequence, it will be necessary to keep our policy, especially military, under review with a view to strengthening France both materially and psychologically as much and as quickly as our capacity and sound strategic concepts will permit.
In addition to the restoration of French confidence, our policies must aid in the solution of the government’s and the country’s economic problems. The US is currently doing everything along this line that can be done by it directly. It has not, however, succeeded in getting France and the other European states to contribute their full measure of self-help, particularly in the matter of the economic integration of Europe. The US must, therefore, constantly seek new ways of guiding France and the other countries of western Europe toward greater economic and political integration.