740.00119 Control (Germany)/8–1748
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
The Ambassador1 called at his request in connection with the report of Generals Clay,2 Robertson3 and Koenig4 on dispositions to be taken by the Allied Forces in Germany in the event of an emergency. His Government had two preliminary requests to make. It understood that the British and US Governments would consider the report in the Combined Chiefs of Staff and if this was correct the French wished to participate in any considerations of it by the Combined Chiefs. The second request was that the three governments, individually and together, consider the report as quickly as possible.
I said that I would check to make sure that no meeting of the Combined Chiefs was contemplated but that it had not met for at least two years and that I doubted that any meetings were contemplated. One reason it has been allowed to lapse was that it complicated our relations with other countries. To admit any other country, as we had been under great pressure to do during the War, would have opened the gates to others and a War could not be run by a sort of international parliament. I also said that after the report had been considered separately by the three national Chiefs of Staffs it might well be considered by the permanent Military Committee in London since it would be impossible properly to plan dispositions east of the Rhine except in connection with plans for dispositions west of it. I said that I would also check on this point and let him know tomorrow. He agreed not to telegraph his Government until I communicated these two answers to him.
He said that he himself had the impression that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were not functioning but that his Government suspected that it was. It would be helpful to remove these suspicions.
He said that although he had not intended to raise the matter, his Government would attach three conditions to its acceptance of a North Atlantic Security arrangement. One was a satisfactory agreement on the report of the Commanders in Chief in Germany. The second would [Page 644] be immediate US assistance in rearmament of the French forces. The third was assurance that in the event of war in Europe the US would send ground forces to help in the defense of France.