840.20/3–848
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State
The Problem.
How this Government can effectively assist, apart from ERP, in stopping further expansion of the area of Communist dictatorship in Europe.
Discussion.
The existing situation in Europe contains two dangers: (1) that the Soviet Government underestimates the present temper of Congress and the American people and may accordingly push its expansionist tactics beyond the point of forceful American reaction, and (2) that too many people in the remaining free countries will be intimidated by the Soviet colossus and the absence of tangible American support to the point of losing their will to resist. Concrete evidence of American determination to resist further Communist encroachment would go far to reduce both dangers.
Assuming that the Soviet Government has no present desire for war, it appears to be counting on the slowness and uncertainty of American reaction, particularly during an election year, to extend its area of control as far and perhaps as fast as possible before meeting serious resistance. The greatest present danger lies in the Soviet Government mistakenly believing that it could safely take some particular action which in fact this country would not stand. An empty bluff on our part or failure to make clear the extent of this country’s determination would be equally culpable and dangerous.
The easy success of the Communists in Czechoslovakia and the probable outcome of the Finnish crisis, while opening some eyes to the dangers of any dealings with the Communists, have created widespread fear and a certain bandwagon psychology, particularly in the crucial non-Communist left. Italy, with its impending elections, is the critical spot at the moment, but French stability is far from assured and the country is now in a highly nervous state. The same is true of Austria. A general stiffening of morale in free Europe is needed, and it can come only from action by this country.
The problem at present is less one of defense against overt foreign aggression than against internal fifth-column aggression supported by the threat of external force, on the Czech model. An essential element in combatting it is to convince non-Communist elements that friendly external force comparable to the threatening external source [Page 41] is available. Absence of any sign of friendly external force was undoubtedly a major factor in the limp Czech collapse. Willingness to fight for liberty is closely related to the strength of the help available.
Bevin has recognized our difficulty in committing United States forces in advance to operate in Europe but believes that, if the United States were able to enter with Great Britain into a general commitment to go to war with an aggressor, potential victims would feel sufficiently reassured to refuse to embark on a fatal policy of appeasement.
No security arrangement for Europe can be effective unless the free European governments and peoples are prepared to pool their resources and to resist by every means at their disposal, including armed force, any threat to the independence of any member whether from within or without. A substantial start is being made in the present Anglo-French-Benelux negotiations. On the other hand, the willingness of this Government to participate in or support such an arrangement is essential to its success and will enormously increase European confidence that it is possible to prevent extension of the area of dictatorship and worthwhile to fight if necessary to prevent it.
It is realized that the state of United States defenses severely limits our immediate military capabilities. It is believed, however, that steps along the lines recommended below would help to crystallize public opinion in support of UMT and facilitate further action to strengthen our military forces.
Recommendations.
That the Secretary ask the President immediately to confer first with the National Security Council and then with Congressional leaders on the steps this Government can take to check the further spread of Communist dictatorship by contributing to the security and confidence of free European nations. Consideration of this subject would include:
- (1)
- The magnitude and nature of the military commitments this Government is in a position to assume with respect to Europe;
- (2)
- What steps we can take to deter further fifth-column aggression on the Czech model, including a possible public declaration that this Government considers that any further suppression of free countries in Europe would be a direct threat to its own security and that it is accordingly prepared to cooperate with such free European governments as demonstrate their determination to act in the common defense, in utilizing every means at its disposal, including armed force, to prevent further Communist expansion and to this end to maintain continuous consultation with such Governments on the measures to be taken;
- (3)
- The possibility of U.S. participation in a NorthAtlantic–Mediterranean regional defense arrangement based on Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter and including initially Great Britain, France, Benelux and Italy.
- (4)
- Advising Bevin and Bidault that if they really mean business the Secretary would be glad to consult with them, and perhaps with Sforza1 and a Benelux representative, either in Washington or in Europe immediately after the March 15 CEEC meeting.
- (5)
- The necessity of keeping a security program separate from, although parallel and related to, ERP to avoid driving the Scandinavians, Swiss and possibly others out of ERP.
- Count Sforza, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.↩