Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

501.BD Europe/12–2748: Circular airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices ¹

confidential

Washington, December 27, 1948—8:05 a. m.

A number of questions have arisen from time to time on the relationship between the work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe with headquarters in Geneva and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation with headquarters in Paris. In order to clarify this relationship and to explain the reasons for continued U.S. support of the ECE, the following summary of the views of the Department and the ECA has been prepared, based upon recent exchanges of telegrams between Mr. Porter’s staff in Geneva, Mr. Harriman’s staff in Paris and the Department and the ECA. It is being circulated for the information and guidance of U.S. diplomatic and ECA Missions in the European countries which are members of either or both organizations.

1. The OEEC and the ECE need not and should not be competitive organizations. The OEEC is, of course, the agency which must assume the major responsibility for strengthening the economies of Western Europe and for bringing about closer economic integration among these countries. Composed as it is of countries which have publicly stated their mutual intention of attaining common goals, and as the organization which recommends to the ECA the division of U.S. assistance among the countries participating in the ERP, it is obviously in a strong position to bring about real measures of economic cooperation among its member countries. The ECE, although its powers are merely recommendatory and its membership includes six countries of Eastern Europe who have openly stated their opposition to the Recovery Program can, nevertheless, serve to complement the OEEC in a number of important fields.

2. Although the Eastern European countries have already begun and will undoubtedly continue to use the ECE as a sounding board for attacks on the European Recovery Program, the United States export license policy, etc., it is believed that there are a number of important reasons which outweigh these disadvantages and warrant continued U.S. support for the Commission. These are summarized in paragraphs 3–6 below.

3. The ECE can perform a useful function by obtaining information on Eastern European availabilities and requirements and by facilitating exchanges under which Eastern Europe will provide goods which are essential to Western recovery, e.g., the provision of timber in return for timber equipment, foodstuffs for fertilizer and agricultural machinery, coal for mining machinery. In addition, during the period when quality coal remains in short supply, the ECE is obviously in a better position to recommend allocations than the OEEC which would presumably be unable to obtain the necessary cooperation of the Poles.

4. The OEEC can probably utilize its resources most effectively if it concentrates on those problems which only it can handle or which it can deal with much more effectively than other organizations. A number of other functions which contribute directly to success of the Recovery Program by strengthening and rationalizing the economies of the participating countries can be performed by the ECE and perhaps other U.N. bodies. For example, agreements on reduction in frontier regulations now hampering the free movements of goods, the standardization of railroad cars and equipment are types of measures which are highly desirable and which can be performed without disadvantage and in some cases with positive advantage in a forum which includes Eastern European countries. Furthermore, were functions such as these to be transferred to the OEEC, there is real danger that the result would be to curtail other work of that organization more fundamental to the strengthening and unifying of the economy of Western Europe.

5. Since the long-term objective of the United States and of the Western European countries is to force Russia to withdraw to her own frontiers and to encourage a free Eastern Europe to establish close political, economic, and social ties with a strengthened and unified Western Europe, it is desirable even at the present time for the United States and the Western powers to maintain such links with Eastern Europe as will contribute to the long-term objective of Western Europe. The ECE at the technical level has shown that it can provide a useful link with the Poles and Czechs and to a lesser extent with the Yugoslavs.

6. Another strong reason for continued support of the ECE is the importance of operating within the United Nations framework wherever possible. The United States Government is publicly committed to this principle. Furthermore, other OEEC countries, in particular the Scandinavian countries, are anxious to demonstrate that they are not “by-passing” the UN by their participation in the ERP. Since the ECE is regarded by many as one of the most successful UN bodies in the economic field, any indication that the United States was attempting to circumscribe the activities of the Commission or was itself pulling out from the Commission would almost certainly have unfortunate repercussions on public opinion in this country, in the Economic and Social Council, and in the General Assembly.

7. It is neither necessary nor desirable to lay clown for the future a hard and fast division of functions as between the ECE and the OEEC. Each case will have to be decided on its own merits in the light of changing circumstances. As a general rule, work which is now being performed by the ECE, for example the work of the Coal Committee and the work of the Transport Committee, to the general satisfaction of the United States and the OEEC countries should continue to be performed by the Commission. Normally, new work should be undertaken in the ECE only if the U.S. and the OEEC countries are convinced that participation by the Eastern European countries would be of real benefit, or if the work could not be undertaken by the OEEC without impeding other more important work and is work in which the participation of Eastern European countries is of little importance. The United States and the OEEC countries should be alert to avoid the undertaking by the ECE of any work which might weaken the OEEC. It is clearly important that the OEEC countries and ourselves have a common approach to important questions coming before the Commission and that there be a general understanding among the OEEC countries of the role of the ECE. Finally, our policy with respect to the ECE will have to be kept under constant review and our support reconsidered at any time it appears that the Commission is no longer able to play a useful part in the economic reconstruction of Europe.

Lovett

1. This airgram was sent to 24 European posts.