840.20/12–3148
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)
| Participants: | Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne, Ambassador of Norway |
| John D. Hickerson, Director for European Affairs | |
| Theodore C. Achilles, Chief, WE | |
| Benjamin M. Hulley, Chief, NOE |
The Ambassador came in at my request to discuss the aide-mémoire on the proposed North Atlantic Pact which he handed to me December 29. I explained the present status of the matter as follows.
The background and early development of the exploratory conversations looking toward conclusion of a North Atlantic Security Treaty were explained in my oral message of September 22 [23].1
Late in October the Governments of Canada and of the Parties to the Brussels Treaty advised the United States Government that they were agreed in principle on the desirability of concluding such a treaty. Subsequent exploratory talks have resulted in steady progress toward concrete proposals for a treaty following closely the lines indicated in the oral message of September 22. In these talks it was recommended, and the recommendation is now being considered by the seven Governments, that Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Norway and Portugal be sounded out as to their willingness to consider participating as original signatories of the treaty and that, if they were prepared in principle to do this, they be invited to participate in the definitive drafting of the terms of the pact. The other representatives proposed, and the United States representatives agreed, that the United States Government should be responsible both for extending such invitations at the appropriate time and for keeping these Governments generally informed.
The treaty envisaged would be within the framework of the United Nations Charter. It would be designed to fortify and preserve the common heritage of the parties and to increase the security of the North Atlantic area. It is hoped that the treaty would serve this purpose by:
- (1)
- Making war less likely through confronting any possible aggressor with evidence of collective determination to resist attack on any party;
- (2)
- Providing for continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid in order better to assure the security of the area;
- (3)
- Prodding for consultation on the request of any party in the event of a threat to or breach of the peace;
- (4)
- Providing that, in the event of an armed attack on any party within the area, all the parties would take such action as might be necessary to restore and assure the security of the area; and
- (5)
- Providing for consultative machinery, both political and military, and in which each party would be represented, to facilitate its implementation.
There would thus be a definite obligation to contribute toward the collective defense of the area both before and after an armed attack had occurred by the provision of assistance in keeping with the resources and geographic location of each party. This would not necessarily involve in every case a declaration of war in the event of an armed attack on another party to the treaty and, indeed, the treaty would not provide that any country automatically declare war in such a contingency. In democratic countries declaration of war is, of course, a parliamentary prerogative. Moreover, some cases it might be more advantageous to the security of the area as a whole if certain countries did not become involved in war unless directly attacked.
It is hoped that the definitive drafting of the treaty can be undertaken soon enough to permit its final conclusion early in February. We should be glad to receive orally and informally any views which the Norwegian Government may wish to express concerning the form and timing of an official approach concerning this matter.
Similar approaches will shortly be made to each of the Governments named above. The relationship of Italy to the proposed pact is still being studied and that Government is accordingly not being approached at this time. No corresponding approach to the Swedish Government is contemplated. Should that Government, however, desire to become a party to such a treaty its participation would undoubtedly be welcomed.
I told him that I had planned to give him this explanation next week as well as to the other four countries whose adherence had been suggested. However, in view of his aide-mémoire I was glad to supply it now to assist him. We would give similar information to the other prospective participants next week although the methods might vary. The Draft Treaty, the essence of which I had outlined to him, had been sent to the other six Governments participating in the talks for their approval as a tentative draft. As our own Government had not approved it there would have to be careful briefing of Congressional leaders in both parties, and the approval of the President must also be obtained.
To supplement the above information I said I would reply as far as is possible at the present to the specific questions posed in his [Page 350] aide-mémoire. He would realize that more definite replies simply could not be furnished at this time. I then read each of his questions and commented on each along the following lines.
- (1)
- The proposal has been made that the North Atlantic Treaty have the same duration as the Brussels Treaty, namely, fifty years. The United States representatives had contemplated some shorter period such as 12 or 20 years, but have expressed no fixed opinion. The question remains open.
- (2)
- I have already answered this question. I should add that the United States does not contemplate guaranteeing anyone.
- (3)
- Conclusion of the Pact would not of itself imply any commitment on the part of any party to furnish military equipment to any other party. However, if a satisfactory treaty is concluded, it is intended to seek legislation authorizing transfer of military supplies and equipment to foreign governments. It is contemplated that the bill would provide requisite priority for implementation of coordinated defense programs formulated under collective defense arrangements in which the United States participates (the North Atlantic Pact). Such programs would be based on “continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid,” each participant contributing what it most effectively can.
- (4)
- See answer to question (3). Some United States material of certain types will be available for transfer in implementation of such programs immediately after passage of such legislation; other types of material will have to be manufactured. Allocation of such material remains to be determined.
- (5)
- See answer to question (3). The British Government might well be asked about this by Norway.
- (6)
- The first part of the question has been answered. The answer to the second part is “No”. What facilities in what countries may in the future be deemed desirable to enhance the security of the North Atlantic area can only be determined in the future by the consultative machinery envisaged.
- (7)
- In the view of this Government denial to any aggressor of the territory or waters of any party is of strategic importance to every other party.
I asked if he wanted to put any further questions in order to meet the requirements of his Government. He asked whether the United States would be able to come immediately to the defense of Norway if attacked, in view of our Constitutional restriction to Congress of the power to declare war. I replied that he was, as he knew, getting into a delicate question, but that we envisaged the Pact as a coordinated whole designed primarily to make war less likely by the very existence of the Pact; secondarily, further to decrease the likelihood of attack by increasing the strength of the parties, and only thirdly to cover action should an attack nevertheless occur. He asked whether the Norwegian Government, if it desired to partake in the talks, would be committed to membership in the Pact. I said that no nation would be [Page 351] committed until it had signed and ratified the treaty. He asked how soon Norway might participate if it found that it wished to. I said I thought the appropriate time would be in the next stage, which should be reached in about a week, after the participating Governments, including our own, had signified their approval of the Draft Treaty as a tentative document for further consideration and amendment by the Governments which had already discussed it as well as those which might join.
I expressed regret that Mr. Lovett had had to go home in the middle of the afternoon because of his cold and would therefore be unable to see the Ambassador. He said he understood quite well.
The Ambassador seemed pleased with the material he had received and hastened off to instruct Nielsen2 who is taking the midnight train for New York, and will fly January 1 to Oslo.