859B.20/2–1248: Telegram
The Ambassador in Denmark (Marvel) to the Secretary of State
137. I deferred conversation on Greenland (Deptel 64, February 2)1 pending receipt memorandum of conversation January 29 which has not yet been received. However, last evening Foreign Minister2 opened discussion in view his concern over turn of events as result of Kauffmann conversation and my planned departure on leave tomorrow.
Foreign Minister outlined memorandum of conversation he had received from Kauffmann. He said latter has not been instructed to bring up Greenland and apparently had done so on his own initiative. Kauffmann had been informed of thinking here along lines expressed in mytel 772, November 153 and mydes 375, November 17,4 namely, negotiations would be undertaken with view of discussing Greenland operations piecemeal, first, weather stations, then navigational aids, then naval installations and air bases, such discussions to continue over period of time with gradual assumption of these operations by Denmark. Foreign Minister pointed out Denmark desired to be able publicly to announce from time to time assumption of these responsibilities and he emphasized if such program were agreed upon Denmark had no intention to serve notice of terminating 1941 treaty.
Foreign Minister said it was extremely difficult for Denmark to enter into new treaty giving bases in Greenland outright to US as such would be military alliance which might provoke occupation of Denmark by USSR. He further said if formal proposals were handed to [Page 587] Kauffmann as contemplated by January 29 conversation, the “character of which” Kauffmann reported he did not know, they might be such that Denmark would be required to give the one-year’s notice of termination provided by 1941 treaty. Consequently he requested me to prevail upon Department to refrain from delivering to Kauffmann any formal document at this time. I assured him I would make this request.
Further discussion brought out Rasmussen’s flat assurance, which he stated had been authorized by Hedtoft, that if US would arrange for removal of refugees from Denmark and south Slesvig, Denmark would agree to US having right of access, inspection, giving of technical advice and equipment to all installations in Greenland. He pointed out world and particularly Russians know little about Greenland, that so long as Denmark could say it has no military alliance and it exercises complete control over Greenland, practical arrangements for maintaining facilities, including air bases, can be devised between Denmark and US. He stated that payments, as suggested under so-called Manus Island plan,5 would not be feasible since payments would become know and immediately labeled as military alliance.
Consequently I recommend no document be handed Kauffmann and further conversations with him be deferred pending consideration mydesps 436 and 45, February 10 [and 11, respectively].
- This telegram, not printed, reported the conversation of January 29 between Mr. Lovett and Ambassador Kauffmann, supra. ↩
- Gustav Rasmussen.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. iii, p. 685.↩
- Not printed.↩
- The plan referred to here was presumably a postwar suggestion by the United States to Australia, since withdrawn, which envisioned a minimum 99-year period of joint rights of use of the island base, coupled with a procedure by which the United States could at its discretion assume temporary control at its own expense.↩
- Not printed.↩