840.50 Recovery/3–848
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
It would be most undesirable to include in one omnibus bill (1) ERP, (2) economic aid for China, (3) funds to prevent disease and unrest in the Western zone of Trieste, (4) funds to prevent disease and unrest in the bizonal area of Germany, (5) military aid to Greece and Turkey and (6) a blanket authorization to the President to give military supplies to any country.
It is understood that the legislative situation is such that the presentation of such a bill might delay the enactment of the ERP legislation, since the Senate has no such bill before it and lengthy hearings might be necessary. Any substantial delay in the passage of ERP legislation would have the most serious effects in Europe, not only the economic situation in a number of countries but more especially on the political situation, particularly in Italy which is now the critical point in view of the all-out Communist drive to win the April 18 elections. A separate memorandum on the effects of delay in ERP has been prepared.1
Secondly, the inclusion of ERP in a bill which also dealt with military aid, both to Greece and Turkey and in a general way to any country, would inevitably link ERP to potential military action against the Soviet Union or its agents. This would change the whole [Page 391] emphasis of ERP from a program to promote positively European recovery to a program of defense against Soviet aggression. While economic recovery and the concomitant closer integration of Western Europe have, of course, the effect of strengthening the defenses against the Communist offensive, it is only because of the positive recovery emphasis that certain countries, notably Sweden and Switzerland have been participants. It is to be doubted that they would remain in the ERP if it were linked to a potential military program. In that case, we would have engineered a break in the front of non-Communist European cooperation.
The political value of the authorization to make military aid available is recognized and its existence would undoubtedly strengthen the resistance of non-Communist forces throughout Europe. As a separate measure it would constitute an independent US action which would strengthen our position and our foreign policy. It is the linking of this military provision with the economic recovery program in the same legislation that appears unwise as a matter of policy. Of course, there is the danger that if the military aid legislation were proposed and defeated in Congress, the effect would be to weaken our position more than if it had never been proposed. Accordingly, a careful evaluation of its prospects seems necessary.
There is some doubt as to whether a military aid authorization should be linked to any economic aid program, even those for Trieste and the occupied areas. Any serious delay in the Trieste appropriations or those for the occupied areas would have very dangerous consequences.
- Not found in Department of State files.↩